Over the past few decades, economists have witnessed with growing uneasiness their failure to explain the ballooning of public debt in most countries. Using methodological individualism and micro-economics, this book overcomes flaws inherent in the standard macro approach, according to which governments manipulate public debt to promote systemic stability. This unique analysis is grounded in the writings of Antonio de Viti de Marco, injecting current analytical contributions and formulations into the framework to offer a forthright insight into public debt and political economy. Public Debt provides an alternative orientation that explains why concepts of public debt that are relevant for authoritarian regimes are not relevant for democratic regimes. It examines public debt in cooperative and monopolistic democracies as well as the corrupting quality of public debt in democracy. Including topics such as macro guidance within a Machiavellian approach, public debt as systemic lying and as a shell game, economy as an ecology vs. economy as an engine, individual vs. group action and cooperative state as ideal type, this book is a unique and refreshing approach to the material. This comprehensive and cohesive sourcebook will serve as a critical resource for academics interested in public debt and political economy.

Over the past few decades, economists have witnessed with growing uneasiness their failure to explain the ballooning of public debt in most countries. Using methodological individualism and micro-economics, this book overcomes flaws inherent in the standard macro approach, according to which governments manipulate public debt to promote systemic stability. This unique analysis is grounded in the writings of Antonio de Viti de Marco, injecting current analytical contributions and formulations into the framework to offer a forthright insight into public debt and political economy.

Public Debt provides an alternative orientation that explains why concepts of public debt that are relevant for authoritarian regimes are not relevant for democratic regimes. It examines public debt in cooperative and monopolistic democracies as well as the corrupting quality of public debt in democracy. Including topics such as macro guidance within a Machiavellian approach, public debt as systemic lying and as a shell game, economy as an ecology vs. economy as an engine, individual vs. group action and cooperative state as ideal type, this book is a unique and refreshing approach to the material.

This comprehensive and cohesive sourcebook will serve as a critical resource for academics interested in public debt and political economy.

The original essays in this book connect the microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches to public debt. Through their thought-provoking views, leading scholars offer insights into the incentives that individuals and governments may have in resorting to public debt, thereby promoting a clearer understanding of its economic consequences. The authors explore public debt along two distinct but complementary analytical paths. One path concerns microeconomic aspects of public debt as it emerges through budgetary processes where individuals respond to the costs and gains of different courses of action. The other concerns the systemic properties of rational individual acting within a democratic system of political economy. Within this scheme of thought, the two levels of analysis are integrated by recognition that efforts to control macro-level outcomes must address the micro-level circumstances and conditions that promote public debt as systemic budgetary outcomes. Scholars and students, as well as policy makers in public debt and political economy, will find this critical resource invaluable to understanding this vital issue.Contributors include: A. Alupoaiei, F. Balassone, G. Brennan, S. Cecchetti, M. Cecioni, M. Cioffi, W. Cornacchia, F. Corneli, F. Dragu, G. Eusepi, E. Longobardi, K. Mause, F. Neagu, A. Pedone, A. Rieck, L. Schuknecht, G. Semeraro, L. Voinea, R.E. Wagner

The original essays in this book connect the microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches to public debt. Through their thought-provoking views, leading scholars offer insights into the incentives that individuals and governments may have in resorting to public debt, thereby promoting a clearer understanding of its economic consequences.

The authors explore public debt along two distinct but complementary analytical paths. One path concerns microeconomic aspects of public debt as it emerges through budgetary processes where individuals respond to the costs and gains of different courses of action. The other concerns the systemic properties of rational individual acting within a democratic system of political economy. Within this scheme of thought, the two levels of analysis are integrated by recognition that efforts to control macro-level outcomes must address the micro-level circumstances and conditions that promote public debt as systemic budgetary outcomes.

Scholars and students, as well as policy makers in public debt and political economy, will find this critical resource invaluable to understanding this vital issue.

Contributors include: A. Alupoaiei, F. Balassone, G. Brennan, S. Cecchetti, M. Cecioni, M. Cioffi, W. Cornacchia, F. Corneli, F. Dragu, G. Eusepi, E. Longobardi, K. Mause, F. Neagu, A. Pedone, A. Rieck, L. Schuknecht, G. Semeraro, L. Voinea, R.E. Wagner

This book makes a valuable, analytical contribution to recent debates on the ongoing institutional changes occurring within the European Union. It provides a comprehensive and diverse insight into a variety of areas, including in-depth studies of fiscal, monetary and voting issues, to help elucidate the current period of transitional change.The authors argue that a fiscal constitution is essential to help solve the deficits and debts that member countries face due to welfare state financing. Moreover, they believe that the successful implementation of a fiscal constitution is the key to a more coherent institutional setting for Europe as a whole. Although monetary institutions within the EU have already secured a degree of constitutional solution in the form of the euro, they warn that its stabilising power should not be overestimated: the European Central Bank has yet to experience financial crises like those faced by the Federal Reserve Bank. The authors move on to propose a new parliamentary design for Europe and assess the advantages for the elite of a small country to join the EU, compared to the population at large. This volume comprehensively explores the rapidly changing institutional configuration of the EU, employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches. It will be required reading for scholars of public choice, and those with an interest in political economy and EU integration. It is also an excellent sourcebook on European institutions and would provide useful complementary reading in a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate courses.

Beyond Conventional Economics presents new original work from leading scholars on the interface between the individual and political and social institutions. The book offers a critique of the inadequacies of the conventional economic approach to politics and a state-of-the-art view of new paradigms challenging the dominant economic notion of the individual. A number of chapters also explore the limits of individually rational behaviour in political decision making - some by challenging the orthodox content of the idea of rationality, others by providing fresh views on the operation of political processes.This book is a must-read for anyone interested in understanding individual behaviour under limited rationality. Thought-provoking and enlightening, this is a unique book documenting a meaningful debate on the limits of rational behaviour inside public choice circles and will appeal to a wide audience of economists, political scientists and public choice scholars.

Over the past few decades, economists have witnessed with growing uneasiness their failure to explain the ballooning of public debt in most countries. Using methodological individualism and micro-economics, this book overcomes flaws inherent in the standard macro approach, according to which governments manipulate public debt to promote systemic stability. This unique analysis is grounded in the writings of Antonio de Viti de Marco, injecting current analytical contributions and formulations into the framework to offer a forthright insight into public debt and political economy. Public Debt provides an alternative orientation that explains why concepts of public debt that are relevant for authoritarian regimes are not relevant for democratic regimes. It examines public debt in cooperative and monopolistic democracies as well as the corrupting quality of public debt in democracy. Including topics such as macro guidance within a Machiavellian approach, public debt as systemic lying and as a shell game, economy as an ecology vs. economy as an engine, individual vs. group action and cooperative state as ideal type, this book is a unique and refreshing approach to the material. This comprehensive and cohesive sourcebook will serve as a critical resource for academics interested in public debt and political economy.

Over the past few decades, economists have witnessed with growing uneasiness their failure to explain the ballooning of public debt in most countries. Using methodological individualism and micro-economics, this book overcomes flaws inherent in the standard macro approach, according to which governments manipulate public debt to promote systemic stability. This unique analysis is grounded in the writings of Antonio de Viti de Marco, injecting current analytical contributions and formulations into the framework to offer a forthright insight into public debt and political economy.

Public Debt provides an alternative orientation that explains why concepts of public debt that are relevant for authoritarian regimes are not relevant for democratic regimes. It examines public debt in cooperative and monopolistic democracies as well as the corrupting quality of public debt in democracy. Including topics such as macro guidance within a Machiavellian approach, public debt as systemic lying and as a shell game, economy as an ecology vs. economy as an engine, individual vs. group action and cooperative state as ideal type, this book is a unique and refreshing approach to the material.

This comprehensive and cohesive sourcebook will serve as a critical resource for academics interested in public debt and political economy.

The original essays in this book connect the microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches to public debt. Through their thought-provoking views, leading scholars offer insights into the incentives that individuals and governments may have in resorting to public debt, thereby promoting a clearer understanding of its economic consequences. The authors explore public debt along two distinct but complementary analytical paths. One path concerns microeconomic aspects of public debt as it emerges through budgetary processes where individuals respond to the costs and gains of different courses of action. The other concerns the systemic properties of rational individual acting within a democratic system of political economy. Within this scheme of thought, the two levels of analysis are integrated by recognition that efforts to control macro-level outcomes must address the micro-level circumstances and conditions that promote public debt as systemic budgetary outcomes. Scholars and students, as well as policy makers in public debt and political economy, will find this critical resource invaluable to understanding this vital issue.Contributors include: A. Alupoaiei, F. Balassone, G. Brennan, S. Cecchetti, M. Cecioni, M. Cioffi, W. Cornacchia, F. Corneli, F. Dragu, G. Eusepi, E. Longobardi, K. Mause, F. Neagu, A. Pedone, A. Rieck, L. Schuknecht, G. Semeraro, L. Voinea, R.E. Wagner

The original essays in this book connect the microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches to public debt. Through their thought-provoking views, leading scholars offer insights into the incentives that individuals and governments may have in resorting to public debt, thereby promoting a clearer understanding of its economic consequences.

The authors explore public debt along two distinct but complementary analytical paths. One path concerns microeconomic aspects of public debt as it emerges through budgetary processes where individuals respond to the costs and gains of different courses of action. The other concerns the systemic properties of rational individual acting within a democratic system of political economy. Within this scheme of thought, the two levels of analysis are integrated by recognition that efforts to control macro-level outcomes must address the micro-level circumstances and conditions that promote public debt as systemic budgetary outcomes.

Scholars and students, as well as policy makers in public debt and political economy, will find this critical resource invaluable to understanding this vital issue.

Contributors include: A. Alupoaiei, F. Balassone, G. Brennan, S. Cecchetti, M. Cecioni, M. Cioffi, W. Cornacchia, F. Corneli, F. Dragu, G. Eusepi, E. Longobardi, K. Mause, F. Neagu, A. Pedone, A. Rieck, L. Schuknecht, G. Semeraro, L. Voinea, R.E. Wagner

This book makes a valuable, analytical contribution to recent debates on the ongoing institutional changes occurring within the European Union. It provides a comprehensive and diverse insight into a variety of areas, including in-depth studies of fiscal, monetary and voting issues, to help elucidate the current period of transitional change.The authors argue that a fiscal constitution is essential to help solve the deficits and debts that member countries face due to welfare state financing. Moreover, they believe that the successful implementation of a fiscal constitution is the key to a more coherent institutional setting for Europe as a whole. Although monetary institutions within the EU have already secured a degree of constitutional solution in the form of the euro, they warn that its stabilising power should not be overestimated: the European Central Bank has yet to experience financial crises like those faced by the Federal Reserve Bank. The authors move on to propose a new parliamentary design for Europe and assess the advantages for the elite of a small country to join the EU, compared to the population at large. This volume comprehensively explores the rapidly changing institutional configuration of the EU, employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches. It will be required reading for scholars of public choice, and those with an interest in political economy and EU integration. It is also an excellent sourcebook on European institutions and would provide useful complementary reading in a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate courses.

Beyond Conventional Economics presents new original work from leading scholars on the interface between the individual and political and social institutions. The book offers a critique of the inadequacies of the conventional economic approach to politics and a state-of-the-art view of new paradigms challenging the dominant economic notion of the individual. A number of chapters also explore the limits of individually rational behaviour in political decision making - some by challenging the orthodox content of the idea of rationality, others by providing fresh views on the operation of political processes.This book is a must-read for anyone interested in understanding individual behaviour under limited rationality. Thought-provoking and enlightening, this is a unique book documenting a meaningful debate on the limits of rational behaviour inside public choice circles and will appeal to a wide audience of economists, political scientists and public choice scholars.