John Turri is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Canada. He specializes in epistemology, philosophy of language, experimental philosophy, and cognitive science. He is editor of Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa (2013) and co-editor of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd edition, Wiley, 2013) and Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (2012).

“The author fosters an excellent bridge to the primary sources and presents the material in a way that scarcely could be made more palatable.  Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above.”  (Choice, 1 December 2014)

• Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii1 The best case for skepticism about the external world?(Stroud, “The Problem of the External World”) 12 Proving the external world exists(Or: Let’s all give Moore a hand!)  (Moore, “Proof of an External World”) 63 Some ways of resisting skepticism(Moore, “Four Forms of Scepticism”) 104 Plausibility and possibilities(Moore, “Certainty”) 155 Skeptic on skeptic(Klein, “How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism”) 196 Realism in epistemology(Williams, “Epistemological Realism”) 247 Socratic questions and the foundation of empirical knowledge(Chisholm, “The Myth of the Given”) 318–9 The foundation of empirical knowledge?(Sellars, “Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” and “Epistemic Principles”) 3610 It’s not a given that empirical knowledge has a foundation(BonJour, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”) 4411 Interpretation, meaning and skepticism(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”) 4912 Blending foundationalism and coherentism(Haack, “A Foundherentist Theory of Epistemic Justification”) 5413 Foundationalism, coherentism and supervenience(Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid”) 6014 Infinitism(Klein, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons”) 6715 The Gettier problem(Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”) 7316 Some principles concerning knowledge and inference(Harman, Thought, Selections) 7717 The essence of the Gettier problem(Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”) 8318 Knowledge is an unanalyzable mental state(Williamson, “A State of Mind”) 8519 Closure, contrast and semi-skepticism(Dretske, “Epistemic Operators”) 9220 Closure, contrast and anti-skepticism(Stine, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure”) 9921 Keeping close track of knowledge(Nozick, “Knowledge and Skepticism”) 10322 Moore wins(Sosa, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore”) 11123 The closure principle: dangers and defense(Vogel, “Are There Counter examples to the Closure Principle?”) 11624 Evidentialist epistemology(Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism”) 12325 Non-defensive epistemology(Foley, “Skepticism and Rationality”) 12926 Reliabilism about justification(Goldman, “What Is Justified Belief?”) 13527 Reliabilism: a level assessment(Vogel, “Reliabilism Leveled”) 14128 Against externalism(BonJour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”) 14629 Against internalism(Goldman, “Internalism Exposed”) 15130 A skeptical take on externalism(Fumerton, “Externalism and Skepticism”) 15631 A friendly take on internalism(Feldman and Conee, “Internalism Defended”) 15932 Warrant(Plantinga, “Warrant: A First Approximation”) 16433 Intellectual virtues(Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind) 16934 Virtue epistemology(Greco, “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology”) 17235 Knowledge, luck and virtue(Pritchard, “Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues”) 17636 Epistemic value and cognitive achievement(Sosa, “The Place of Truth in Epistemology”) 18137 Giving up on knowledge(Kvanvig, “Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?”) 18738 Giving up on (exact) truth(Elgin, “True Enough”) 19239 Naturalized epistemology advertised(Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”) 19640 Naturalized epistemology criticized(Kim, “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?”) 20341 Naturalized epistemology radicalized(Antony, “Quine as Feminist”) 20742 A apriori justification and unrevisability(Putnam, “There is at Least One A Priori Truth”) 21143 A priori justification and revisability(Casullo, “Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge”) 21544 Philosophical method and empirical science(Bealer, “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy”) 21945 Experimental epistemology(Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”) 22646 Natural kinds, intuitions and method in epistemology(Kornblith, “Investigating Knowledge Itself”) 23047 Contextualism and skeptical puzzles(DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”) 23548 Contextualism and infallibilist intuitions(Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”) 24049 Contextualism and intuitional instability(Cohen, “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems”) 24450 Knowledge and action(Stanley, “Knowledge and Practical Interests, Selections”) 24751 Rationality and action(Fantl and McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification”) 25252 One invariantist’s scorecard(Hawthorne, “Sensitive Moderate Invariantism”) 25853 A relativist theory of knowledge attributions(MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions”) 26454 Rationality and trust(Baker, “Trust and Rationality”) 27055 Testimony and gullibility(Fricker, “Against Gullibility”) 27356 Some reflections on how epistemic sources work(Burge, “Content Preservation”) 27757 Testimony and knowledge(Lackey, “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission”) 28258 Memory and knowledge(Huemer, “The Problem of Memory Knowledge”) 28659 Perception and knowledge(McDowell, “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”) 29160 Skills and knowledge(Reynolds, “Knowing How to Believe with Justification”) 295Index 299

John Turri is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Canada. He specializes in epistemology, philosophy of language, experimental philosophy, and cognitive science. He is editor of Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa (2013) and co-editor of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd edition, Wiley, 2013) and Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (2012).

“The author fosters an excellent bridge to the primary sources and presents the material in a way that scarcely could be made more palatable.  Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above.”  (Choice, 1 December 2014)

• Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii1 The best case for skepticism about the external world?(Stroud, “The Problem of the External World”) 12 Proving the external world exists(Or: Let’s all give Moore a hand!)  (Moore, “Proof of an External World”) 63 Some ways of resisting skepticism(Moore, “Four Forms of Scepticism”) 104 Plausibility and possibilities(Moore, “Certainty”) 155 Skeptic on skeptic(Klein, “How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism”) 196 Realism in epistemology(Williams, “Epistemological Realism”) 247 Socratic questions and the foundation of empirical knowledge(Chisholm, “The Myth of the Given”) 318–9 The foundation of empirical knowledge?(Sellars, “Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” and “Epistemic Principles”) 3610 It’s not a given that empirical knowledge has a foundation(BonJour, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”) 4411 Interpretation, meaning and skepticism(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”) 4912 Blending foundationalism and coherentism(Haack, “A Foundherentist Theory of Epistemic Justification”) 5413 Foundationalism, coherentism and supervenience(Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid”) 6014 Infinitism(Klein, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons”) 6715 The Gettier problem(Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”) 7316 Some principles concerning knowledge and inference(Harman, Thought, Selections) 7717 The essence of the Gettier problem(Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”) 8318 Knowledge is an unanalyzable mental state(Williamson, “A State of Mind”) 8519 Closure, contrast and semi-skepticism(Dretske, “Epistemic Operators”) 9220 Closure, contrast and anti-skepticism(Stine, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure”) 9921 Keeping close track of knowledge(Nozick, “Knowledge and Skepticism”) 10322 Moore wins(Sosa, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore”) 11123 The closure principle: dangers and defense(Vogel, “Are There Counter examples to the Closure Principle?”) 11624 Evidentialist epistemology(Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism”) 12325 Non-defensive epistemology(Foley, “Skepticism and Rationality”) 12926 Reliabilism about justification(Goldman, “What Is Justified Belief?”) 13527 Reliabilism: a level assessment(Vogel, “Reliabilism Leveled”) 14128 Against externalism(BonJour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”) 14629 Against internalism(Goldman, “Internalism Exposed”) 15130 A skeptical take on externalism(Fumerton, “Externalism and Skepticism”) 15631 A friendly take on internalism(Feldman and Conee, “Internalism Defended”) 15932 Warrant(Plantinga, “Warrant: A First Approximation”) 16433 Intellectual virtues(Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind) 16934 Virtue epistemology(Greco, “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology”) 17235 Knowledge, luck and virtue(Pritchard, “Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues”) 17636 Epistemic value and cognitive achievement(Sosa, “The Place of Truth in Epistemology”) 18137 Giving up on knowledge(Kvanvig, “Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?”) 18738 Giving up on (exact) truth(Elgin, “True Enough”) 19239 Naturalized epistemology advertised(Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”) 19640 Naturalized epistemology criticized(Kim, “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?”) 20341 Naturalized epistemology radicalized(Antony, “Quine as Feminist”) 20742 A apriori justification and unrevisability(Putnam, “There is at Least One A Priori Truth”) 21143 A priori justification and revisability(Casullo, “Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge”) 21544 Philosophical method and empirical science(Bealer, “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy”) 21945 Experimental epistemology(Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”) 22646 Natural kinds, intuitions and method in epistemology(Kornblith, “Investigating Knowledge Itself”) 23047 Contextualism and skeptical puzzles(DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”) 23548 Contextualism and infallibilist intuitions(Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”) 24049 Contextualism and intuitional instability(Cohen, “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems”) 24450 Knowledge and action(Stanley, “Knowledge and Practical Interests, Selections”) 24751 Rationality and action(Fantl and McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification”) 25252 One invariantist’s scorecard(Hawthorne, “Sensitive Moderate Invariantism”) 25853 A relativist theory of knowledge attributions(MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions”) 26454 Rationality and trust(Baker, “Trust and Rationality”) 27055 Testimony and gullibility(Fricker, “Against Gullibility”) 27356 Some reflections on how epistemic sources work(Burge, “Content Preservation”) 27757 Testimony and knowledge(Lackey, “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission”) 28258 Memory and knowledge(Huemer, “The Problem of Memory Knowledge”) 28659 Perception and knowledge(McDowell, “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”) 29160 Skills and knowledge(Reynolds, “Knowing How to Believe with Justification”) 295Index 299

John Turri is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Canada. He specializes in epistemology, philosophy of language, experimental philosophy, and cognitive science. He is editor of Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa (2013) and co-editor of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd edition, Wiley, 2013) and Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (2012).

“The author fosters an excellent bridge to the primary sources and presents the material in a way that scarcely could be made more palatable.  Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above.”  (Choice, 1 December 2014)

• Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii1 The best case for skepticism about the external world?(Stroud, “The Problem of the External World”) 12 Proving the external world exists(Or: Let’s all give Moore a hand!)  (Moore, “Proof of an External World”) 63 Some ways of resisting skepticism(Moore, “Four Forms of Scepticism”) 104 Plausibility and possibilities(Moore, “Certainty”) 155 Skeptic on skeptic(Klein, “How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism”) 196 Realism in epistemology(Williams, “Epistemological Realism”) 247 Socratic questions and the foundation of empirical knowledge(Chisholm, “The Myth of the Given”) 318–9 The foundation of empirical knowledge?(Sellars, “Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” and “Epistemic Principles”) 3610 It’s not a given that empirical knowledge has a foundation(BonJour, “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?”) 4411 Interpretation, meaning and skepticism(Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”) 4912 Blending foundationalism and coherentism(Haack, “A Foundherentist Theory of Epistemic Justification”) 5413 Foundationalism, coherentism and supervenience(Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid”) 6014 Infinitism(Klein, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons”) 6715 The Gettier problem(Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”) 7316 Some principles concerning knowledge and inference(Harman, Thought, Selections) 7717 The essence of the Gettier problem(Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”) 8318 Knowledge is an unanalyzable mental state(Williamson, “A State of Mind”) 8519 Closure, contrast and semi-skepticism(Dretske, “Epistemic Operators”) 9220 Closure, contrast and anti-skepticism(Stine, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure”) 9921 Keeping close track of knowledge(Nozick, “Knowledge and Skepticism”) 10322 Moore wins(Sosa, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore”) 11123 The closure principle: dangers and defense(Vogel, “Are There Counter examples to the Closure Principle?”) 11624 Evidentialist epistemology(Feldman and Conee, “Evidentialism”) 12325 Non-defensive epistemology(Foley, “Skepticism and Rationality”) 12926 Reliabilism about justification(Goldman, “What Is Justified Belief?”) 13527 Reliabilism: a level assessment(Vogel, “Reliabilism Leveled”) 14128 Against externalism(BonJour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”) 14629 Against internalism(Goldman, “Internalism Exposed”) 15130 A skeptical take on externalism(Fumerton, “Externalism and Skepticism”) 15631 A friendly take on internalism(Feldman and Conee, “Internalism Defended”) 15932 Warrant(Plantinga, “Warrant: A First Approximation”) 16433 Intellectual virtues(Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind) 16934 Virtue epistemology(Greco, “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology”) 17235 Knowledge, luck and virtue(Pritchard, “Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues”) 17636 Epistemic value and cognitive achievement(Sosa, “The Place of Truth in Epistemology”) 18137 Giving up on knowledge(Kvanvig, “Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?”) 18738 Giving up on (exact) truth(Elgin, “True Enough”) 19239 Naturalized epistemology advertised(Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”) 19640 Naturalized epistemology criticized(Kim, “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?”) 20341 Naturalized epistemology radicalized(Antony, “Quine as Feminist”) 20742 A apriori justification and unrevisability(Putnam, “There is at Least One A Priori Truth”) 21143 A priori justification and revisability(Casullo, “Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge”) 21544 Philosophical method and empirical science(Bealer, “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy”) 21945 Experimental epistemology(Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”) 22646 Natural kinds, intuitions and method in epistemology(Kornblith, “Investigating Knowledge Itself”) 23047 Contextualism and skeptical puzzles(DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem”) 23548 Contextualism and infallibilist intuitions(Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”) 24049 Contextualism and intuitional instability(Cohen, “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems”) 24450 Knowledge and action(Stanley, “Knowledge and Practical Interests, Selections”) 24751 Rationality and action(Fantl and McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification”) 25252 One invariantist’s scorecard(Hawthorne, “Sensitive Moderate Invariantism”) 25853 A relativist theory of knowledge attributions(MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions”) 26454 Rationality and trust(Baker, “Trust and Rationality”) 27055 Testimony and gullibility(Fricker, “Against Gullibility”) 27356 Some reflections on how epistemic sources work(Burge, “Content Preservation”) 27757 Testimony and knowledge(Lackey, “Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission”) 28258 Memory and knowledge(Huemer, “The Problem of Memory Knowledge”) 28659 Perception and knowledge(McDowell, “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”) 29160 Skills and knowledge(Reynolds, “Knowing How to Believe with Justification”) 295Index 299