Philosophy for AS and A Level

Michael Lacewing is a teacher of philosophy and theology at Christ’s Hospital school, and a former Reader in Philosophy and Vice-Principal Academic at Heythrop College, University of London. He is founder of the company A Level Philosophy (www.alevelphilosophy.co.uk), and advises the British Philosophical Association on matters related to philosophy in schools.

'Michael Lacewing writes in an engaging way and really brings the A-Level philosophy syllabus to life; he focuses not only on the content but on the philosophical method itself. An essential read for any A-Level philosophy student'.Cressida Tweed, teacher of philosophy at Woodhouse College and Lead philosophy tutor at the National Extension college, UK.

• ContentsPermissions Introduction How to use this book How to do philosophy Following the syllabus Additional features Using the anthology Glossary Companion website and further resources Acknowledgements 1 How to do philosophy Philosophical argument Deductive argument Inductive argument Hypothetical reasoning Understanding arguments and argument maps Evaluating arguments Evaluating claims An aside: why reason? Fallacies Reading philosophy Approaching the text Engaging with the text Beyond the text Writing philosophy What you need to know Planning an essay Writing an essay A standard essay structure General advice 2 Epistemology I. What is knowledge? A. Knowledge and its definitionTypes of knowledgePropositional knowledgeThe definition of knowledgeThe purpose and nature of definitionCan propositional knowledge be defined?Key points: knowledge and its definition B. The tripartite view The tripartite definition of knowledge Why justified true belief?Thinking harder: A note on certaintyAre the conditions individually necessary? Justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge Truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge Belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge Gettier’s objection: are the conditions jointly sufficient? Key points: the tripartite view C. Responses Add a ‘no false lemmas’ condition (J+T+B+N) Infallibilism Thinking harder: rejecting the argument for infallibilism Reliabilism (R+T+B) Truth and the third conditionVirtue epistemology (V+T+B) Zagzebski’s analysis of knowledgeKey points: Responses Summary: What is knowledge? II. Perception as a source of knowledge A. Direct realism The argument from perceptual variation Responses The argument from illusion Thinking harder: the argument from hallucinationThe disjunctive theory of perception The time-lag argument Thinking harder: direct realism and openness Key points: direct realism B. Indirect realism What are sense-data? Why indirect realism?Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities Scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects The existence of the external world is the best hypothesis Two supporting arguments Thinking harder: the existence of mind-independent objects is not a hypothesis Representation, resemblance and the nature of physical objects Berkeley’s argument that mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects Key points: indirect realism C. Berkeley’s idealism Berkeley on primary and secondary qualities Berkeley on secondary qualitiesBerkeley’s attack on the primary/secondary quality distinctionThe immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects Three arguments against mind-independent objectsBerkeley’s ‘master’ argument Idealism and GodThinking harder: idealism and the cause of our perceptions Issues with Berkeley’s idealism Problems with the role played by God in Berkeley’s idealismArguments from illusion and hallucinationIdealism leads to solipsismKey points: Berkeley’s idealism Summary: perception as a source of knowledge III. Reason as a source of knowledge Rationalism, empiricism and innatismA priori/a posteriori knowledgeAnalytic/synthetic propositionsNecessary/contingent truthDefining rationalism, empiricism and innatismKey points: rationalism, empiricism and innatismA. InnatismTwo arguments for innate knowledgePlato’s slave boy argumentLeibniz on knowledge of necessary truthsLocke’s arguments against innate knowledgeLeibniz’s response to Locke Thinking harder: experience triggers innate knowledge Alternative empiricist accounts Locke’s argument against innate conceptsRejecting Locke’s definition of ‘innate concept’Leibniz’s defence of innate concepts The mind as a ‘tabula rasa’ Locke’s two sources of concepts Hume on impressions and ideas Simple and complex concepts Issues with the empiricist theory of conceptsThinking harder: challenging the copy principle Leibniz on ‘intellectual ideas’ Thinking harder: the concept of substance DiscussionKey points: innatismB. The intuition and deduction thesis Rationalism and empiricism revisitedThe meaning of ‘intuition’ and ‘deduction’ Empiricist alternativesHume’s forkDescartes’ theory of rational intuitionThe cogitoClear and distinct ideasEmpiricist responses to the cogitoClear and distinct ideas and GodDescartes’ Trademark argumentThinking harder: degrees of realityEmpiricist responses to the Trademark argumentDescartes’ cosmological argumentEmpiricist responses to Descartes’ cosmological argumentDescartes’ ontological argumentEmpiricist responses to Descartes’ ontological argumentDescartes’ proof of the external worldThe concept of a physical objectThinking harder: The existence of physical objectsEmpiricist responses to Descartes’ proof of the external worldKey points: the intuition and deduction thesis Summary: reason as a source of knowledge IV. The limits of knowledge A. Philosophical scepticism The particular nature of philosophical scepticismAm I a brain in a vat?The distinction between philosophical scepticism and normal incredulity Local and global scepticismDescartes’ sceptical argumentsKey points: philosophical scepticismB. Responses to scepticism Descartes’ own responseEmpiricist responsesThinking harder: Direct realismThinking harder: ReliabilismKey points: responses to scepticismSummary: the limits of knowledge3 Moral Philosophy I. Normative ethical theories A. Utilitarianism Bentham’s quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism ‘The Principle of Utility’ ‘Measuring Pleasure and Pain’ Mill on utilitarianismMill’s qualitative hedonistic utilitarianismIs pleasure the only good? Smart on hedonistic and non-hedonistic utilitarianismNozick’s experience machinePreference utilitarianism Mill’s ‘proof’ of utilitarianismStage 1: Happiness is goodStage 2: Only happiness is goodIssues for (act) utilitarianism Problems with calculation Fairness, individual liberty and rights Partiality Moral integrity and the individual’s intentions Rule utilitarianism Smart on rule utilitarianismRule utilitarianism developedObjections Key points: utilitarianismB. Kantian deontological ethics DeontologyKant’s account of the good will and duty The good willThe distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting out of dutyThinking harder: The good will againThe categorical imperativeHypothetical and categorical imperativesThinking harder: Contradiction in conception and contradiction in willThe second formulation of the Categorical Imperative Issues for Kantian deontological ethics Universalisability and morality Conflicts between dutiesThe view that consequences of actions determine their moral value Morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives The value of certain motives Key points: Kantian deontological ethics C. Aristotelian virtue ethics The good for human beingsEudaimonia Final ends The function argument Testing the analysis Thinking harder: the rational ‘soul’Aristotle’s account of virtuesVirtues as character traits Virtues, the doctrine of the mean and the importance of feelings The role of education in the development of a moral character Practical wisdom The role of practical wisdom The relation between practical wisdom, virtue and action Key points: Aristotelian virtue ethics (I) Eudaimonia, pleasure and philosophyEudaimonia and pleasureEudaimonia and philosophyVoluntary action, choice and moral responsibilityVoluntary and involuntary actions Choice and deliberation Thinking harder: moral responsibilityJusticeIssues for Aristotelian virtue ethics Guidance on how to act Conflicts between virtues The possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts andvirtuous people in terms of each other Thinking harder: Virtue and eudaimoniaKey points: Aristotelian virtue ethics (II) Summary: normative ethical theoriesII. Applied ethics StealingUtilitarianism Kantian deontology Aristotelian virtue ethics Eating animals Utilitarianism Kantian deontology Aristotle, Diamond and virtue ethics Simulated killing Playing the killer An audience’s perspective Telling lies Utilitarianism Kantian deontology Aristotelian virtue ethics Key points: applied ethics Summary: applied ethics III. Metaethics What is metaethics?The origins of moral principles: reason, emotion/attitudes, or societyThe distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivismKey points: The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism A. Moral realism From cognitivism to moral realism Moral naturalism Utilitarianism as naturalism Thinking harder: naturalism in virtue ethics Moral non-naturalism: Moore’s intuitionismThe naturalistic fallacy The open question argumentThinking harder: is the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ a real fallacy? IntuitionismObjectionsIssues for moral realismA J Ayer’s verification principleThe argument from Hume’s forkHume’s argument from motivationHume’s is-ought gapMackie’s argument from relativityMackie’s arguments from queernessKey points: moral realism B. Moral anti-realism Error theoryNon-cognitivism and moral anti-realismEmotivismEmotivism and subjectivismAyer’s defenceEmotivism after Ayer PrescriptivismPrescriptive meaningGoodMoral language Issues for moral anti-realismCan moral anti-realism account for how we use moral language?Thinking harder: disagreement and moral argument Whether moral anti-realism becomes moral nihilismMoral progress Key points: moral anti-realism Metaethics and applied ethicsSummary: metaethics 4 Preparing for the exam The examination The structure of the exam Assessment objectives Understanding the question: giving the examiners what they are looking for Short-answer questions Nine-mark questions Fifteen-mark questions Revision: it’s more than memory Exam technique: getting the best result you can Revision tips Exam tips Glossary (with Joanne Lovesey) Index by syllabus content Subject index