Political Economy of Environmental Regulation

Edited by Robert N. Stavins, A. J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; University Fellow, Resources for the Future; and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, US

'In this stimulating compendium, Stavins has assembled many important papers dealing with both positive and normative themes in environmental regulation. The political economy overlay is more than a convenient organizational device, since environmental regulation is both an economic challenge and a target of political opportunity.'

• Contents: AcknowledgementsIntroduction Robert N. StavinsPART ISETTING THE TARGETS AND GOALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 1. Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan (1984), ‘Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics’2. Maureen L. Cropper, William N. Evans, Stephen J. Berardi, Maria M. Ducla-Soares and Paul R. Portney (1992), ‘The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making’3. Roger D. Congleton (1992), ‘Political Institutions and Pollution Control’4. Andrew Metrick and Martin L. Weitzman (1996), ‘Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation’5. James Murdoch and Todd Sandler (1997), ‘The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: The Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol’6. Toke S. Aidt (1998), ‘Political Internalization of Economic Externalities and Environmental Policy’PART IICHOOSING THE INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION7. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1975), ‘Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes’8. Michael T. Maloney and Robert E. McCormick (1982), ‘A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation’9. Donald N. Dewees (1983), ‘Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy’10. Robert W. Hahn (1989), ‘Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders’11. James T. Hamilton (1997), ‘Taxes, Torts, and Toxics Release Inventory: Congressional Voting on Instruments to Control Pollution’12. Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee (1998), ‘The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program’13. Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz and Robert N. Stavins (1998), ‘The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy’14. Marcel Boyer and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1999), ‘Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation’15. Friedrich Schneider and Juergen Volkert (1999), ‘No Chance for Incentive-oriented Environmental Policies in Representative Democracies? A Public Choice Analysis’PART IIISETTING THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT TO BE DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITY 16. Per G. Fredriksson and Noel Gaston (2000), ‘Environmental Governance in Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups’17. John A. List and Shelby Gerking (2000), ‘Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States’18. Richard L. Revesz (2001), ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis’19. Per G. Fredriksson and Daniel L. Millimet (2002), ‘Strategic Interaction and the Determination of Environmental Policy across U.S. States’PART IVASSESSING THE USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 20. Robert W. Hahn (2000), ‘The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy’21. Wallace E. Oates (2000), ‘From Research to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics’22. Robert W. Hahn, Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins (2003), ‘Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A Retrospective Analysis’Name Index