M. Molefe is senior researcher at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), at the University of Fort Hare.

“With this book, M. Molefe continues his important analytical enquiry into African ethics, now critically discussing how strong our obligations are to strangers compared to associates. Whereas some working in the African tradition deny that morality prescribes any kind of favouritism towards intimates and others accept that it does when it comes to right action, Molefe’s novel view is that partiality is best understood as an instance of morally good character (personhood). His virtue-centric approach and his defense of it as both more African and more philosophically plausible than the alternatives, deserve attention from the field.”

• ForewordPrefaceAcknowledgmentsIntroduction: The Missing Debate on Partiality and Impartiality in African PhilosophyChapter One: Kwasi Wiredu on Partiality and ImpartialityChapter Two: Partiality and Impartiality in Metz’s Moral PhilosophyChapter Three: Kwame Gyekye’s Moral Philosophy on Partiality and ImpartialityChapter Four: Conclusion: Highlighting Major ThemesChapter Five: Personhood and Morality in African PhilosophyChapter Six: Ethics of Personhood: Partiality and Impartiality in African PhilosophyConclusionReferencesIndexAbout the Author

M. Molefe is senior researcher at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), at the University of Fort Hare.

“With this book, M. Molefe continues his important analytical enquiry into African ethics, now critically discussing how strong our obligations are to strangers compared to associates. Whereas some working in the African tradition deny that morality prescribes any kind of favouritism towards intimates and others accept that it does when it comes to right action, Molefe’s novel view is that partiality is best understood as an instance of morally good character (personhood). His virtue-centric approach and his defense of it as both more African and more philosophically plausible than the alternatives, deserve attention from the field.”

• ForewordPrefaceAcknowledgmentsIntroduction: The Missing Debate on Partiality and Impartiality in African PhilosophyChapter One: Kwasi Wiredu on Partiality and ImpartialityChapter Two: Partiality and Impartiality in Metz’s Moral PhilosophyChapter Three: Kwame Gyekye’s Moral Philosophy on Partiality and ImpartialityChapter Four: Conclusion: Highlighting Major ThemesChapter Five: Personhood and Morality in African PhilosophyChapter Six: Ethics of Personhood: Partiality and Impartiality in African PhilosophyConclusionReferencesIndexAbout the Author

M. Molefe is senior researcher at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), at the University of Fort Hare.

“With this book, M. Molefe continues his important analytical enquiry into African ethics, now critically discussing how strong our obligations are to strangers compared to associates. Whereas some working in the African tradition deny that morality prescribes any kind of favouritism towards intimates and others accept that it does when it comes to right action, Molefe’s novel view is that partiality is best understood as an instance of morally good character (personhood). His virtue-centric approach and his defense of it as both more African and more philosophically plausible than the alternatives, deserve attention from the field.”

• ForewordPrefaceAcknowledgmentsIntroduction: The Missing Debate on Partiality and Impartiality in African PhilosophyChapter One: Kwasi Wiredu on Partiality and ImpartialityChapter Two: Partiality and Impartiality in Metz’s Moral PhilosophyChapter Three: Kwame Gyekye’s Moral Philosophy on Partiality and ImpartialityChapter Four: Conclusion: Highlighting Major ThemesChapter Five: Personhood and Morality in African PhilosophyChapter Six: Ethics of Personhood: Partiality and Impartiality in African PhilosophyConclusionReferencesIndexAbout the Author