DRETSKE AND HIS CRITICS Dretske and his Critics Frederick Dretske’s views on the nature of seeing, the possibility of knowledge, the nature of content or non-natural meaning, the nature of behavior, and the role of content in the causal explanation of behavior have been profoundly important. Dretske and his Critics contains original discussions of these issues by John Heil, Stuart Cohen, David H. Sanford, Jaegwon Kim, Fred Adams, Daniel Dennett, Robert Cummins, Terence Horgan and Brian McLaughlin. Each chapter is responded to by Dretske himself. In Seeing and Knowing (1968), Dretske argued that there is a relational sense of seeing according to which, if one sees X, then X exists (or occurs); and if one sees X, and X = Y, then one sees Y. He carefully contrasted seeing in this relational sense with seeing that something is the case. In his contribution to this volume, Heil examines Dretske’s notion of non-epistemic seeing. Dretske is largely responsible for the relevant alternatives response to skepticism about knowledge. In arguing that we cannot know the sorts of things we ordinarily claim to know, the skeptic appeals to irrelevant alternatives that the purported knower cannot eliminate. In their contributions to this volume, Cohen and Sanford examine Dretske’s relevant alternatives response to skepticism about knowledge. In Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes (1988), Dretske defended a component account of behavior, and offered original, naturalized accounts of the nature of content and of the role of content in the causal explanation of behavior. In their contributions, Kim, Adams, Dennett, Cummins, and Horgan examine Dretske’s account of behavior and his naturalized account of the role of content in the causal explanation of behavior. McLaughlin focuses on Dretske’s naturalized account of content.
