This book makes a valuable, analytical contribution to recent debates on the ongoing institutional changes occurring within the European Union. It provides a comprehensive and diverse insight into a variety of areas, including in-depth studies of fiscal, monetary and voting issues, to help elucidate the current period of transitional change.The authors argue that a fiscal constitution is essential to help solve the deficits and debts that member countries face due to welfare state financing. Moreover, they believe that the successful implementation of a fiscal constitution is the key to a more coherent institutional setting for Europe as a whole. Although monetary institutions within the EU have already secured a degree of constitutional solution in the form of the euro, they warn that its stabilising power should not be overestimated: the European Central Bank has yet to experience financial crises like those faced by the Federal Reserve Bank. The authors move on to propose a new parliamentary design for Europe and assess the advantages for the elite of a small country to join the EU, compared to the population at large. This volume comprehensively explores the rapidly changing institutional configuration of the EU, employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches. It will be required reading for scholars of public choice, and those with an interest in political economy and EU integration. It is also an excellent sourcebook on European institutions and would provide useful complementary reading in a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate courses.
