Talbot Brewer is in the philosophy department at the University of Virginia.

• Preface; Acknowledgments; A Difficulty with Kant's Account of Desire; Introduction; I. Kant on Moral Worth an dGoodness of Will; II. Difficulties with Kant's Notion of Moral Worth; III. Moral Worth and Virtue; IV. Specifying Our Reservatio about Kant's Cases; V. Recasting the Groundwork Cases; VI. Kant's Second Critique Thought Experiment; VII. Conclusion; Kantian Virtue, Affects and Rules; Introduction; I. Kantian Virtue and Joyfulness in Dutiful Action; II. Emprical and Intelligible Virtue; III. Affects and Perceptual Salience; IV. The Value of Moral Sensibility; V. The Place of Rules in Moral Sensibility; VI. Two Kinds of Illusions; VII. Desires as Consequences of Past Choices; VIII. Kant's Reductio of Voluntarist Accounts of Responsibility?; Two Conceptions of Commitment; Introduction: Undertaking commitments; I. The Words that Commit Us; II. The Peculiar Case of Consent; III. Commissive Force and Descriptive Truth; IV. Commitments and Social Groups; V. Two Kinds of Social Groups; VI. INternalist Commitment, Integrity and Authority; Special Non-PRomissory Obligations; Introduction; I. Walzer on Obligations and Commitments; II. Internalist and Externalist Commitments; III. Walzer and INternalist Commitments; IV. The Conditions of Ultimate Obligation; V. An Analysis of Special Non-Promissory Obligations; VI. The Radicalism of Internalist Obligations--Ibsen's Nora; Bibliography; Index

Talbot Brewer is in the philosophy department at the University of Virginia.

• Preface; Acknowledgments; A Difficulty with Kant's Account of Desire; Introduction; I. Kant on Moral Worth an dGoodness of Will; II. Difficulties with Kant's Notion of Moral Worth; III. Moral Worth and Virtue; IV. Specifying Our Reservatio about Kant's Cases; V. Recasting the Groundwork Cases; VI. Kant's Second Critique Thought Experiment; VII. Conclusion; Kantian Virtue, Affects and Rules; Introduction; I. Kantian Virtue and Joyfulness in Dutiful Action; II. Emprical and Intelligible Virtue; III. Affects and Perceptual Salience; IV. The Value of Moral Sensibility; V. The Place of Rules in Moral Sensibility; VI. Two Kinds of Illusions; VII. Desires as Consequences of Past Choices; VIII. Kant's Reductio of Voluntarist Accounts of Responsibility?; Two Conceptions of Commitment; Introduction: Undertaking commitments; I. The Words that Commit Us; II. The Peculiar Case of Consent; III. Commissive Force and Descriptive Truth; IV. Commitments and Social Groups; V. Two Kinds of Social Groups; VI. INternalist Commitment, Integrity and Authority; Special Non-PRomissory Obligations; Introduction; I. Walzer on Obligations and Commitments; II. Internalist and Externalist Commitments; III. Walzer and INternalist Commitments; IV. The Conditions of Ultimate Obligation; V. An Analysis of Special Non-Promissory Obligations; VI. The Radicalism of Internalist Obligations--Ibsen's Nora; Bibliography; Index