Dr Daniel Hucker, Teaching Associate, School of History, University of Nottingham, UK

'This is a richly researched and closely argued book in which issues, personality clashes, party factionalisms, and the evolution of opinion towards firm acceptance of the need to fight Nazism in 1939 are nicely finessed and treated with genuine sensitivity. Daniel Hucker avoids snap judgements, preferring instead to analyse and explain why and how French and British political leaders acted and reacted as they did when confronted with the increasingly desperate circumstances before them. It is an outstanding piece of work and is sure to make an impact.' Martin Thomas, University of Exeter, UK ’Daniel Hucker’s first book is a model of sustained, meticulous research... It is innovative in its recognition of possible connections between the mood of one country and the policy of another; and it is a welcome addition to a corpus of literature that transcends the once-dominant notions of French lethargy and submissiveness.’ English Historical Review 'Hucker has done the scholarly community a service by analysing French and British policymaking in such careful detail and in tandem.' French History 'Daniel Hucker’s monograph is a valuable addition to current literature. Meticulously researched, this work does far more than survey public opinion... [It] has an excellent bibliography and is rich in archival sources, both British and French. It is well written with strong, fluent analysis throughout... his work reveals the links between the unspoken assumptions shaping foreign policy and the diplomatic process itself. Hucker is thus able to illuminate the organic, multi-faceted nature of foreign policy and policy-making in the crucial months prior to the outbreak of World War II.' European History Quarterly 'The scope and depth of Hucker’s research ensures he avoids the easy trap of merely recreating those conclusions on public opinion that contemporary figures cared to record. His study is based upon a meticulous survey of available sources in both Britain and

• Introduction; Chapter 1 The Prelude to Munich; Chapter 2 The Aftermath of Munich, October–December 1938; Chapter 3 Beware the Ides of March, January–March 1939; Chapter 4 Repercussions of the Prague Coup; Chapter 5 Appeasement after Prague; Chapter 6 Public Opinion and the Triple Alliance Negotiations; Chapter 7 From the Nazi-Soviet Pact to War; Chapter 101 Conclusion;

Dr Daniel Hucker, Teaching Associate, School of History, University of Nottingham, UK

'This is a richly researched and closely argued book in which issues, personality clashes, party factionalisms, and the evolution of opinion towards firm acceptance of the need to fight Nazism in 1939 are nicely finessed and treated with genuine sensitivity. Daniel Hucker avoids snap judgements, preferring instead to analyse and explain why and how French and British political leaders acted and reacted as they did when confronted with the increasingly desperate circumstances before them. It is an outstanding piece of work and is sure to make an impact.' Martin Thomas, University of Exeter, UK ’Daniel Hucker’s first book is a model of sustained, meticulous research... It is innovative in its recognition of possible connections between the mood of one country and the policy of another; and it is a welcome addition to a corpus of literature that transcends the once-dominant notions of French lethargy and submissiveness.’ English Historical Review 'Hucker has done the scholarly community a service by analysing French and British policymaking in such careful detail and in tandem.' French History 'Daniel Hucker’s monograph is a valuable addition to current literature. Meticulously researched, this work does far more than survey public opinion... [It] has an excellent bibliography and is rich in archival sources, both British and French. It is well written with strong, fluent analysis throughout... his work reveals the links between the unspoken assumptions shaping foreign policy and the diplomatic process itself. Hucker is thus able to illuminate the organic, multi-faceted nature of foreign policy and policy-making in the crucial months prior to the outbreak of World War II.' European History Quarterly 'The scope and depth of Hucker’s research ensures he avoids the easy trap of merely recreating those conclusions on public opinion that contemporary figures cared to record. His study is based upon a meticulous survey of available sources in both Britain and

• Introduction; Chapter 1 The Prelude to Munich; Chapter 2 The Aftermath of Munich, October–December 1938; Chapter 3 Beware the Ides of March, January–March 1939; Chapter 4 Repercussions of the Prague Coup; Chapter 5 Appeasement after Prague; Chapter 6 Public Opinion and the Triple Alliance Negotiations; Chapter 7 From the Nazi-Soviet Pact to War; Chapter 101 Conclusion;

Dr Daniel Hucker, Teaching Associate, School of History, University of Nottingham, UK

'This is a richly researched and closely argued book in which issues, personality clashes, party factionalisms, and the evolution of opinion towards firm acceptance of the need to fight Nazism in 1939 are nicely finessed and treated with genuine sensitivity. Daniel Hucker avoids snap judgements, preferring instead to analyse and explain why and how French and British political leaders acted and reacted as they did when confronted with the increasingly desperate circumstances before them. It is an outstanding piece of work and is sure to make an impact.' Martin Thomas, University of Exeter, UK ’Daniel Hucker’s first book is a model of sustained, meticulous research... It is innovative in its recognition of possible connections between the mood of one country and the policy of another; and it is a welcome addition to a corpus of literature that transcends the once-dominant notions of French lethargy and submissiveness.’ English Historical Review 'Hucker has done the scholarly community a service by analysing French and British policymaking in such careful detail and in tandem.' French History 'Daniel Hucker’s monograph is a valuable addition to current literature. Meticulously researched, this work does far more than survey public opinion... [It] has an excellent bibliography and is rich in archival sources, both British and French. It is well written with strong, fluent analysis throughout... his work reveals the links between the unspoken assumptions shaping foreign policy and the diplomatic process itself. Hucker is thus able to illuminate the organic, multi-faceted nature of foreign policy and policy-making in the crucial months prior to the outbreak of World War II.' European History Quarterly 'The scope and depth of Hucker’s research ensures he avoids the easy trap of merely recreating those conclusions on public opinion that contemporary figures cared to record. His study is based upon a meticulous survey of available sources in both Britain and

• Introduction; Chapter 1 The Prelude to Munich; Chapter 2 The Aftermath of Munich, October–December 1938; Chapter 3 Beware the Ides of March, January–March 1939; Chapter 4 Repercussions of the Prague Coup; Chapter 5 Appeasement after Prague; Chapter 6 Public Opinion and the Triple Alliance Negotiations; Chapter 7 From the Nazi-Soviet Pact to War; Chapter 101 Conclusion;