Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Aarhus, Denmark and Professor II in Philosophy at the University of Tromsø, Norway. His most recent book is Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination (2013).

This brilliant and challenging book … Illuminates different conceptions of luck, as found in the philosophical literature, clarifies the difference between telic and deontic equality, and explains the 'levelling down' problem and the way that this affects luck egalitarians, and egalitarians more generally.

• Chapter 1. Luck egalitarianism and some close and distant relatives1.1 Introduction1.2 What is luck egalitarianism?1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism?1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen1.7 Luck egalitarianism and other views1.8 SummaryChapter 2. Why equality?2.1 Introduction2.2 Formal equality2.3 Equality of human beings2.4 Williams on the idea of equality2.5 Rawls on range properties2.6 Respect and opaqueness2.7 A different proposal2.8 SummaryChapter 3. Luck 3.1 Introduction3.2 Different kinds of luck3.3 Thin luck3.4 Thick luck3.5 Independent notions of luck3.6 How much luck is there?3.7 Constitutive luck3.8 Option luck versus brute luck3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality3.10 Bad luck versus good luck3.11 SummaryChapter 4. Equality of what? 4.1 Introduction4.2 Welfare4.3 The specification objection4.4 The disability objection4.5 The offensive preference objection4.6 The experience and snobbish tastes objection4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection4.8 Dworkin’s resourcist view4.9 Sen’s capability metric4.10 Summary Chapter 5. Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism 5.1 Introduction5.2 Some distinctions5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality5.4 The levelling down objection5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection5.7 Egalitarian responses5.8 SummaryChapter 6. The scope of luck egalitarianism 6.1 Introduction6.2 Whole lives6.3 Generations6.4 Groups6.5 States6.6 Individuals who are neither persons nor human beings6.7 SummaryChapter 7. Social relations egalitarianism versus luck egalitarianism 7.1 Introduction7.2 Social relations egalitarianism7.3 Anderson’s democratic equality7.4 Humiliation and harshness7.5 What is at stake?7.6 The source of the disagreement between social relations and luck egalitarians?7.7 SummaryChapter 8. Other values 8.1 Introduction8.2 Freedom8.3 Demandingness8.4 Community8.5 Publicity and stability8.6 Reflections8.7 ConclusionBibliographyIndex

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Aarhus, Denmark and Professor II in Philosophy at the University of Tromsø, Norway. His most recent book is Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination (2013).

This brilliant and challenging book … Illuminates different conceptions of luck, as found in the philosophical literature, clarifies the difference between telic and deontic equality, and explains the 'levelling down' problem and the way that this affects luck egalitarians, and egalitarians more generally.

• Chapter 1. Luck egalitarianism and some close and distant relatives1.1 Introduction1.2 What is luck egalitarianism?1.3 What is attractive about luck egalitarianism?1.4 Three important luck egalitarians: Dworkin1.5 Three important luck egalitarians: Arneson1.6 Three important luck egalitarians: Cohen1.7 Luck egalitarianism and other views1.8 SummaryChapter 2. Why equality?2.1 Introduction2.2 Formal equality2.3 Equality of human beings2.4 Williams on the idea of equality2.5 Rawls on range properties2.6 Respect and opaqueness2.7 A different proposal2.8 SummaryChapter 3. Luck 3.1 Introduction3.2 Different kinds of luck3.3 Thin luck3.4 Thick luck3.5 Independent notions of luck3.6 How much luck is there?3.7 Constitutive luck3.8 Option luck versus brute luck3.9 Neutralizing luck and equality3.10 Bad luck versus good luck3.11 SummaryChapter 4. Equality of what? 4.1 Introduction4.2 Welfare4.3 The specification objection4.4 The disability objection4.5 The offensive preference objection4.6 The experience and snobbish tastes objection4.7 The non-instrumental concern objection4.8 Dworkin’s resourcist view4.9 Sen’s capability metric4.10 Summary Chapter 5. Telic and deontic luck egalitarianism 5.1 Introduction5.2 Some distinctions5.3 Telic versus deontic and the scope of equality5.4 The levelling down objection5.5 Telic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection5.6 Deontic egalitarianism and the levelling down objection5.7 Egalitarian responses5.8 SummaryChapter 6. The scope of luck egalitarianism 6.1 Introduction6.2 Whole lives6.3 Generations6.4 Groups6.5 States6.6 Individuals who are neither persons nor human beings6.7 SummaryChapter 7. Social relations egalitarianism versus luck egalitarianism 7.1 Introduction7.2 Social relations egalitarianism7.3 Anderson’s democratic equality7.4 Humiliation and harshness7.5 What is at stake?7.6 The source of the disagreement between social relations and luck egalitarians?7.7 SummaryChapter 8. Other values 8.1 Introduction8.2 Freedom8.3 Demandingness8.4 Community8.5 Publicity and stability8.6 Reflections8.7 ConclusionBibliographyIndex