Emotional Brain and the Guilty Mind

Federica Coppola is Robert A Burt Presidential Scholar in Society and Neuroscience at the Centre for Science and Society at Columbia University, USA.

This book is essential reading for anyone with an interest in criminal law and neuroscience. Coppola’s agenda for reformulating criminal responsibility and punishment is as compelling as it is controversial. The book is a must read.

• 1. The Rationalist Soul of Culpability: An Analysis of the Guilty Mind I. Introduction II. The ‘Broad’ Nature of Culpability III. Autonomy and Rationality: Framing the Model of the ‘Person’ in Criminal Law IV. The Voluntarist Architecture of Culpability: Choice, Capacity, and Fair Opportunity V. Voluntarism and Legal Doctrine A. Mental Capacity and Excuses: Legal Insanity B. Fair Opportunity and Excuses: Duress VI. Voluntarism, Emotions, and Socio-Environmental Factors A. A Mechanistic Conception of Emotions i. Emotions and the Law of Homicide ii. Emotional Incapacity and Legal Insanity B. The Irrelevance of the Social Environment VII. Emotions and Socio-environmental Factors in Sentencing VIII. Conclusion 2. From the Guilty Mind to the Punished Person: Criminal Culpability through the ‘Evolution’ of Punishment I. Introduction II. Rational Individualism and the Enlightenment III. Between Libertarian and Scientific Individualism IV. The Rise and Fall of Treatmentist Rehabilitation: From Penal Modernism to the Model Penal Code V. Voluntarism and the Resurgence of Retribution VI. Backlashes A. Harsh Punitiveness B. Social Exclusion and Stigmatisation VII. Conclusion 3. Critiques of the Model of the ‘Person’ in Culpability and Punishment I. Introduction II. A Th in Account of Human Agency A. A Flawed Conception of Emotions B. The (Political) Exclusion of the Social Context III. A Static View of the Culpable Person IV. Dehumanisation V. Conclusion 4. Emotions, the Social Environment, and the Brain I. Introduction II. The Emotional Brain A. Definition(s) of Emotions B. Modern Theories of Emotions: The Emotion/Cognition Ambiguous Divide C. From Emotion Generation to Emotion Regulation: Insights from Neuroscience D. Emotion and Decision-making III. Emotions, Empathy, and Moral Behaviour A. Social/Moral Emotions B. Empathy C. The Neuromoral Network D. Emotions, Morality, and Self-regulation IV. From the Emotional Brain to the Social Brain: How the Social Environment Becomes Embedded and InformsSocial Behaviour V. Emotional Plasticity, Social Connections, and Positive Behavioural Change VI. The Pain of Social Exclusion VII. Conclusion 5. Holistic and Situated Culpability I. Introduction II. Autonomy and Rationality as Multidimensional Concepts: Reframing the ‘Person’ in Criminal Law III. Holistic and Situated Culpability: Revising the Architecture of the Current Paradigm A. Normative Competence B. Situational Control C. Situational Control and the Role of Context: Situating the Fair Opportunity to do Otherwise IV. Implications for Legal Doctrine A. Legal Insanity i. Moral Capacity Test ii. Control Capacity Test B. Diminished Opportunity, Diminished Culpability: A Re-interpretation of Stephen Morse’s Proposed‘Generic Partial Excuse’ Doctrine V. Holistic and Situated Culpability, and the Personal Guilt Principle VI. Conclusion 6. Social Rehabilitation I. Introduction II. Dynamic Personhood III. Social Rehabilitation: Theory, Pillars, and Normative Value A. Definition and Distinguishing Features B. Social Rehabilitation, Dynamic Personhood, and Crime Desistance C. Social Rehabilitation, Human Dignity, and the (Neuro)Science of Change D. Social Rehabilitation and Other Justifications for Punishmenti. Retribution ii. Incapacitationiii. Special Deterrence E. Social Rehabilitation and Restorative Justice IV. Practical Corollaries A. Humanising Sentencing B. Banning Mandatory Life Sentences C. Transforming Incarceration D. Abolishing (or Profoundly Reforming) Solitary Confinement V. Conclusion