Richard E. Wagner - Böcker

Federalism has generally been characterized as a system of government that is friendly to liberty. It is not obvious, though, why this should be so. Federalism is a form of government where citizens simultaneously reside in at least two governments, each of which has independent authority to tax and to regulate. By contrast, in a unitary form of government, citizens face only one government with independent authority to tax and regulate. At first glance, it would seem a bit strange to claim that liberty is more secure when citizens are members of two governments with independent authority than when they are members of only one such government. The relationship between federalism and liberty turns out to be a complex one, and one that is capable of working in either direction. Whether federalism supports or erodes liberty depends importantly on the institutional framework within which federalist governance takes place. The essays in this work examine this institutionalist theme from both theoretical and practical perspectives.

Cigarettes are under political attack at all_levels of government in the United States. From Washington, D. C. to state capitals to local govern­ ments, proposals abound to increase the cigarette excise tax, to impose smoking bans, to prevent cigarette advertising, to restrict the sale of cigarettes through vending machines, to cut off the export of cigarettes, to earmark the cigarette excise tax for health programs, to divest the stock of cigarette companies, and so on. And all of these are purportedly being advocated in the name of health. Undergirding and abetting the health argument is an economic argument that claims to place a value of up to $100 billion per year on the alleged health costs of smoking to the American economy, which is more than $3 per pack of cigarettes smoked. As our title suggests, our interest lies in the economics of smoking and not in the health issues surrounding smoking. We are professional economists and not medical scientists. We will focus on what, if any, economic consequences arise for nonsmokers when smokers smoke. For purposes of our discussion, we simply accept the premise that smoking damages health and proceed with our analysis. Since we have not studied the issue ourselves, we have no way of knowing whether such a premise is true. But it really does not matter for getting the economics of smoking right. The important point resides in who pays for whatever to smoking.

This timely book reveals that the budget deficits and accumulating debts that plague modern democracies reflect a clash between two rationalities of governance: one of private property and one of common property. The clashing of these rationalities at various places in society creates forms of societal tectonics that play out through budgeting. The book demonstrates that while this clash is an inherent feature of democratic political economy, it can nonetheless be limited through embracing once again a constitution of liberty. Not all commons settings have tragic outcomes, of course, but tragic outcomes loom large in democratic processes because they entail conflict between two very different forms of substantive rationality; the political and market rationalities. These are both orders that contain interactions among participants, but the institutional frameworks that govern those interactions differ, generating democratic budgetary tragedies. Those tragedies, moreover, are inherent in the conflict between the different rationalities and so cannot be eliminated. They can, as this book argues, be reduced by restoring a constitution of liberty in place of the constitution of control that has taken shape throughout the west over the past century. Economists interested in public finance, public policy and political economy along with scholars of political science, public administration, law and political philosophy will find this book intriguing. Contents: Preface 1. Budgeting: The Elusive Quest for Fiscal Responsibility 2. Budgeting and Political Economy: A Theoretical Framework 3. Budget Deficits, Ricardian Equivalence, and Macro-Micro Supervenience 4. Property Rights, Societal Tectonics, and the Fiscal Commons 5. Parliamentary Assemblies as Peculiar Market Bazaars 6. Taxation, Fiscal Politics, and Political Pricing 7. Regulation as Alternative Taxation 8. Public Finance for a Constitution of Liberty Bibliography Index

Economists commit a category mistake when they treat democratic governments as indebted. Monarchs can be indebted, as can individuals. In contrast, democracies can't truly be indebted. They are financial intermediaries that form a bridge between what are often willing borrowers and forced lenders. The language of public debt is an ideological language that promotes politically expressed desires and is not a scientific language that clarifies the practice of public finance. Economists have gone astray by assuming that a government is just another person whose impulses toward prudent action will restrict recourse to public debt and induce rational political action.

The essays in this book treat the relationships among politics, taxation, and the rule of law. A central tenet of democratic ideology is that taxation is something that we choose to do to ourselves, rather than being something that is imposed on us by some ruler. The basic ideology of the American constitutional founding is that government is not the source of our rights of person and property. To the contrary, government is something we establish with our prior rights of person and property to preserve and protect those rights. While it is possible to articulate some intellectual notions about good government and appropriate taxation, it does not follow from the mere fact of this articulation that actual taxation works as articulated. Taxation may be a necessary means of preserving and protecting rights of person and property, but it might also operate in various ways to undermine, abridge, and erode those rights. The central tenet of democratic ideology, a tenet that is reflected thoroughly in the American constitutional founding, is that it is people's prior right to their property that limits the reach of government.This ideology rejects without a second thought any notion that government defines the limits of people's right to property. Yet democratic practice may well contradict and subvert democratic ideology, though the relationship between practice and ideology is not so simple as one being dominant over the other.

The Handbook of Public Finance provides a definitive source, reference, and text for the field of public finance. In 18 chapters it surveys the state of the art - the tradition and breadth of the field but also its current status and recent developments. The Handbook's intellectual foundation and orientation is truly multidisciplinary. Throughout its examination of the standard material of public finance, it explores the connections between that material and such neighboring fields as political science, sociology, law, and public administration. The editors and contributors to the Handbook are distinguished scholars who write clearly and accessibly about the political economy of government budgets and their policy implications. To address the needs and interests of international scholars, they place European issues next to the American agenda and give attention to the issues of transformation in Central Eastern Europe and elsewhere.General Editors: Jürgen G. Backhaus, University of Erfurt Richard E. Wagner, George Mason UniversityContributors: Andy H. Barnett, Charles B. Blankart, Thomas E. Borcherding, Rainald Borck, Geoffrey Brennan, Giuseppe Eusepi, J. Stephen Ferris, Fred E. Folvary, Andrea Garzoni, Heinz Grossekettaler, Walter Hettich, Scott Hinds, Randall G. Holcombe, Jean-Michel Josselin, Carla Marchese, Alain Marciano, William S. Peirce, Nicholas Sanchez, David Schap, A. Allan Schmid, Russell S. Sobel, Stanley L. Winer, Bruce Yandle.

Public Interest Institute began operations in 1992 as Iowa's only state-level, independent, research organization. As a public-policy research organization, our four principal goals are to become an information and analysis resource for all Iowans; provide local, state, and national policy-makers with a rigorous, objective, and understandable analysis of specific policy initiatives; identify practical alternatives for action on critical issues; and provide a forum for policy-makers and individuals to share ideas and concerns. The Institute promotes the importance of a free-enterprise economic system and its relationship to a free and democratic society. It seeks to support the proper role of a limited government in a society based upon individual freedom and liberty. Concerned citizens are challenged to become better informed about public issues, for ideas have consequences, and involved individuals can make a difference. Following the general treatment of how to achieve these ideals contained in LIMITING LEVIATHAN, we have continued our series of books designed to examine the topics raised there in greater depth. In FEDERALIST GOVERNMENT IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE we developed the ways in which dividing governmental power between levels such as national and state can help citizens preserve their freedoms. In this volume we develop the ways in which property rights do the same.

Federalism has generally been characterized as a system of government that is friendly to liberty. It is not obvious, though, why this should be so. Federalism is a form of government where citizens simultaneously reside in at least two governments, each of which has independent authority to tax and to regulate. By contrast, in a unitary form of government citizens face only one government with independent authority to tax and regulate. At first glance, it would seem a bit strange to claim that liberty is more secure when citizens are members of two governments with independent authority than when they are members of only one such government. The relationship between federalism and liberty turns out to be a complex one, and one that is capable of working in either direction. Whether federalism supports or erodes liberty depends on importantly on the institutional framework within which federalist governance takes place. The essays in Federalist Government in Principle and Practice examine this institutionalist theme from both theoretical and practical perspectives.

This volume contains the papers, along with the discussant's re­ marks, presented at a conference on 'Federal Fiscal Responsibility', held at The Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, on 26-27 March 1976. Additionally, we, the editors, have included an introductory essay which sets forth some of our background thoughts that in­ formed our organization of the conference and which also de­ scribes some of our reactions to the conference. This conference was sponsored by the Liberty Fund, Inc. of Indianapolis, Indiana, which incorporated this conference into its overall program directed toward the study of the ideals of a free society of responsible individuals. Related to this effort, the Liberty Fund also assisted in supporting research on Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, by James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner (New York: Academic Press, 1977). Both Democracy in Deficit and the conference were de­ signed to examine one important aspect of the Liberty Fund's general set of concerns, namely the' way in which political con­ siderations influence the macroeconomic aspects of budgetary policy, thereby, in turn, influencing the future of American liberty and prosperity. We are most grateful to the Liberty Fund for their efforts, and we are pleased that Enid Goodrich, William Fletcher, Neil McLeod, and Helen Schultz of the Liberty Fund were able to attend the conference.

The Handbook of Public Finance provides a definitive source, reference, and text for the field of public finance. Throughout its examination of the standard material of public finance, it explores the connections between that material and such neighboring fields as political science, sociology, law, and public administration.

James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy: A Rational Reconstruction examines the contemporary meaning and significance of James M. Buchanan’s body of work. The book uses Buchanan’s past contributions to explore the present and future relevance of his scholarly contributions and insights. It seeks mainly to explain what insight for their work contemporary scholars might acquire by becoming familiar with some of Buchanan’s formulations. Buchanan was one of the most creative and prolific scholars of political economy during the post-war period. Not only was his body of work so immense that it could not be contained within 20 volumes of Collected Works, but also Buchanan’s scholarship made such strong contact with law, ethics, and political science that he could easily have served as a poster-child for the programs in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics which have been gaining momentum in recent years. Buchanan spoke for a style of economics that made wide and firm contact with the full range of the humane studies. This book emphasizes those features of Buchanan’s thought that seem relevant for contemporary scholarship within the broadly liberal tradition of political economy.

This timely book reveals that the budget deficits and accumulating debts that plague modern democracies reflect a clash between two rationalities of governance: one of private property and one of common property. The clashing of these rationalities at various places in society creates forms of societal tectonics that play out through budgeting. The book demonstrates that while this clash is an inherent feature of democratic political economy, it can nonetheless be limited through embracing once again a constitution of liberty. Not all commons settings have tragic outcomes, of course, but tragic outcomes loom large in democratic processes because they entail conflict between two very different forms of substantive rationality; the political and market rationalities. These are both orders that contain interactions among participants, but the institutional frameworks that govern those interactions differ, generating democratic budgetary tragedies. Those tragedies, moreover, are inherent in the conflict between the different rationalities and so cannot be eliminated. They can, as this book argues, be reduced by restoring a constitution of liberty in place of the constitution of control that has taken shape throughout the west over the past century. Economists interested in public finance, public policy and political economy along with scholars of political science, public administration, law and political philosophy will find this book intriguing. Contents: Preface 1. Budgeting: The Elusive Quest for Fiscal Responsibility 2. Budgeting and Political Economy: A Theoretical Framework 3. Budget Deficits, Ricardian Equivalence, and Macro-Micro Supervenience 4. Property Rights, Societal Tectonics, and the Fiscal Commons 5. Parliamentary Assemblies as Peculiar Market Bazaars 6. Taxation, Fiscal Politics, and Political Pricing 7. Regulation as Alternative Taxation 8. Public Finance for a Constitution of Liberty Bibliography Index

'While market activity and political activity are often analyzed independently of each other, Wagner demonstrates their interdependence. His novel analysis shows that politics has a level of complexity well beyond the way it is typically depicted in the social sciences, and shows that political activity has more in common with market activity than is commonly recognized. The book offers a wide range of insights and pushes readers to take a more nuanced view of politics.'- Randall G. Holcombe, Florida State University, USEconomists typically treat government as something outside the business realm, a sort of 'Lord of the Manor'. Richard Wagner argues that this is the wrong approach and can ultimately be destructive to capitalism and to society.Modern governments are a peculiar form of business enterprise. They face the same problems as regular businesses, such as ascertaining demand and organizing production, and act within the system in a way that can lead to a parasitical relationship with the market. Largely rooted in political economy, this book develops new theoretical ideas and formulations to explain why democracy is a difficult form of government to maintain. The author explores how and why limited governments can morph into a system of destructive politics, and looks at ways to escape this process.This dynamic book will be useful for public choice scholars, economists, political scientists, and lawyers who are interested in political economy in its various guises.

'While market activity and political activity are often analyzed independently of each other, Wagner demonstrates their interdependence. His novel analysis shows that politics has a level of complexity well beyond the way it is typically depicted in the social sciences, and shows that political activity has more in common with market activity than is commonly recognized. The book offers a wide range of insights and pushes readers to take a more nuanced view of politics.'- Randall G. Holcombe, Florida State University, USEconomists typically treat government as something outside the business realm, a sort of 'Lord of the Manor'. Richard Wagner argues that this is the wrong approach and can ultimately be destructive to capitalism and to society.Modern governments are a peculiar form of business enterprise. They face the same problems as regular businesses, such as ascertaining demand and organizing production, and act within the system in a way that can lead to a parasitical relationship with the market. Largely rooted in political economy, this book develops new theoretical ideas and formulations to explain why democracy is a difficult form of government to maintain. The author explores how and why limited governments can morph into a system of destructive politics, and looks at ways to escape this process.This dynamic book will be useful for public choice scholars, economists, political scientists, and lawyers who are interested in political economy in its various guises.

Over the past few decades, economists have witnessed with growing uneasiness their failure to explain the ballooning of public debt in most countries. Using methodological individualism and micro-economics, this book overcomes flaws inherent in the standard macro approach, according to which governments manipulate public debt to promote systemic stability. This unique analysis is grounded in the writings of Antonio de Viti de Marco, injecting current analytical contributions and formulations into the framework to offer a forthright insight into public debt and political economy. Public Debt provides an alternative orientation that explains why concepts of public debt that are relevant for authoritarian regimes are not relevant for democratic regimes. It examines public debt in cooperative and monopolistic democracies as well as the corrupting quality of public debt in democracy. Including topics such as macro guidance within a Machiavellian approach, public debt as systemic lying and as a shell game, economy as an ecology vs. economy as an engine, individual vs. group action and cooperative state as ideal type, this book is a unique and refreshing approach to the material. This comprehensive and cohesive sourcebook will serve as a critical resource for academics interested in public debt and political economy.

The original essays in this book connect the microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches to public debt. Through their thought-provoking views, leading scholars offer insights into the incentives that individuals and governments may have in resorting to public debt, thereby promoting a clearer understanding of its economic consequences. The authors explore public debt along two distinct but complementary analytical paths. One path concerns microeconomic aspects of public debt as it emerges through budgetary processes where individuals respond to the costs and gains of different courses of action. The other concerns the systemic properties of rational individual acting within a democratic system of political economy. Within this scheme of thought, the two levels of analysis are integrated by recognition that efforts to control macro-level outcomes must address the micro-level circumstances and conditions that promote public debt as systemic budgetary outcomes. Scholars and students, as well as policy makers in public debt and political economy, will find this critical resource invaluable to understanding this vital issue.Contributors include: A. Alupoaiei, F. Balassone, G. Brennan, S. Cecchetti, M. Cecioni, M. Cioffi, W. Cornacchia, F. Corneli, F. Dragu, G. Eusepi, E. Longobardi, K. Mause, F. Neagu, A. Pedone, A. Rieck, L. Schuknecht, G. Semeraro, L. Voinea, R.E. Wagner

Innovative in its approach, Rethinking Public Choice reviews the concept of public choice since the 1950s post-war period and the application of economics to political practices and institutions, as well as its evolution in recent years attracting contributions from political science and philosophy. Examining the growing variety of theoretical orientations on the topic, such as entangled political economy and additive political economy, the book provides new analytical insights into combining the old and new to establish a more unified political economy. Richard E. Wagner expertly highlights the key issues an entangled economy can bring, including incomplete information and its constant evolution as it reflects ever changing public choice ideas. Wagner seeks to extend the reach of public choice by distinguishing the formal idea of rationality that has dominated public choice from the immensely varied practice of human action that opens up now directions for public choice. This insightful approach will prove an excellent resource for academics and scholars of economics and political science, as well as those within the field of public administration as it offers an excellent blend of all subjects.

Taking an innovative look at the origins of economics, this forward-thinking book relocates economics from a materialistic general theory of rational action into an idealistic theory of social organization and individual action. Adding new insightful analytical methods such as complexity theory, graph theory and computational modelling to the original insights of the Scottish Enlightenment, Richard Wagner explores economics in an ever-changing society, looking at the key civilizing processes and the important social questions. Rethinking Economics as Social Theory moves away from the traditional review of analytical exercises and associated data and illustrates an enlightening scheme of thought where human societies are heterogeneous and not homogeneous and where change is continually in motion. Furthermore, Wagner theorises that economizing is a universal form of human action that plays out in numerous substantive directions and shows cooperation and conflict to have a yin-and-yang relationship. This illuminating book will prove an excellent resource for economists interested in working outside of comparative statics as well as social scientists looking for a broader vision of economics. Philosophers and those working in the field of biological sciences will also find this an informative read.

The enormous growth of the state occurring over much of this century has led the authors of this book to re-examine the proper relationship between the American people and their government. The authors first analyse the case for limiting governmental power and discuss which limits are appropriate, including tax and regulatory limits and electoral, congressional term and constitutional limits. They also examine possible auxiliary sources of state limitation, such as technological and economic limitations, informal order and lessons to be learned from local government. In sum, this book provides a seminal analysis of the necessity of limiting state power in order to preserve human rights.Limiting Leviathan will be a valuable reference point for scholars of public choice and government institutions.

This book advances a social-theoretic treatment of public finance, which contrasts with the typical treatment of government as an agent of intervention into a market economy. To start, Richard Wagner construes government not as an agent but as a polycentric process of interaction, just as is a market economy. The theory of markets and the theory of public finance are thus construed as complementary components of a broader endeavor of social theorizing, with both seeking to provide insight into the emergence of generally coordinated relationships within society. The author places analytical focus on emergent processes of development rather than on states of equilibrium, and with much of that development set in motion by conflict among people and their plans. Some of the book's defining characteristics include:Budgets emerge through organizationally constituted political entrepreneurshipGovernment is construed as a process of interaction and participation and not as a unitary entity of interventionGovernment and markets are incorporated into a unified theory of property which is traced to human nature and its requirements for both autonomy and solidarity.Richard Wagner's book will be of interest to researchers in public finance, public choice, Austrian economics, political science and public policy.

This book advances a social-theoretic treatment of public finance, which contrasts with the typical treatment of government as an agent of intervention into a market economy. To start, Richard Wagner construes government not as an agent but as a polycentric process of interaction, just as is a market economy. The theory of markets and the theory of public finance are thus construed as complementary components of a broader endeavor of social theorizing, with both seeking to provide insight into the emergence of generally coordinated relationships within society. The author places analytical focus on emergent processes of development rather than on states of equilibrium, and with much of that development set in motion by conflict among people and their plans. Some of the book's defining characteristics include:Budgets emerge through organizationally constituted political entrepreneurshipGovernment is construed as a process of interaction and participation and not as a unitary entity of interventionGovernment and markets are incorporated into a unified theory of property which is traced to human nature and its requirements for both autonomy and solidarity.Richard Wagner's book will be of interest to researchers in public finance, public choice, Austrian economics, political science and public policy.

In this far-reaching and insightful monograph, Richard Wagner exposes the failure of the United States constitution to overcome the tyranny of the majority so feared by the Founding Fathers. Recognising that to the extent a written parchment is enforceable, it is through the construction of a self-supporting balance of private interests, Professor Wagner sketches a balance between the principles of good constitutional order and the placement of guns of self-interest necessary for the preservation of the rights to life, liberty and property. He concludes his analysis with an assessment of the prospects of converting the rent-seeking state into an entrepreneurial state self-interestedly committed to classical liberal principles of constitutional order.The author clearly demonstrates why the tyranny of the majority cannot be prevented by constitutional parchment unless the institutions of society are designed to offer complementary support to limited government and the rule of law. Parchment, Guns and Constitutional Order offers a solution designed to harness the political process to that objective.

Trade policy in the United States since 1930 is rigorously evaluated in this major new book. Using public choice analysis to identify and explain protectionist behavior, Charles K. Rowley, Willem Thorbecke and Richard E. Wagner demonstrate why unilateral free trade cannot be achieved through the normal political process and make a strong case for constitutional reform.Trade Protection in the United States analyzes the history of US trade policy to explain why interest groups are able to foster protectionist policies despite the advantages which free trade offers consumers. The authors also explain why the principles of managed trade - as epitomized in the institution of the GATT - are inevitably subverted by protectionism. This important book concludes with a vigorous justification of unilateral free trade and makes a convincing case for protecting the freedom to trade through an amendment to the US constitution.Applying recent developments in constitutional political economy to a key policy issue, this book will be welcomed by economists, political scientists and lawyers as a major statement of the right to trade.

In Economic Policy in a Liberal Democracy, Richard E. Wagner offers an approach to welfare economics and economic policy appropriate for a classically liberal society.Professor Wagner explains how welfare economics has been unable to fulfil the aspirations of its advocates because it assumes that the consequences of policy measures are sufficiently knowable to achieve specific and intended outcomes. The standard vision of the corrective state, where the state intervenes to repair economic failures and to achieve beneficial consequences, is revealed to be incoherent because the state lacks the competence to influence economic outcomes. Once the full complexity of the economy is recognized, policy measures are shown to generate a plethora of unintended consequences. What emerges instead is a focus on policy for creating and maintaining a constitutional framework that maintains and supports the liberal order in which people organise their activities.

“A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan’s many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory.”–Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA"The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book."–Mario Rizzo, Professor of Economics, New York University, USAThis book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan’s receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to used logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarlycommunity. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan’s scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also was a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy.This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan’s scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan’s scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past.

“A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan’s many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory.”–Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA"The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book."–Mario Rizzo, Professor of Economics, New York University, USAThis book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan’s receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to used logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarlycommunity. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan’s scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also was a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy.This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan’s scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan’s scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past.

This book examines macroeconomic theory from an analytical framework provided by theories of complex systems, in contrast to conventional theories founded on aggregation.

This book examines macroeconomic theory from an analytical framework provided by theories of complex systems, in contrast to conventional theories founded on aggregation.