Troy A. Jollimore is Lecturer at the University of California, Davis.

"This book looks at the connections between personal relationships and theories of ethical behavior, arguing that many such theories simply cannot account for relationships such as friendship, and that such theories should therefore be rejected." -- Troy A. Jollimore, California State University, Chico

• List of Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1. The Objection from Friendship; 2. Agent-neutrality, Agent-relativity, and Consequentialism; 3. Friendship; 4. Preview of the Argument; Chapter 2: Consequentialism and Friendship; 1. The Nature of the Objection; 2. Friendships and Feelings; 3. Differential Ability; Consequentialism and Legitimate Values; 5. Sophisticated Consequentialism; 6. Friendship Without Partiality?; 7. A Friend to Everyone?; 8. Morality and Friendship; Chapter 3: Morality and Its Limits; 1. Introduction; 2. Are Moral Considerations Overriding?; 3. Worries About Morality; 4. Is Morality Everything?; 5. The Defense of Consequentialism; Chapter 4: Agent-Neutrality; 1. Consequentialism Without Maximization; 2. Two Types of Non-Consequentialism; 3. Is the Hybrid Theory Intuitively Plausible?; 4. Restrictions and Integrity; 5. Restrictions and Relativity; 6. Three Objections from Scheffler; 7. Relativity and Subjectivism; Chapter 5: Three Accounts of Agent-Relativity; 1, Introduction; 2. Sen: Relativity of Permissibility; 3. Nagel: Relativity of Reasons; 4. McNaught and Rawling: Relativity of Principles; 5. Moral Reasons, Moral Theories, and Moral Value Rankings; Chapter 6: Agent-Relativity: The Moral Preferability Account: 1. Preferability and Relativity; 2. Agent-Relative Reasons, Principles, and Properties; 3. Agent-Relativistic Consequentialism; 4. The Moral Agent and the Realm of Duty; Bibliography; Index

Troy A. Jollimore is Lecturer at the University of California, Davis.

"This book looks at the connections between personal relationships and theories of ethical behavior, arguing that many such theories simply cannot account for relationships such as friendship, and that such theories should therefore be rejected." -- Troy A. Jollimore, California State University, Chico

• List of Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1. The Objection from Friendship; 2. Agent-neutrality, Agent-relativity, and Consequentialism; 3. Friendship; 4. Preview of the Argument; Chapter 2: Consequentialism and Friendship; 1. The Nature of the Objection; 2. Friendships and Feelings; 3. Differential Ability; Consequentialism and Legitimate Values; 5. Sophisticated Consequentialism; 6. Friendship Without Partiality?; 7. A Friend to Everyone?; 8. Morality and Friendship; Chapter 3: Morality and Its Limits; 1. Introduction; 2. Are Moral Considerations Overriding?; 3. Worries About Morality; 4. Is Morality Everything?; 5. The Defense of Consequentialism; Chapter 4: Agent-Neutrality; 1. Consequentialism Without Maximization; 2. Two Types of Non-Consequentialism; 3. Is the Hybrid Theory Intuitively Plausible?; 4. Restrictions and Integrity; 5. Restrictions and Relativity; 6. Three Objections from Scheffler; 7. Relativity and Subjectivism; Chapter 5: Three Accounts of Agent-Relativity; 1, Introduction; 2. Sen: Relativity of Permissibility; 3. Nagel: Relativity of Reasons; 4. McNaught and Rawling: Relativity of Principles; 5. Moral Reasons, Moral Theories, and Moral Value Rankings; Chapter 6: Agent-Relativity: The Moral Preferability Account: 1. Preferability and Relativity; 2. Agent-Relative Reasons, Principles, and Properties; 3. Agent-Relativistic Consequentialism; 4. The Moral Agent and the Realm of Duty; Bibliography; Index

Troy A. Jollimore is Lecturer at the University of California, Davis.

"This book looks at the connections between personal relationships and theories of ethical behavior, arguing that many such theories simply cannot account for relationships such as friendship, and that such theories should therefore be rejected." -- Troy A. Jollimore, California State University, Chico

• List of Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1. The Objection from Friendship; 2. Agent-neutrality, Agent-relativity, and Consequentialism; 3. Friendship; 4. Preview of the Argument; Chapter 2: Consequentialism and Friendship; 1. The Nature of the Objection; 2. Friendships and Feelings; 3. Differential Ability; Consequentialism and Legitimate Values; 5. Sophisticated Consequentialism; 6. Friendship Without Partiality?; 7. A Friend to Everyone?; 8. Morality and Friendship; Chapter 3: Morality and Its Limits; 1. Introduction; 2. Are Moral Considerations Overriding?; 3. Worries About Morality; 4. Is Morality Everything?; 5. The Defense of Consequentialism; Chapter 4: Agent-Neutrality; 1. Consequentialism Without Maximization; 2. Two Types of Non-Consequentialism; 3. Is the Hybrid Theory Intuitively Plausible?; 4. Restrictions and Integrity; 5. Restrictions and Relativity; 6. Three Objections from Scheffler; 7. Relativity and Subjectivism; Chapter 5: Three Accounts of Agent-Relativity; 1, Introduction; 2. Sen: Relativity of Permissibility; 3. Nagel: Relativity of Reasons; 4. McNaught and Rawling: Relativity of Principles; 5. Moral Reasons, Moral Theories, and Moral Value Rankings; Chapter 6: Agent-Relativity: The Moral Preferability Account: 1. Preferability and Relativity; 2. Agent-Relative Reasons, Principles, and Properties; 3. Agent-Relativistic Consequentialism; 4. The Moral Agent and the Realm of Duty; Bibliography; Index