Robert D. Tollison – författare

The rapidly changing and evolving art market might appear to be chaotic to the casual observer, with new highs, potential lows, and tastes and fashions changing season to season. Economists, however, view the actions of buyers and sellers as constituting an identifiable market. They have, for some decades, studied such issues as artistic productivity and "death effects" on prices, investment returns, and on the basis of the behavior and estimated prices in auction markets. The Economics of American Art analyzes the most pervasive economic issues facing the art world, applied to the whole spectrum of American art. The book begins by looking at how a market for American art developed, how the politics of the post-war era shaped, at least in large part, the direction of American art, and how this legacy continues into contemporary art today. The book then tackles several salient, integral questions animating the American art world: Are age and "type" of artist (i.e. traditional or "innovative") related and, if so, how might they be related to productivity? Is investment in American art a remunerative endeavor compared to other investment possibilities? Do economic insights provide understanding of fakes, fraud and theft of art, particularly American art, and is it possible to prevent art crime? Is there is a boom (or a bust) in the market for contemporary American art as might be found in other markets? The ongoing evolution of American art is attended by a massive number of influences, and the economic concepts employed in this volume will complement other critical and important cultural studies of art. Both practical and accessible, The Economics of American Art will be essential for collectors, auction houses, American art experts of all kinds, museums, gallery owners and, not least, by economists with continuing scholarly interests in these matters.

The rapidly changing and evolving art market might appear to be chaotic to the casual observer, with new highs, potential lows, and tastes and fashions changing season to season. Economists, however, view the actions of buyers and sellers as constituting an identifiable market. They have, for some decades, studied such issues as artistic productivity and "death effects" on prices, investment returns, and on the basis of the behavior and estimated prices in auction markets.The Economics of American Art analyzes the most pervasive economic issues facing the art world, applied to the whole spectrum of American art. The book begins by looking at how a market for American art developed, how the politics of the post-war era shaped, at least in large part, the direction of American art, and how this legacy continues into contemporary art today. The book then tackles several salient, integral questions animating the American art world: Are age and "type" of artist (i.e. traditional or "innovative") related and, if so, how might they be related to productivity? Is investment in American art a remunerative endeavor compared to other investment possibilities? Do economic insights provide understanding of fakes, fraud and theft of art, particularly American art, and is it possible to prevent art crime? Is there is a boom (or a bust) in the market for contemporary American art as might be found in other markets?The ongoing evolution of American art is attended by a massive number of influences, and the economic concepts employed in this volume will complement other critical and important cultural studies of art. Both practical and accessible, The Economics of American Art will be essential for collectors, auction houses, American art experts of all kinds, museums, gallery owners and, not least, by economists with continuing scholarly interests in these matters.

The rapidly changing and evolving art market might appear to be chaotic to the casual observer, with new highs, potential lows, and tastes and fashions changing season to season. Economists, however, view the actions of buyers and sellers as constituting an identifiable market. They have, for some decades, studied such issues as artistic productivity and "death effects" on prices, investment returns, and on the basis of the behavior and estimated prices in auction markets.The Economics of American Art analyzes the most pervasive economic issues facing the art world, applied to the whole spectrum of American art. The book begins by looking at how a market for American art developed, how the politics of the post-war era shaped, at least in large part, the direction of American art, and how this legacy continues into contemporary art today. The book then tackles several salient, integral questions animating the American art world: Are age and "type" of artist (i.e. traditional or "innovative") related and, if so, how might they be related to productivity? Is investment in American art a remunerative endeavor compared to other investment possibilities? Do economic insights provide understanding of fakes, fraud and theft of art, particularly American art, and is it possible to prevent art crime? Is there is a boom (or a bust) in the market for contemporary American art as might be found in other markets?The ongoing evolution of American art is attended by a massive number of influences, and the economic concepts employed in this volume will complement other critical and important cultural studies of art. Both practical and accessible, The Economics of American Art will be essential for collectors, auction houses, American art experts of all kinds, museums, gallery owners and, not least, by economists with continuing scholarly interests in these matters.

The Church dominated society in the Middle Ages and functioned as a quasi-government, providing public and private goods. This book is the first to examine specific institutions in the Church in the Middle Ages in economic terms. Other books have argued generally that the Church either had a positive or negative effect on economic development. The authors of this book look more closely at the actual Church institutions and practices and describe how each functioned as a part of the larger economy of the time. They focus especially on marriage, usury, heresy, the crusades, and the monasteries. It is not their purpose to reject or impugn religious motives that may be advanced by theologians and historians. Their goal is to bring a fresh perspective to the role of institutions of the medieval Church in economic development.

Without meaning to be irreverent, it is fair to say that in the Middle Ages, at the height of its political and economic power, the Roman Catholic Church functioned in part as a powerful and sophisticated corporation. The Church dealt in a "product" many consumers felt they had to have: the salvation of their immortal souls. The Pope served as its CEO, the College of Cardinals as its board of directors, bishoprics and monasteries as its franchises. And while the Church certainly had moral and social goals, this early antecedent to AT&T and General Motors had economic motives and methods as well, seeking to maximize profits by eliminating competitors and extending its markets. In Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm, five highly respected economists advance the controversial argument that the story of the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages is in large part a story of supply and demand. Without denying the centrality--or sincerity--of religious motives, the authors employ the tools of modern economics to analyze how the Church''s objectives went well beyond the realm of the spiritual. They explore the myriad sources of the Church''s wealth, including tithes and land rents, donations and bequests, judicial services and monastic agricultural production. And they present an in-depth look at the ways in which Church principles on marriage, usury, and crusade were revised as necessary to meet--and in many ways to create--the needs of a vast body of consumers. Along the way, the book raises and answers many intriguing questions. The authors explore the reasons behind the great crusades against the Moslems, probing beyond motives of pure idealism to highlight the Church''s concern with revenues from tourism and the sale of relics threatened by Moslem encroachment in the holy lands. They examine the Church''s involvement in the marriage market, revealing how the clergy filled their coffers by extracting fees for blessing or dissolving marital unions, for hearing marital disputes, and even for granting permission for blood relatives to wed. And they shed light on the concept of purgatory, showing how this "product innovation" developed by the Church in the twelfth century--a form of "deferred payment"--opened the floodgates for a fresh market in post-mortem atonement through payments on behalf of the deceased. Finally, the authors show how the cumulative costs that the faithful were asked to bear eventually priced the Roman Catholic church out of the market, paving the way for Protestant reformers like Martin Luther. A ground-breaking look at the growth and decline of the medieval Church, Sacred Trust demonstrates how economic reasoning can be used to cast light on the behavior of any complex historical institution. It offers rare insight into one of the great historical powers of Western civilization, in a analysis that will intrigue anyone interested in life in the Middle Ages, in church history, or in the influence of economic motives on historical events.

In the global marketplace of ideas, few realms spark as much conflict as religion. For millions of people, it is an integral part of everyday life, reflected by a widely divergent supply of practices and philosophical perspectives. Yet, historically, the marketplace has not always been competitive. While the early Common Era saw competition between Christianity, Judaism, and the many pagan cults, Roman Christianity came eventually to dominate Western Europe.   Using basic concepts of economic theory, Robert B. Ekelund Jr. and Robert D. Tollison explain the origin and subsequent spread of Roman Christianity, showing first how the standard concepts of risk, cost, and benefit can account for the demand for religion. Then, drawing on the economics of networking, entrepreneurship, and industrial organization, the book explains Christianity''s rapid ascent. Like a business, the church developed sound business strategies that increased its market share to a near monopoly in the medieval period. This book offers a fascinating look at the dynamics of Christianity’s rise, as well as how aspects the church’s structure—developed over the first millennium—illuminate a number of critical problems faced by the church today.

In Policy Challenges and Political Responses, leading public choice scholars confront the most significant problems facing democratic societies at the dawn of the 21st century. Ranging widely across the policy spectrum, this authoritative volume demonstrates the vibrancy and continuing relevance of the public choice research program by applying its ideas and methods to constitution-making in the European Union, terrorism, the growth of government, political campaign finance, vote-counting technologies, participatory democracy, corporate governance, school choice, and tort reform. Essays assessing the present state of the social contract and the enduring tensions between capitalism, socialism, and democracy broaden the book’s perspective.The distinguished list of contributors includes James Buchanan, Charles Rowley, Dennis Mueller, Todd Sandler, Randall Holcombe, Michael Munger, Thomas Stratmann, Harold Mulherin, Lawrence Kenny, and Paul Rubin. Edited by two of the editors of the journal Public Choice and as fresh as today’s headlines, this volume positions the public choice literature in the context of current events and points its research agenda in new directions. It is a unique and indispensable collection of value to economists, political scientists, political philosophers, and public policymakers.

The Theory of Public Choice is a landmark volume that brings together key essays and articles charting the rapid evolution of public choice theory during its most formative decade. Edited by James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison—leading figures in the “Virginian School” of political economy—this collection synthesizes the major advances of public choice as it applies the tools of economic analysis to the workings of democratic and political institutions. The volume begins with overviews of the field’s development, highlighting public choice’s foundational challenge to “romantic” notions of government and its turn toward a more realistic, empirical understanding of collective decision-making. Renowned contributors—including Buchanan, Dennis Mueller, Gordon Tullock, and many others—explore subjects from voting theory and constitutional economics to rent-seeking, bureaucracy, and the political economy of welfare and regulation. Organized into topical sections covering theoretical advances, applications, empirical studies, and philosophical issues, The Theory of Public Choice illuminates how economics, political science, and policy analysis intersect. Whether addressing topics like political resource allocation, the logic of majority rule, or the emergence of tax and spending limitations, these essays demonstrate how public choice theory has reshaped the way scholars, policymakers, and citizens think about government. Accessible yet rigorous, this collection is essential for anyone seeking insight into the mechanisms of collective action, constitutional design, and the ongoing challenge of ensuring accountability and efficiency in public institutions. It stands as a vital resource for students and scholars in economics, political science, public policy, and related fields.

The Theory of Public Choice is a landmark volume that brings together key essays and articles charting the rapid evolution of public choice theory during its most formative decade. Edited by James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison-leading figures in the "e;Virginian School"e; of political economy-this collection synthesizes the major advances of public choice as it applies the tools of economic analysis to the workings of democratic and political institutions.The volume begins with overviews of the field's development, highlighting public choice's foundational challenge to "e;romantic"e; notions of government and its turn toward a more realistic, empirical understanding of collective decision-making. Renowned contributors-including Buchanan, Dennis Mueller, Gordon Tullock, and many others-explore subjects from voting theory and constitutional economics to rent-seeking, bureaucracy, and the political economy of welfare and regulation.Organized into topical sections covering theoretical advances, applications, empirical studies, and philosophical issues, The Theory of Public Choice illuminates how economics, political science, and policy analysis intersect. Whether addressing topics like political resource allocation, the logic of majority rule, or the emergence of tax and spending limitations, these essays demonstrate how public choice theory has reshaped the way scholars, policymakers, and citizens think about government.Accessible yet rigorous, this collection is essential for anyone seeking insight into the mechanisms of collective action, constitutional design, and the ongoing challenge of ensuring accountability and efficiency in public institutions. It stands as a vital resource for students and scholars in economics, political science, public policy, and related fields.

Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Public Choice explores politics in an empirical spirit. The topics covered are novel and important, including the impact of campaign finance on the size of government, the economics of gerrymandering, constitutional change, and budgetary politics. The approach is to formulate and to test interesting hypotheses about political behavior. The essential idea is to illustrate the power of public choice theory in explaining actual politics. The volume brings together the work of Crain and Tollison and other scholars who have worked in this public choice tradition, and shows the power of empirical approaches in explaining the origin and inner working of political institutions and processes.

Cigarettes are under political attack at all_levels of government in the United States. From Washington, D. C. to state capitals to local govern­ ments, proposals abound to increase the cigarette excise tax, to impose smoking bans, to prevent cigarette advertising, to restrict the sale of cigarettes through vending machines, to cut off the export of cigarettes, to earmark the cigarette excise tax for health programs, to divest the stock of cigarette companies, and so on. And all of these are purportedly being advocated in the name of health. Undergirding and abetting the health argument is an economic argument that claims to place a value of up to $100 billion per year on the alleged health costs of smoking to the American economy, which is more than $3 per pack of cigarettes smoked. As our title suggests, our interest lies in the economics of smoking and not in the health issues surrounding smoking. We are professional economists and not medical scientists. We will focus on what, if any, economic consequences arise for nonsmokers when smokers smoke. For purposes of our discussion, we simply accept the premise that smoking damages health and proceed with our analysis. Since we have not studied the issue ourselves, we have no way of knowing whether such a premise is true. But it really does not matter for getting the economics of smoking right. The important point resides in who pays for whatever to smoking.

It is now twenty years since the concept of rent-seeking was first devised by Gordon Tullock, though he was not responsible for coining the phrase itself. His initial insight has burgeoned over two decades into a major research program which has had an impact not only on public choice, but also on the related disciplines of economics, political science, and law and economics. The reach of the insight has proved to be universal, with relevance not just for the democracies, but also, and arguably more important, for all forms of autocracy, irrespective of ideological com­ plexion. It is not surprising, therefore, that this volume is the third edited publication dedicated specifically to scholarship into rent-seeking behavior. The theory of rent-seeking bridges normative and positive analyses of state action. In its normative dimension, rent-seeking scholarship has expanded, enlivened, in some respects turned on its head, the traditional welfare analyses of such features of modern economics as monopoly, externalities, public goods, and trade protection devices. In its positive dimension, rent-seeking contributions have provided an important analy­ tical perspective from which to understand and to predict the behavior of politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats, the media and the academy within the political market place. This bridge between normative and positive elements of analysis is invaluable in facilitating an understanding of and evaluating the costs of state activity within a consistent paradigm.

In Policy Challenges and Political Responses, leading public choice scholars confront the most significant problems facing democratic societies at the dawn of the 21st century. Ranging widely across the policy spectrum, this authoritative volume demonstrates the vibrancy and continuing relevance of the public choice research program by applying its ideas and methods to constitution-making in the European Union, terrorism, the growth of government, political campaign finance, vote-counting technologies, participatory democracy, corporate governance, school choice, and tort reform. Essays assessing the present state of the social contract and the enduring tensions between capitalism, socialism, and democracy broaden the book’s perspective.The distinguished list of contributors includes James Buchanan, Charles Rowley, Dennis Mueller, Todd Sandler, Randall Holcombe, Michael Munger, Thomas Stratmann, Harold Mulherin, Lawrence Kenny, and Paul Rubin. Edited by two of the editors of the journal Public Choice and as fresh as today’s headlines, this volume positions the public choice literature in the context of current events and points its research agenda in new directions. It is a unique and indispensable collection of value to economists, political scientists, political philosophers, and public policymakers.

It is now twenty years since the concept of rent-seeking was first devised by Gordon Tullock, though he was not responsible for coining the phrase itself. His initial insight has burgeoned over two decades into a major research program which has had an impact not only on public choice, but also on the related disciplines of economics, political science, and law and economics. The reach of the insight has proved to be universal, with relevance not just for the democracies, but also, and arguably more important, for all forms of autocracy, irrespective of ideological com­ plexion. It is not surprising, therefore, that this volume is the third edited publication dedicated specifically to scholarship into rent-seeking behavior. The theory of rent-seeking bridges normative and positive analyses of state action. In its normative dimension, rent-seeking scholarship has expanded, enlivened, in some respects turned on its head, the traditional welfare analyses of such features of modern economics as monopoly, externalities, public goods, and trade protection devices. In its positive dimension, rent-seeking contributions have provided an important analy­ tical perspective from which to understand and to predict the behavior of politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats, the media and the academy within the political market place. This bridge between normative and positive elements of analysis is invaluable in facilitating an understanding of and evaluating the costs of state activity within a consistent paradigm.

This collection of previously unpublished expository writings by Gordon Tullock on themes ranging from game theory, externalities, public choice, rent-seeking, law and economics, and economic progress is representative of the breadth of Tullock''s career. As co-founder of Public Choice, Tullock has been a major contributor to our understanding of the logic of collective choice and the politics of collective action. Tullock''s insights have helped establish the unambiguous message that political, social, and economic institutions affect individual behavior whether in economics or political markets. Tullock''s hypotheses, proposed laws, and paradoxes have shaped the development of public choice, as well as charting new areas in law, economics, and sociobiology.In sorting through Tullock''s personal papers, the editors learned and here present the many dimensions of the man and the breadth of his interests. From the papers, we can piece together much of Tullock''s personal history. For example, there are myths surrounding Gordon Tullock that can be laid to rest: his birthplace, the lack of a baccalaureate degree, the "one" course that marks his formal training in economics, and his career prior to his academic emergence in the mid-1950s.

It is now twenty years since the concept of rent-seeking was first devised by Gordon Tullock, though he was not responsible for coining the phrase itself. His initial insight has burgeoned over two decades into a major research program which has had an impact not only on public choice, but also on the related disciplines of economics, political science, and law and economics. The reach of the insight has proved to be universal, with relevance not just for the democracies, but also, and arguably more important, for all forms of autocracy, irrespective of ideological com­ plexion. It is not surprising, therefore, that this volume is the third edited publication dedicated specifically to scholarship into rent-seeking behavior. The theory of rent-seeking bridges normative and positive analyses of state action. In its normative dimension, rent-seeking scholarship has expanded, enlivened, in some respects turned on its head, the traditional welfare analyses of such features of modern economics as monopoly, externalities, public goods, and trade protection devices. In its positive dimension, rent-seeking contributions have provided an important analy­ tical perspective from which to understand and to predict the behavior of politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats, the media and the academy within the political market place. This bridge between normative and positive elements of analysis is invaluable in facilitating an understanding of and evaluating the costs of state activity within a consistent paradigm.

This collection brings together the classic papers on the economics of rent seeking. These papers date from Gordon Tullock's original 1967 paper which first put forth the idea that the pursuit of transfers was socially costly. Other classic papers by Anne Krueger and Richard Posner are included, as well as a series of more recent papers which trace the evolution of the literature on this important innovation in economic theory.

The Economics of Budget Deficits provides a comprehensive overview of the scholarly literature exploring the causes and consequences of deficit spending and the public debt. Incorporating classical, Keynesian and public choice analyses of debt-financed public expenditures, the two volumes contain major theoretical and empirical contributions to the debate. They cover such critical fiscal policy issues as the history and measurement of budget deficits, the question of who bears the burden of the public debt, the use of deficits to solve problems of dynamic policy inconsistency and the relative effectiveness of fiscal rules and constitutional constraints as mechanisms for achieving budget balance. The editors provide an authoritative introduction to the two volumes and separate overviews of each of the seven parts. The Economics of Budget Deficits is an indispensable reference for all scholars and students interested in fiscal policy and for all policymakers.

This Festschrift was "presented" in electronic form to Buchanan on the occasion of his eightieth birthday on October 3, 1999, after dinner in Fairfax, Virginia. As one might have expected, the response to our call for papers was vo­ luminous. In looking over the many contributions, we felt that a "published" Festschrift was also possible and fitting for the eightieth birthday of so prodi­ gious and influential a scholar as Professor Buchanan. To that end we have assembled the following volume. In selecting the papers to be included here we have basically tried to choose those papers which in some way bear on Buchanan's contributions. Perfectly good papers about issues not related to Buchanan's research agenda or not referring directly to Buchanan's work were not included. Space constraints did not allow universal coverage, so choices had to be made. It should be stated clearly that these were our choices based on the criterion that the contribution be relevant to Buchanan's work. Buchanan had nothing whatsoever to do with the selection of papers for this volume. Once choices had been made, we arranged the papers by subject matter ranging from various aspects of Buchanan's work in economics, political science, philosophy, and related areas, to some more personal recollections of Jim as a professor, friend, and colleague. Including the latter material was also our decision, and this probably represents a choice with which Jim would not have agreed. We think, however, that the reader will find these pieces interesting and informative.

This Festschrift was "presented" in electronic form to Buchanan on the occasion of his eightieth birthday on October 3, 1999, after dinner in Fairfax, Virginia. As one might have expected, the response to our call for papers was vo­ luminous. In looking over the many contributions, we felt that a "published" Festschrift was also possible and fitting for the eightieth birthday of so prodi­ gious and influential a scholar as Professor Buchanan. To that end we have assembled the following volume. In selecting the papers to be included here we have basically tried to choose those papers which in some way bear on Buchanan's contributions. Perfectly good papers about issues not related to Buchanan's research agenda or not referring directly to Buchanan's work were not included. Space constraints did not allow universal coverage, so choices had to be made. It should be stated clearly that these were our choices based on the criterion that the contribution be relevant to Buchanan's work. Buchanan had nothing whatsoever to do with the selection of papers for this volume. Once choices had been made, we arranged the papers by subject matter ranging from various aspects of Buchanan's work in economics, political science, philosophy, and related areas, to some more personal recollections of Jim as a professor, friend, and colleague. Including the latter material was also our decision, and this probably represents a choice with which Jim would not have agreed. We think, however, that the reader will find these pieces interesting and informative.

This Festschrift was "presented" in electronic form to Buchanan on the occasion of his eightieth birthday on October 3, 1999, after dinner in Fairfax, Virginia. As one might have expected, the response to our call for papers was vo­ luminous. In looking over the many contributions, we felt that a "published" Festschrift was also possible and fitting for the eightieth birthday of so prodi­ gious and influential a scholar as Professor Buchanan. To that end we have assembled the following volume. In selecting the papers to be included here we have basically tried to choose those papers which in some way bear on Buchanan''s contributions. Perfectly good papers about issues not related to Buchanan''s research agenda or not referring directly to Buchanan''s work were not included. Space constraints did not allow universal coverage, so choices had to be made. It should be stated clearly that these were our choices based on the criterion that the contribution be relevant to Buchanan''s work. Buchanan had nothing whatsoever to do with the selection of papers for this volume. Once choices had been made, we arranged the papers by subject matter ranging from various aspects of Buchanan''s work in economics, political science, philosophy, and related areas, to some more personal recollections of Jim as a professor, friend, and colleague. Including the latter material was also our decision, and this probably represents a choice with which Jim would not have agreed. We think, however, that the reader will find these pieces interesting and informative.

Cigarettes are under political attack at all_levels of government in the United States. From Washington, D. C. to state capitals to local govern­ ments, proposals abound to increase the cigarette excise tax, to impose smoking bans, to prevent cigarette advertising, to restrict the sale of cigarettes through vending machines, to cut off the export of cigarettes, to earmark the cigarette excise tax for health programs, to divest the stock of cigarette companies, and so on. And all of these are purportedly being advocated in the name of health. Undergirding and abetting the health argument is an economic argument that claims to place a value of up to $100 billion per year on the alleged health costs of smoking to the American economy, which is more than $3 per pack of cigarettes smoked. As our title suggests, our interest lies in the economics of smoking and not in the health issues surrounding smoking. We are professional economists and not medical scientists. We will focus on what, if any, economic consequences arise for nonsmokers when smokers smoke. For purposes of our discussion, we simply accept the premise that smoking damages health and proceed with our analysis. Since we have not studied the issue ourselves, we have no way of knowing whether such a premise is true. But it really does not matter for getting the economics of smoking right. The important point resides in who pays for whatever to smoking.

Cigarettes are under political attack at all_levels of government in the United States. From Washington, D. C. to state capitals to local govern­ ments, proposals abound to increase the cigarette excise tax, to impose smoking bans, to prevent cigarette advertising, to restrict the sale of cigarettes through vending machines, to cut off the export of cigarettes, to earmark the cigarette excise tax for health programs, to divest the stock of cigarette companies, and so on. And all of these are purportedly being advocated in the name of health. Undergirding and abetting the health argument is an economic argument that claims to place a value of up to $100 billion per year on the alleged health costs of smoking to the American economy, which is more than $3 per pack of cigarettes smoked. As our title suggests, our interest lies in the economics of smoking and not in the health issues surrounding smoking. We are professional economists and not medical scientists. We will focus on what, if any, economic consequences arise for nonsmokers when smokers smoke. For purposes of our discussion, we simply accept the premise that smoking damages health and proceed with our analysis. Since we have not studied the issue ourselves, we have no way of knowing whether such a premise is true. But it really does not matter for getting the economics of smoking right. The important point resides in who pays for whatever to smoking.

The Next 25 Years of Public Choice brings together the perspectives of many of the world''s leading scholars of public choice on the present state of knowledge and the likely future course of scholarship on public choice and constitutional economy. This book presents material in a manner accessible to a wide educated readership and will be influential in guiding future research in this important field. It is directed at professional scholars of public choice, economics and political science, government officials, graduate students and anyone seriously interested in public policy. A distinguished group of internationally well-known scholars offer their own often far-reaching views on strengths and weaknesses in the current literature and pinpoint important avenues of research amenable to future research.