Edited by C. Mónica Capra, Department of Economic Sciences, Claremont Graduate University, Rachel T.A. Croson, College of Liberal Arts, University of Minnesota, Mary L. Rigdon, Associate Director, Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, University of Arizona and Tanya S. Rosenblat, School of Information and Department of Economics, University of Michigan, US

'This Handbook is a must-have resource for experimental economists and game theorists. It consists of authoritative contributions from top researchers in the areas it covers. The topics range from methodology to surveys of important and active research in experimental game theory. The Handbook is both rigorous in its treatment of the topics as well as accessible to readers not familiar with the areas of coverage.'--Charles Noussair, University of Arizona, US'Every game theorist and experimental economist should have this book and use it to analyze data, design experiments, and understand their results.'--Elizabeth Hoffman, Iowa State University, US

• Contents:Introduction to the Handbook of Experimental Game Theory1C. Mónica Capra, Rachel T.A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon and Tanya S. RosenblatPART IA SAMPLING OF METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS1Stochastic game theory for social science: a primer on quantal responseequilibrium8Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey2The experimetrics of depth-of-reasoning models48Peter G. Moffatt3The process of choice in games69Giorgio Coricelli, Luca Polonio and Alexander Vostroknutov4Games with continuous-time experimental protocols95Alexander L. Brown and Daniel G. Stephenson5Bargaining in the field125Marco Castillo and Ragan PetriePART II EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION6Recent advances in experimental coordination games149David J. Cooper and Roberto A. Weber7Public goods, norms and cooperation184Marie Claire Villeval8Cooperation among strangers with and without a monetary system213Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari9Game-theoretic accounts of social norms: the role of normative expectations241Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso10Strategies used by non-human primates in dynamic games256Mackenzie F. Webster, Julia Watzek and Sarah F. Brosnan11Reciprocity in games with unknown types271Garret Ridinger and Michael McBride12Behavioral rules289Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes BuckenmaierPART III EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION13Strategic information transmission: a survey of experiments and theoreticalfoundations311Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim14Communication and information in games of collective decision: a survey of experimental results348César Martinelli and Thomas R. Palfrey15Voting game experiments with incomplete information: a survey376Jens Großer16Experiments in market design399Siqi PanIndex

Edited by C. Mónica Capra, Department of Economic Sciences, Claremont Graduate University, Rachel T.A. Croson, College of Liberal Arts, University of Minnesota, Mary L. Rigdon, Associate Director, Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, University of Arizona and Tanya S. Rosenblat, School of Information and Department of Economics, University of Michigan, US

'This Handbook is a must-have resource for experimental economists and game theorists. It consists of authoritative contributions from top researchers in the areas it covers. The topics range from methodology to surveys of important and active research in experimental game theory. The Handbook is both rigorous in its treatment of the topics as well as accessible to readers not familiar with the areas of coverage.'--Charles Noussair, University of Arizona, US'Every game theorist and experimental economist should have this book and use it to analyze data, design experiments, and understand their results.'--Elizabeth Hoffman, Iowa State University, US

• Contents:Introduction to the Handbook of Experimental Game Theory1C. Mónica Capra, Rachel T.A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon and Tanya S. RosenblatPART IA SAMPLING OF METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS1Stochastic game theory for social science: a primer on quantal responseequilibrium8Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey2The experimetrics of depth-of-reasoning models48Peter G. Moffatt3The process of choice in games69Giorgio Coricelli, Luca Polonio and Alexander Vostroknutov4Games with continuous-time experimental protocols95Alexander L. Brown and Daniel G. Stephenson5Bargaining in the field125Marco Castillo and Ragan PetriePART II EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION6Recent advances in experimental coordination games149David J. Cooper and Roberto A. Weber7Public goods, norms and cooperation184Marie Claire Villeval8Cooperation among strangers with and without a monetary system213Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari9Game-theoretic accounts of social norms: the role of normative expectations241Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso10Strategies used by non-human primates in dynamic games256Mackenzie F. Webster, Julia Watzek and Sarah F. Brosnan11Reciprocity in games with unknown types271Garret Ridinger and Michael McBride12Behavioral rules289Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes BuckenmaierPART III EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION13Strategic information transmission: a survey of experiments and theoreticalfoundations311Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim14Communication and information in games of collective decision: a survey of experimental results348César Martinelli and Thomas R. Palfrey15Voting game experiments with incomplete information: a survey376Jens Großer16Experiments in market design399Siqi PanIndex

Edited by C. Mónica Capra, Department of Economic Sciences, Claremont Graduate University, Rachel T.A. Croson, College of Liberal Arts, University of Minnesota, Mary L. Rigdon, Associate Director, Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, University of Arizona and Tanya S. Rosenblat, School of Information and Department of Economics, University of Michigan, US

'This Handbook is a must-have resource for experimental economists and game theorists. It consists of authoritative contributions from top researchers in the areas it covers. The topics range from methodology to surveys of important and active research in experimental game theory. The Handbook is both rigorous in its treatment of the topics as well as accessible to readers not familiar with the areas of coverage.'--Charles Noussair, University of Arizona, US'Every game theorist and experimental economist should have this book and use it to analyze data, design experiments, and understand their results.'--Elizabeth Hoffman, Iowa State University, US

• Contents:Introduction to the Handbook of Experimental Game Theory1C. Mónica Capra, Rachel T.A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon and Tanya S. RosenblatPART IA SAMPLING OF METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS1Stochastic game theory for social science: a primer on quantal responseequilibrium8Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey2The experimetrics of depth-of-reasoning models48Peter G. Moffatt3The process of choice in games69Giorgio Coricelli, Luca Polonio and Alexander Vostroknutov4Games with continuous-time experimental protocols95Alexander L. Brown and Daniel G. Stephenson5Bargaining in the field125Marco Castillo and Ragan PetriePART II EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION6Recent advances in experimental coordination games149David J. Cooper and Roberto A. Weber7Public goods, norms and cooperation184Marie Claire Villeval8Cooperation among strangers with and without a monetary system213Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari9Game-theoretic accounts of social norms: the role of normative expectations241Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso10Strategies used by non-human primates in dynamic games256Mackenzie F. Webster, Julia Watzek and Sarah F. Brosnan11Reciprocity in games with unknown types271Garret Ridinger and Michael McBride12Behavioral rules289Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Johannes BuckenmaierPART III EXPERIMENTS ON STATIC AND DYNAMIC GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION13Strategic information transmission: a survey of experiments and theoreticalfoundations311Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim14Communication and information in games of collective decision: a survey of experimental results348César Martinelli and Thomas R. Palfrey15Voting game experiments with incomplete information: a survey376Jens Großer16Experiments in market design399Siqi PanIndex