Triantafyllos Gkouvas is Visiting Academic at the University of Glasgow, UK.

This is an important and substantive contribution to metaphysical and methodological debates in the philosophy of law. The book advances a sophisticated analysis that deserves a careful consideration and discussion.

• 1. From Legalese to Ontologese I. Dworkin’s Vision of Jurisprudential Disagreement II. The Site and Scope of Jurisprudential Disagreement III. Legal Facts and Legal Propositions 2. Relating Legal Propositions to Legal Facts I. Legal Truthmakers II. From a Theory of Truth to a Theory of Truthmaking III. Legal Propositionalism IV. Legal Propositionalism without Legal Truthmakers 3. Relating Legal Facts to Legal Propositions I. Two Hypotheses about Jurisprudential Perspectivalism A. Pragmatic Perspectivalism B. Semantic Perspectivalism C. Perspectival Theoretical Disagreement II. Non-perspectival Jurisprudential Statements III. Are Constitutive Disputes Merely Verbal? IV. Constitutive Disagreement and the Practical Point of View 4. Two Levels of Disagreement about the Metaphysics of Law I. Legal Constitution and its Discontents A. First-Order Disagreement over Legal Constitution B. Second-Order Disagreement over Legal Constitution II. Objectionable Jurisprudential Commitments III. Disagreement over Legal Grounding 5. Resisting Ordinary Reasons Imperialism I. Axes of Normative Relevance II. Normative Roles III. Rational Requirements, Asymmetry and Response-Constraint IV. Thick Evaluation, Global Judgement and Constitutive Impact 6. The Metric Approach to Legal Normativity I. The Limits of the Metric Approach II. Legal Facts as Nexus Reasons A. The Influential Role of Legal Facts B. The Evaluative Role of Legal Facts C. The Explanatory Role of Legal Facts 7. Two Levels of Disagreement about the Normativity of Law I. First-Order Disagreement about the Grounds of Nexus Facts II. Second-Order Disagreement about the Normativity of Legal Facts A. How Can a Legal Interpretivist Disagree with a Nexus Theorist? B. How Can a Plan Positivist Disagree with a Nexus Theorist?

Triantafyllos Gkouvas is Visiting Academic at the University of Glasgow, UK.

This is an important and substantive contribution to metaphysical and methodological debates in the philosophy of law. The book advances a sophisticated analysis that deserves a careful consideration and discussion.

• 1. From Legalese to Ontologese I. Dworkin’s Vision of Jurisprudential Disagreement II. The Site and Scope of Jurisprudential Disagreement III. Legal Facts and Legal Propositions 2. Relating Legal Propositions to Legal Facts I. Legal Truthmakers II. From a Theory of Truth to a Theory of Truthmaking III. Legal Propositionalism IV. Legal Propositionalism without Legal Truthmakers 3. Relating Legal Facts to Legal Propositions I. Two Hypotheses about Jurisprudential Perspectivalism A. Pragmatic Perspectivalism B. Semantic Perspectivalism C. Perspectival Theoretical Disagreement II. Non-perspectival Jurisprudential Statements III. Are Constitutive Disputes Merely Verbal? IV. Constitutive Disagreement and the Practical Point of View 4. Two Levels of Disagreement about the Metaphysics of Law I. Legal Constitution and its Discontents A. First-Order Disagreement over Legal Constitution B. Second-Order Disagreement over Legal Constitution II. Objectionable Jurisprudential Commitments III. Disagreement over Legal Grounding 5. Resisting Ordinary Reasons Imperialism I. Axes of Normative Relevance II. Normative Roles III. Rational Requirements, Asymmetry and Response-Constraint IV. Thick Evaluation, Global Judgement and Constitutive Impact 6. The Metric Approach to Legal Normativity I. The Limits of the Metric Approach II. Legal Facts as Nexus Reasons A. The Influential Role of Legal Facts B. The Evaluative Role of Legal Facts C. The Explanatory Role of Legal Facts 7. Two Levels of Disagreement about the Normativity of Law I. First-Order Disagreement about the Grounds of Nexus Facts II. Second-Order Disagreement about the Normativity of Legal Facts A. How Can a Legal Interpretivist Disagree with a Nexus Theorist? B. How Can a Plan Positivist Disagree with a Nexus Theorist?

Triantafyllos Gkouvas is Visiting Academic at the University of Glasgow, UK.

This is an important and substantive contribution to metaphysical and methodological debates in the philosophy of law. The book advances a sophisticated analysis that deserves a careful consideration and discussion.

• 1. From Legalese to Ontologese I. Dworkin’s Vision of Jurisprudential Disagreement II. The Site and Scope of Jurisprudential Disagreement III. Legal Facts and Legal Propositions 2. Relating Legal Propositions to Legal Facts I. Legal Truthmakers II. From a Theory of Truth to a Theory of Truthmaking III. Legal Propositionalism IV. Legal Propositionalism without Legal Truthmakers 3. Relating Legal Facts to Legal Propositions I. Two Hypotheses about Jurisprudential Perspectivalism A. Pragmatic Perspectivalism B. Semantic Perspectivalism C. Perspectival Theoretical Disagreement II. Non-perspectival Jurisprudential Statements III. Are Constitutive Disputes Merely Verbal? IV. Constitutive Disagreement and the Practical Point of View 4. Two Levels of Disagreement about the Metaphysics of Law I. Legal Constitution and its Discontents A. First-Order Disagreement over Legal Constitution B. Second-Order Disagreement over Legal Constitution II. Objectionable Jurisprudential Commitments III. Disagreement over Legal Grounding 5. Resisting Ordinary Reasons Imperialism I. Axes of Normative Relevance II. Normative Roles III. Rational Requirements, Asymmetry and Response-Constraint IV. Thick Evaluation, Global Judgement and Constitutive Impact 6. The Metric Approach to Legal Normativity I. The Limits of the Metric Approach II. Legal Facts as Nexus Reasons A. The Influential Role of Legal Facts B. The Evaluative Role of Legal Facts C. The Explanatory Role of Legal Facts 7. Two Levels of Disagreement about the Normativity of Law I. First-Order Disagreement about the Grounds of Nexus Facts II. Second-Order Disagreement about the Normativity of Legal Facts A. How Can a Legal Interpretivist Disagree with a Nexus Theorist? B. How Can a Plan Positivist Disagree with a Nexus Theorist?