For Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., the battle for Lorraine during the fall and winter of 1944 was a frustrating and grueling experience of static warfare. Plagued by supply shortages, critical interference from superiors, flooded rivers, fortified cities, and the highly determined German army, Patton had little opportunity to wage the type of fast armored campaign of which he was so enamored. Author John Rickard examines Patton's generalship during these bitter battles and suggests that Patton was unable to adapt to the new realities of the campaign, thereby failing to wage the most effective warfare possible. Relying on a broad range of historical sources, including personal papers and division after-action reports, this treatment of Patton's operational performance in Lorraine goes beyond the official history. It describes Patton's philosophy of war and explains why it failed him in Lorraine. Supplemented by full orders of battle, casualty and equipment loses, and excellent maps based on Hugh M. Cole's official U.S. Army history of the campaign, Patton at Bay,/i> is a penetrating study of one of America's best fighting generals.
