Antitrust and Competition Policy

Edited by Andrew N. Kleit, Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics, Pennsylvania State University, US

'It is most welcome to see classic law and economics pieces by Harold Demsetz, Oliver Williamson, Lester Telser, George Stigler and other giants of the field together in one volume along with newer and more enforcement oriented voices. . . Antitrust and Competition Policy fills and important need for both attorneys and economists in their continuing collaboration in the competition field. . . provides a comprehensive collection of the major voices and views that have shaped our profession over the past 50 years.'

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroduction Andrew N. KleitPART IMONOPOLIZATION 1. Harold Demsetz (1974), ‘Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly’2. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), ‘On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits’PART IIMERGERS 3. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’4. Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty (1973), ‘The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits’5. Robert D. Willig (1991), ‘Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines’6. Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons (1989), ‘Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?’7. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1988), ‘Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm’8. Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb (1994), ‘The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy’PART IIICOLLUSION 9. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’10. George A. Hay and Daniel Kelley (1974), ‘An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies’11. Thomas E. Cooper (1986), ‘Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion’PART IVVERTICAL RESTRAINTS 12. Lester G. Telser (1960), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’13. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’PART VPREDATORY PRICING 14. John S. McGee (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’15. Robert H. Bork (1978), ‘Injury to Competition: The Law's Basic Theories’16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), ‘Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence’PART VIEXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR 17. Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman (1987), ‘Cost-Raising Strategies’18. Timothy J. Brennan (1988), ‘Understanding “Raising Rivals' Costs”’19. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure’20. David Reiffen (1992), ‘Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment’21. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to Entry’22. David A. Butz and Andrew N. Kleit (2001), ‘Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit’PART VIINETWORK EXTERNALITIES 23. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro (1985), ‘Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility’24. Paul A. David (1985), ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’25. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis (1990), ‘The Fable of the Keys’PART VIIIANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND BUREAUCRACY 26. William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover (1985), ‘Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition’27. Timothy J. Brennan (1995), ‘Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today?’28. Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins and Fred S. McChesney (1990), ‘Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges’29. Malcolm B. Coate, Andrew N. Kleit and Rene Bustamante (1995), ‘Fight, Fold or Settle?: Modelling the Reaction to FTC Merger Challenges’Name Index