Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance

LUCIANO ANDREOZZI University of Trento, ItalyMASAHIKO AOKI Stanford University, USALEONARDO BECCHETTI University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', ItalyAVNER BEN-NER University of Minnesota, USABRUCE CHAPMAN University of Toronto, CanadaERNIE ENGLANDER George Washington University, USA BRUNO S. FREY University of Zurich, SwitzerlandALLEN KAUFMAN University of New Hampshire, USALI-WEN LIN University of Illinois, USAMARGIT OSTERLOH University of Zurich, SwitzerlandNOEMI PACE University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', ItalyBIDHAN PARMAR University of Virginia, USALOUIS PUTTERMAN Brown University, USATING REN Peking University, ChinaLYNN A. STOUT University of California, Los Angeles, USAVIKTOR J. VANBERG University of Freiburg, GermanyANDREW WICKS University of Virginia, USACYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS University of Illinois, USAOLIVER E. WILLIAMSON University of California, Berkeley, USAHOSSAM ZEITOUN University of Zurich, Switzerland

• Introduction PART I: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATURE OF THE FIRM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TRANSACTION COSTS, TEAM PRODUCTION AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY Corporate Governance: A Contractual and Organizational Perspective Human-Asset Essentiality and Corporate Social Capital in a Stakeholders-Society Perspective Stakeholder Theory as a Basis for Capitalism Behavioral Economics, Federalism and the Triumph of Stakeholder Theory Specific Investment and Corporate Law PART II: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT AND NORMATIVE RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND CSR Corporate Social Responsibility in a Market Economy: The Perspective of Constitutional Economics A Rawlsian View on CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): The Multi-stakeholder Model of Corporate Governance A Rawlsian View on CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium When Reputation is not Enough: Justifying Corporate Social Responsibility Rational Association and Corporate Responsibility PART III: CSR, REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION The Sustainable Corporation and its Governance: Long Run Performance and Social Responsibility The Role of Standardization, Certification and Assurance Service in Global Commerce PART IV: MODELS OF NON-PURELY SELF-INTERESTED ECONOMIC AGENTS AND THE INTRINISIC MOTIVATION FOR THE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF THE ORGANISATIONS Voluntary Co-determination Produces Sustainable Competitive Advantage Corporate Trust Games in Modern Knowledge Economies Effects of Different Stakeholder Groups' Strategic Control on Organizational Effectiveness and Well-being of Customers and Employees: An Empirical Investigation Trusting, Trustworthiness and CSR: Some Experiments and Implications