Constitutional Erosion in Brazil

Emilio Peluso Neder Meyer is a Constitutional Law Professor at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil, and the Director of the Study Center on Transitional Justice.

A comprehensive, in-depth account and analysis of the dramatic erosion of constitutional democracy in Brazil – required reading not just for anyone interested in Brazil, but for anyone interested in the spread of illiberal, authoritarian populism across South America and around the world today. Emilio Peluso Neder Meyer identifies brilliantly the causes and manifestations of constitutional crisis presided over by Bolsonaro’s government, and traces them, among other things, to tensions between the democratic and authoritarian ingredients of the Brazilian Constitution.

• Introduction: Defining Brazil’s Constitutional Erosion I. What is a Constitutional Crisis? II. Constitutional Erosion III. Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Erosion: A Comparative Assessment IV. Brazil under Bolsonaro: Soldiers as Politicians V. Armed Forces and Politics: Brazil and Beyond VI. The Structure of this Book 1. Transitional Constitutionalism: Judicial and Military Attempts at Controlling a TransitionI. The Brazilian Dictatorship of 1964–1985 Juridical Apparatus II. Transitional Justice Processes Shaping Constitutionalism III. Amnesty and the Federal Supreme Court IV. The 1964–1985 Dictatorship on Trial V. Interactions between Brazilian Institutions and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights VI. The Military in Brazil: From Impunity to Politics 2. Social-Democratic Constitutionalism: Neoliberal Unconstitutional Politics and Socio-Economic Rights I. Authoritarianism and Neoliberalism II. Constitutions and Economic Power III. Transformative Constitutionalism and Transformative Justice IV. Socio-economic Rights, Constitutionalism and Transition in South Africa V. Socio-economic Rights, Constitutionalism and Transition in Brazil VI. Neoliberalism and Transitional Constitutionalism 3. Institutional and Personal Judicial Guarantees: Judges, Inequality and PoliticsI. Against the Transition: The Lack of Efficient Judicial Institutional Reforms II. Corporativist GuaranteesIII. Operation Car Wash: Taming Politics through Judicial Discourse IV. The Personification of Operation Car Wash V. From the Bench to Politics VI. Individualities v Institutional Behaviour 4. Judges and Courts Destabilising Constitutionalism I. Deputies and Senators in the Federal Supreme Court II. The Judicial Oversight of an Impeachment III. Ruling on Presumption of Innocence: Balancing and Unbalancing Constitutional RightsIV. Imprisoning the Ex-President V. Constitutional Courts and Political Instability VI. Unstable Constitutionalism in Brazil 5. Subverting the Rule of Law: The Military vs the Milícias – Eroding Brazilian Constitutionalism I. The Military in Brazilian Post-1988 DemocracyII. Soldiers Returning to Politics III. Militarised Public Security IV. Supporting Elections via Milícias V. Constitutional Erosion or Blatant Coups? A Comparative Assessment VI. Fuelling Attacks on Constitutional Democracy 6. Moderating Powers? Military and Judges in Brazilian Constitutionalism I. An Overview of the Moderating Power II. Authoritarianism: A Substitute for the Moderating Power III. The Ghost of the Moderating Power and the Military Elite IV. 1964–1985 – Suspension and Return of the Moderating Model V. Moderating Power Transfer: From the Military to the Judiciary and Back againVI. A Case of Weak Democracy Syndrome 7. Digital Constitutionalism: WhatsApp Elections and Fake News I. Capitalism, New Technologies and Democracy II. Surveillance Capitalism and Instrumentarian Power III. Politics and Network Propaganda IV. Fake News, Authoritarianism and Political Choices V. WhatsApp, Elections and Misinformation VI. Controlling Fake News in Brazil 8. Constitutional Resilience against Erosion: Responses Provided for by the 1988 Constitution I. Coalitional Presidentialism and its Misuse II. The Constant Threat of Impeachment III. Capturing State Institutions and Fighting the Media IV. Parliamentary Control and the Abuse of Executive Orders V. On Federalism: The Governors’ Reactions VI. ‘I Will Interfere!’ The Federal Supreme Court Fights Back