Geoffrey Brennan – författare

Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. In Explaining Norms, four philosophers and social scientists team up to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering a comprehensive account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist and change; and how they work. Norms, they argue, should be understood in non-reductive terms as clusters of normative attitudes that serve the function of making us accountable to oneanother—with the different kinds of norms (legal, moral, and social norms) differing in virtue of being constituted by different kinds of normative attitudes that serve to make us accountable in different ways. Explanations of and by norms should be seen as thoroughly pluralist in character. Explanations of norms shouldappeal to the ways that norms help us to pursue projects and goals, individually and collectively, as well as to enable us to constitute social meanings. Explanations by norms should recognise the multiplicity of ways in which norms may bear upon the actions we perform, the attitudes we form and the modes of deliberation in which we engage: following, merely conforming with, and even breaching norms. While advancing novel and distinctive positions on all of these topics, ExplainingNorms will also serve as a sourcebook with a rich array of arguments and illustrations for others to reassemble in ways of their own choosing.

During a career spanning over thirty years Philip Pettit has made seminal contributions in moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of mind and action, and metaphysics. His many contributions would be remarkable enough in themselves, but they are made all the more remarkable by the ways in which Pettit connects them with each other. Pettit holds that the lessons learned when thinking about problems in one area of philosophy often constitute ready-made solutions to problems we faced in completely different areas. His body of work taken as a whole provides a vivid example of what philosophy looks like when done with that conviction. Common Minds presents specially written papers by some of the most eminent philosophers alive today, grappling with some of the themes derived from the larger programme that Pettit has inspired. How are we to do the best we can, whether in the domain of morality or politics, given that we are non-ideal agents acting in non-ideal circumstances? What is the normative significance of the capacity we have to engage in rational deliberation, both individually and collectively, about what to do? How are we to square our conception of ourselves as rational deliberators with the more mechanistic conception of ourselves and the world we inhabit that we get from the natural sciences? The volume concludes with a substantial piece by Pettit in which he gives an overview of his work, draws out the connections between its key themes, and provides a rich commentary on the preceding essays.

However much people want esteem, it is an untradable commodity-- there is no way that you can buy the good opinion of another or sell to others your good opinion of them. And yet esteem is allocated in society according to systematic determinants: people's performance, publicity, and presentation relative to others will help to fix how much esteem they enjoy and how much disesteem they avoid. In turn, rational individuals are bound to compete with one another, however tacitly, in the attempt to increase their chances of winning esteem and avoiding disesteem. And this competition shapes the environments in which they each pursue esteem, setting relevant comparators and benchmarks, and determining the cost that a person must bear for obtaining a given level of esteem. Hidden in the multifarious interactions and exchanges of social life, then, there is a quiet force at work -- a force as silent and powerful as gravity -- which molds the basic form of people's relationships and associations. This force was more or less routinely invoked in the writings of classical theorists like Aristotle and Plato, Locke and Montesquieu, Mandeville and Hume and Madison. Although Adam Smith himself gave it great credence, however, the rise of economics proper coincided with a sudden decline in the attention devoted to the economy of esteem. What had been a topic of compelling interest for earlier authors fell into relative neglect throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This book is designed to reverse the trend. It begins by outlining the psychology of esteem and the way the working of that psychology can give rise to an economy. It then shows how a variety of social patterns that are otherwise anomalous come to make a lot of sense within an economics of esteem. And it looks, finally, at the ways in which the economy of esteem may be reshaped to improve overall social outcomes. While making connections with older patterns of social theorising, it offers a novel orientation for contemporary thought about how society works and how it may be made to work. It puts the economy of esteem firmly on the agenda of economics and social science and of moral and political theory.

Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. In Explaining Norms, four philosophers and social scientists team up to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering a comprehensive account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist and change; and how they work. Norms, they argue, should be understood in non-reductive terms as clusters of normative attitudes that serve the function of making us accountable to one another--with the different kinds of norms (legal, moral, and social norms) differing in virtue of being constituted by different kinds of normative attitudes that serve to make us accountable in different ways. Explanations of and by norms should be seen as thoroughly pluralist in character. Explanations of norms should appeal to the ways that norms help us to pursue projects and goals, individually and collectively, as well as to enable us to constitute social meanings. Explanations by norms should recognise the multiplicity of ways in which norms may bear upon the actions we perform, the attitudes we form and the modes of deliberation in which we engage: following, merely conforming with, and even breaching norms. While advancing novel and distinctive positions on all of these topics, Explaining Norms will also serve as a sourcebook with a rich array of arguments and illustrations for others to reassemble in ways of their own choosing.

During a career spanning over thirty years Philip Pettit has made seminal contributions in moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of mind and action, and metaphysics. His many contributions would be remarkable enough in themselves, but they are made all the more remarkable by the ways in which Pettit connects them with each other. Pettit holds that the lessons learned when thinking about problems in one area of philosophy often constitute ready-made solutions to problems we faced in completely different areas. His body of work taken as a whole provides a vivid example of what philosophy looks like when done with that conviction. Common Minds presents specially written papers by some of the most eminent philosophers alive today, grappling with some of the themes derived from the larger programme that Pettit has inspired. How are we to do the best we can, whether in the domain of morality or politics, given that we are non-ideal agents acting in non-ideal circumstances? What is the normative significance of the capacity we have to engage in rational deliberation, both individually and collectively, about what to do? How are we to square our conception of ourselves as rational deliberators with the more mechanistic conception of ourselves and the world we inhabit that we get from the natural sciences? The volume concludes with a substantial piece by Pettit in which he gives an overview of his work, draws out the connections between its key themes, and provides a rich commentary on the preceding essays.

However much people want esteem, it is an untradable commodity: there is no way that I can buy the good opinion of another or sell to others my good opinion of them. But though it is a non-tradable good, esteem is allocated in society according to systematic determinants; people's performance, publicity, and presentation relative to others will help to fix how much esteem they enjoy and how much disesteem they avoid. The fact that it is subject to such determinants means in turn that rational individuals are bound to compete with one another, however tacitly, in the attempt to control those influences, increasing their chances of winning esteem and avoiding disesteem. And the fact that they all compete for esteem in this way shapes the environment in which they each pursue the good, setting relevant comparators and benchmarks, and determining the cost that a person must bear -- the price that they must pay -- for obtaining a given level of esteem in any domain of activity. Hidden in the multifarious interactions and exchanges of social life, then, there is a quiet force at work -- a force as silent and powerful as gravity -- which moulds the basic form of people's relationships and associations. This force was more or less routinely invoked in the writings of classical theorists like Aristotle and Plato, Locke and Montesquieu, Mandeville and Hume and Madison. Sometimes it was invoked to explain why people behaved as they did, sometimes to identify initiatives whereby they might be persuaded to behave better. Although Adam Smith himself gave it great credence, however, the rise of economics proper coincided with a sudden decline in the attention devoted to the economy of esteem. What had been a topic of compelling interest for earlier authors fell into relative neglect throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This book is designed to reverse the trend. It begins by outlining the psychology of esteem and the way the working of that psychology can give rise to an economy. It then shows how a variety of social patterns that are otherwise anomalous come to make a lot of sense within an economics of esteem. And it looks, finally, at the ways in which the economy of esteem may be reshaped so as to make for an improvement -- by reference to received criteria - in overall social outcomes. While making connections with older patterns of social theorising, it offers a novel orientation for contemporary thought about how society works and how it may be made to work. It puts the economy of esteem firmly on the agenda of economic and social science and of moral and political theory.

However much people want esteem, it is an untradable commodity-- there is no way that you can buy the good opinion of another or sell to others your good opinion of them. And yet esteem is allocated in society according to systematic determinants: people's performance, publicity, and presentation relative to others will help to fix how much esteem they enjoy and how much disesteem they avoid. In turn, rational individuals are bound to compete with one another, however tacitly, in the attempt to increase their chances of winning esteem and avoiding disesteem. And this competition shapes the environments in which they each pursue esteem, setting relevant comparators and benchmarks, and determining the cost that a person must bear for obtaining a given level of esteem. Hidden in the multifarious interactions and exchanges of social life, then, there is a quiet force at work -- a force as silent and powerful as gravity -- which molds the basic form of people's relationships and associations. This force was more or less routinely invoked in the writings of classical theorists like Aristotle and Plato, Locke and Montesquieu, Mandeville and Hume and Madison. Although Adam Smith himself gave it great credence, however, the rise of economics proper coincided with a sudden decline in the attention devoted to the economy of esteem. What had been a topic of compelling interest for earlier authors fell into relative neglect throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This book is designed to reverse the trend. It begins by outlining the psychology of esteem and the way the working of that psychology can give rise to an economy. It then shows how a variety of social patterns that are otherwise anomalous come to make a lot of sense within an economics of esteem. And it looks, finally, at the ways in which the economy of esteem may be reshaped to improve overall social outcomes. While making connections with older patterns of social theorising, it offers a novel orientation for contemporary thought about how society works and how it may be made to work. It puts the economy of esteem firmly on the agenda of economics and social science and of moral and political theory.

Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. In Explaining Norms, four philosophers and social scientists team up to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering a comprehensive account of norms: what they are; how and why they emerge, persist and change; and how they work. Norms, they argue, should be understood in non-reductive terms as clusters of normative attitudes that serve the function of making us accountable to one another--with the different kinds of norms (legal, moral, and social norms) differing in virtue of being constituted by different kinds of normative attitudes that serve to make us accountable in different ways. Explanations of and by norms should be seen as thoroughly pluralist in character. Explanations of norms should appeal to the ways that norms help us to pursue projects and goals, individually and collectively, as well as to enable us to constitute social meanings. Explanations by norms should recognise the multiplicity of ways in which norms may bear upon the actions we perform, the attitudes we form and the modes of deliberation in which we engage: following, merely conforming with, and even breaching norms. While advancing novel and distinctive positions on all of these topics, Explaining Norms will also serve as a sourcebook with a rich array of arguments and illustrations for others to reassemble in ways of their own choosing.

Should government's power to tax be limited? The events of the late 1970s in the wake of California's Proposition 13 brought this question very sharply into popular focus. Whether the power to tax should be restricted, and if so how, are issues of immediate policy significance. Providing a serious analysis of these issues, the authors of this 1980 book offer an approach to the understanding and evaluation of the fiscal system, one that yields profound implications. The central question becomes: how much 'power to tax' would the citizen voluntarily grant to government as a party to some initial social contract devising a fiscal constitution? Those in office are assumed to exploit the power assigned to them to the maximum possible extent: government is modelled as 'revenue-maximizing Leviathan'. Armed with such a model, the authors proceed to trace out the restrictions on the power to tax that might be expected to emerge from the citizen's constitutional deliberations.

Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to understand the workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices might be established.

Should government's power to tax be limited? The events of the late 1970s in the wake of California's Proposition 13 brought this question very sharply into popular focus. Whether the power to tax should be restricted, and if so how, are issues of immediate policy significance. Providing a serious analysis of these issues, the authors of this 1980 book offer an approach to the understanding and evaluation of the fiscal system, one that yields profound implications. The central question becomes: how much 'power to tax' would the citizen voluntarily grant to government as a party to some initial social contract devising a fiscal constitution? Those in office are assumed to exploit the power assigned to them to the maximum possible extent: government is modelled as 'revenue-maximizing Leviathan'. Armed with such a model, the authors proceed to trace out the restrictions on the power to tax that might be expected to emerge from the citizen's constitutional deliberations.

Do voters in large scale democracies reliably vote for the electoral outcomes most in their interest? Much of the literature on voting predicts that they do, but this book argues that fully rational voters will not, in fact, consistently vote for the political outcomes they prefer. The authors offer a theory of voting which they term an 'expressive' theory of electoral politics. This theory is shown to be more coherent and more consistent with actual observed voting behaviour. This important book offers a compelling challenge to the central premises of the prevailing theories of voting behaviour.

This provocative book, first published in 1995, argues that Australia is already a federal republic rather than a constitutional monarchy. It argues that by adopting a federal constitution in 1901 Australians ensured their status as a sovereign people. While the book does not deny the parliamentary and monarchic elements of the Australian system, it calls for a positive reassessment of the Constitution. Brian Galligan forcefully argues that the Australian Constitution has primacy over the other political institutions of the nation. The book considers fundamental issues that arise in discussion of the Constitution and federalism, including the role of the Senate, the possibility of a bill of rights, the way the High Court fits into the current system and the nature of governmental relations. This book will overturn the orthodoxies of much informed opinion and will challenge republicans and monarchists alike. Brian Galligan's unique perspective as a political scientist throws light on many aspects of federalism and will stimulate wide debate.

In this rich, evocative and challenging 1997 book, Chilla Bulbeck examines the impact of feminism on ordinary Australian women. She argues that the impact of feminism on women's lives has been significant, even though many of the women whose lives have changed because of its influence shun the term 'feminist', or find feminism irrelevant. The lives of sixty women, whose own words and experiences make up most of this book, are set against broader changes in Australian society since the 1950s. These women reveal their attitudes to feminism, but the book's focus is on other aspects of their lives: growing up, education, work, marriage and divorce, motherhood and children, and sex and sexuality. Women of all ages, from various ethnic backgrounds, from cities and the country tell their stories. Partly a history of feminism, the book also unflinchingly considers whether feminism is only relevant to white, middle-class women.

The demands placed on western governments have increased exponentially over the years, but the fundamental structure of most of these governments - the two party system - has not. Governments are not only required to be competitive in the global economy, but the societies they represent have changed, becoming culturally and ethnically diverse. Ian Marsh's challenging book suggests that the two party regime cannot accommodate these changing needs. It outlines the ways in which politics might change to meet these new demands and achieve genuine participatory democracy. The book explores the nature of citizenship from a historical perspective, proposing a definition of citizenship for the future. Ian Marsh argues that political learning will be central to the development of this new citizen, so that they, and not only the leadership elite, have genuine political input.

Australia Reshaped is the capstone volume in the Reshaping Australian Institutions series. As the summation of all that has gone before, this book is structurally and qualitatively different from the others. Eight leading social scientists have been invited to write a major essay on a key element of Australian institutional life. Each chapter has the length and depth of a major contribution, acting as an overview of the field for both local readers and an international scholarly audience.

Environmentalism is one of the major issues of our time. A key question is how responsive are Australian institutions to the challenges posed by environmental issues? This book focuses on how effectively political institutions and organisations are able to address concerns about the deterioration of the environment. The book considers the key players in environmental debate and policy-making: social movements, interest groups, political parties, the media, the parliaments and the bureaucracy. It contains much rich empirical material. This stimulating and original book makes an important contribution not only to environmental politics, but to the ways in which institutions can become more effective and responsive to social forces. It will be of interest not only to political scientists and sociologists, but to environmental activists and policy-makers themselves.

Do voters in large scale democracies reliably vote for the electoral outcomes most in their interest? Much of the literature on voting predicts that they do, but this book argues that fully rational voters will not, in fact, consistently vote for the political outcomes they prefer. The authors offer a theory of voting which they term an 'expressive' theory of electoral politics. This theory is shown to be more coherent and more consistent with actual observed voting behaviour. This important book offers a compelling challenge to the central premises of the prevailing theories of voting behaviour.

This provocative 1998 study of federalism identifies a pattern of intergovernmental relations in Australia. Through his general discussion of the nature of the Australian federal system, and close analysis of recent developments in Australian politics and policy-making, Painter argues that our federal system is being fundamentally reshaped as state and commonwealth governments cooperate more closely than ever before on joint policy-making schemes. Much of this collaboration has been prompted by the need for microeconomic reform in the 1990s, and increasing concern about the degree of overlap, inefficiency and duplication across the federal system. The book includes a narrative account of the often fraught progress of the Special Premier's Conferences and the Council of Australian Governments. It also includes detailed discussion of a number of key examples.

The news media is traditionally the watchdog of democracy. Today, it is also one of the most pervasive global industries. In this lively and accessible book, Schultz systematically analyses the role of journalism in Australia and the scope of its democratic purpose. She examines key news stories, and looks at the attitudes of Australian journalists themselves. The fourth estate remains the ideal of most journalists, but the reality has been impaired by the increasing concentration of media ownership and by political, ethical and occupational interests. While Australian journalism has become bolder and more investigative, increasing commercialism and decreasing ethical standards have left the public sceptical. Schultz argues for a revival of the fourth estate based on journalistic independence and poltical autonomy, together with increased accountability and responsiveness.

The news media is traditionally the watchdog of democracy. Today, it is also one of the most pervasive global industries. In this lively and accessible book, Schultz systematically analyses the role of journalism in Australia and the scope of its democratic purpose. She examines key news stories, and looks at the attitudes of Australian journalists themselves. The fourth estate remains the ideal of most journalists, but the reality has been impaired by the increasing concentration of media ownership and by political, ethical and occupational interests. While Australian journalism has become bolder and more investigative, increasing commercialism and decreasing ethical standards have left the public sceptical. Schultz argues for a revival of the fourth estate based on journalistic independence and poltical autonomy, together with increased accountability and responsiveness.

This book offers an account of key features of modern representative democracy. Working from the rational actor tradition, it builds a middle ground between orthodox political theory and the economic analysis of politics. Standard economic models of politics emphasise the design of the institutional devices of democracy as operated by essentially self-interested individuals. This book departs from that model by focusing on democratic desires alongside democratic devices, stressing that important aspects of democracy depend on the motivation of democrats and the interplay between devices and desires. Individuals are taken to be not only rational, but also somewhat moral. The authors argue that this approach provides access to aspects of the debate on democratic institutions that are beyond the narrowly economic model. They apply their analysis to voting, elections, representation, political departments and the separation and division of powers, providing a wide-ranging discussion of the design of democratic institutions.

Australia once had extremely high levels of trade union participation, yet since the 1970s the number of union members has been falling dramatically. This book gives the clearest picture yet of why people do or do not belong to unions and, in a sophisticated way, examines the reasons for union decline. Uniquely, it considers both the macro and micro levels, looking at the structure of the economy and the labour market, the relations between unions and employees, the ideological dispositions people have towards unionism, the role of the state and the political and industrial strategies of unions. The author highlights the importance of structural and strategic changes in determining the direction of union membership. This book makes a major contribution to our understanding of union decline, and its implications, and presents a range of strategies for reversing this downturn.

Australia once had extremely high levels of trade union participation, yet since the 1970s the number of union members has been falling dramatically. This book gives the clearest picture yet of why people do or do not belong to unions and, in a sophisticated way, examines the reasons for union decline. Uniquely, it considers both the macro and micro levels, looking at the structure of the economy and the labour market, the relations between unions and employees, the ideological dispositions people have towards unionism, the role of the state and the political and industrial strategies of unions. The author highlights the importance of structural and strategic changes in determining the direction of union membership. This book makes a major contribution to our understanding of union decline, and its implications, and presents a range of strategies for reversing this downturn.

This book offers an account of key features of modern representative democracy. Working from the rational actor tradition, it builds a middle ground between orthodox political theory and the economic analysis of politics. Standard economic models of politics emphasise the design of the institutional devices of democracy as operated by essentially self-interested individuals. This book departs from that model by focusing on democratic desires alongside democratic devices, stressing that important aspects of democracy depend on the motivation of democrats and the interplay between devices and desires. Individuals are taken to be not only rational, but also somewhat moral. The authors argue that this approach provides access to aspects of the debate on democratic institutions that are beyond the narrowly economic model. They apply their analysis to voting, elections, representation, political departments and the separation and division of powers, providing a wide-ranging discussion of the design of democratic institutions.

The High Court is taking an increasingly important role in shaping the contours of democracy in Australia. In deciding fundamental democratic questions, does the Court pursue a consistent and overarching democratic vision? Or are its decisions essentially constrained by institutional and practical limitations? Judging Democracy, first published in 2000, addresses this question by examining the Court's recent decisions on human rights, citizenship, native title and separation of powers. It represents the first major political and legal examination of the Court's new jurisprudence and the way it is influencing democracy and the institutions of governance in Australia. A foreword to the book has been written by the former Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir Anthony Mason.

Australia Reshaped is the capstone volume in the Reshaping Australian Institutions series. As the summation of all that has gone before, this book is structurally and qualitatively different from the others. Eight leading social scientists have been invited to write a major essay on a key element of Australian institutional life. Each chapter has the length and depth of a major contribution, acting as an overview of the field for both local readers and an international scholarly audience.

This book makes a rational and eloquent case for the closer integration of ethics and economics. It expands upon themes concerned with esteem, self-esteem, emotional bonding between agents, expressive concerns, and moral requirements. Economists have long assumed that 'value' and 'price' are synonymous and interchangeable. The authors show how disregarding this false assumption and adopting an interdisciplinary approach could improve the economics profession by distinguishing economic values from ethical values. Replete with discussions that will challenge conventional economics, this book offers a corrective argument against the rigid separation of agents' motivation and the purely normative aspects of economic analysis. The various contributions explore the different dimensions at the frontier between the rational and the moral in political economy, ethics and philosophy. Containing a variety of cross-border analyses, this innovative book will be a must-read for economists, political scientists and philosophers. It will also be an invaluable resource for students in the fields of economics and philosophy.