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Jihwan Hwang - North Korea, Nuclear Risk-Taking, and the United States, Inbunden

Inbunden, Engelska, 2023

North Korea, Nuclear Risk-Taking, and the United States

Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un

Av Jihwan Hwang

Del i serien Bloomsbury Studies on Korea's Place in International Relations

1133 kr

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Jihwan Hwang analyzes Pyongyang’s nuclear policy changes over the last three decades under Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un. Why did a weaker North Korea take the risk of standing up against the much stronger U.S. with its nuclear weapons program, even escalating the crisis to the point of a war? Later, why did North Korea change its course of action amid the crisis even though the security environment remained essentially the same? Hwang draws on the main tenets of prospect theory in international relations and argues that Pyongyang becomes either risk-acceptant or risk-averse toward the U.S., depending on the situation it faces. When Pyongyang perceived the status quo to be deteriorating, it framed its situation as a loss and chose a risk-acceptant of confrontation to restore the status quo. Equally, when Pyongyang perceived the situation to be improving, it chose a risk-averse engagement in the domain of gain. In contrast, when Pyongyang perceived an extreme loss such as military confrontation against the United States, it would rather choose a risk-averse policy to avoid the catastrophic outcome of war. The issues of risk are central to an understanding of Pyongyang’s nuclear policy decision-making.
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Jihwan Hwang is professor of International Relations at the University of Seoul, Korea.

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In this outstanding and original book, Hwang analyzes North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy under three leaders during the nuclear crises on the Korean peninsula since the early 1990s. He challenges the realist and liberal approaches dominating scholarly and policy discourses and offers an alternative approach based on prospect theory. The book argues that North Korea’s leaders are risk-acceptant or risk-averse according to their perception of gains and losses in international and domestic environments. As a result, North Korea has moved between engagement and confrontation with the US when its supreme leader has perceived North Korea's security predicament to be deteriorating. Hwang explains why Kim Il Sung changed North Korea's nuclear policy from confrontation to engagement (risk-aversion), signing the June 1994 Agreed Framework with the US. The second nuclear crisis under Kim Jong Il witnessed a sharp change in nuclear policy from confrontation (withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty) to engagement (Six-Party Talks) back to confrontation. Lastly, Hwang discusses North Korea's nuclear risk-taking attitudes under Kim Jong Un, including the failed summits with the US and the return to a confrontation policy toward the US. A useful addition to Jun Taek Kwon and Weiqi Zhang's Strategies of Survival (CH, Apr'24, 61-2307). Highly recommended. Advanced undergraduates through faculty; practitioners.

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