Edited by Elias L. Khalil, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar

• Contents:Volume I: A Taste for FairnessAcknowledgementsIntroduction: A Taste for Every Season Elias L. Khalil1. M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), ‘On Dividing Justly’2. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’3. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics’4. Robyn M. Dawes and Richard H. Thaler (1988), ‘Anomalies: Cooperation’5. Richard H. Thaler (1988), ‘Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game’6. Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler (1995), ‘Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners’7. Sally Blount (1995), ‘When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences’8. Gary E. Bolton (1991), ‘A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence’9. Matthew Rabin (1993), ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’10. Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000), ‘ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition’11. Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999), ‘A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation’12. Patrick Francois and Jan Zabojnik (2005), ‘Trust, Social Capital, and Economic Development’13. Herbert Gintis (2000), ‘Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality’14. Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr (2001), ‘Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment’15. Robert Kurzban and Daniel Houser (2005), ‘Experiments Investigating Cooperative Types in Humans: A Complement to Evolutionary Theory and Simulations’16. Erte Xiao and Daniel Houser (2005), ‘Emotion Expression in Human Punishment Behavior’17. James Andreoni (1995), ‘Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?’18. Daniel Houser and Robert Kurzban (2002), ‘Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments’19. James Andreoni and John Miller (2002), ‘Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism’20. Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002), ‘Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests’21. David K. Levine (1998), ‘Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments’22. Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein and Klaus M. Schmidt (2007), ‘Fairness and Contract Design’23. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith (1996), ‘Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games’24. John A. List (2007), ‘On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games’Name IndexVolume II: A Taste for the PresentAcknowledgementsAn introduction to all three volumes by the editor appears in Volume I1. Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue (2002), ‘Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review’2. R.H. Strotz (1956), ‘Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization’3. R.A. Pollak (1968), ‘Consistent Planning’4. Steven M. Goldman (1980), ‘Consistent Plans’5. George Ainslie (2005), ‘Précis of Breakdown of Will’6. Daniel Read (2001), ‘Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or Subadditive?’7. Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier (2006), ‘Paying Not to Go to the Gym’8. Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch (2002), ‘Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment’9. David Laibson (1997), ‘Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting’10. George-Marios Angeletos, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman and Stephen Weinberg (2001), ‘The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation’11. Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (1999), ‘Doing It Now or Later’12. Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (2001), ‘Choice and Procrastination’13. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2004), ‘Willpower and Personal Rules’14. Juan D. Carrillo and Thomas Mariotti (2000), ‘Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device’15. Richard H. Thaler and H.M. Shefrin (1981), ‘An Economic Theory of Self-Control’16. Hersh M. Shefrin and Richard H. Thaler (1988), ‘The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis’17. B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel (2004), ‘Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes’18. David Laibson (2001), ‘A Cue-Theory of Consumption’19. Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (2006), ‘A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control’20. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2004), ‘Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption’21. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2004), ‘Self Control, Revealed Preference and Consumption Choice’22. George Loewenstein (1987), ‘Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption’23. George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (2003), ‘Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility’Name IndexVolume III: Tastes for Endowment, Identity and the EmotionsAcknowledgementsAn introduction to all three volumes by the editor appears in Volume IPART IA TASTE FOR ENDOWMENT 1. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’2. Richard Thaler (1980), ‘Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice’3. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1991), ‘Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias’4. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1986), ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’5. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1991), ‘Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model’6. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1990), ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’7. Jack L. Knetsch (1989), ‘The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves’8. Ian Bateman, Alistair Munro, Bruce Rhodes, Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden (1997), ‘A Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences’9. John A. List (2004), ‘Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace’10. Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler (1995), ‘Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle’11. Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea (2001), ‘The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior’12. David Bowman, Deborah Minehart and Matthew Rabin (1999), ‘Loss Aversion in a Consumption-Savings Model’13. Terrance Odean (1998), ‘Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?’14. David Genesove and Christopher Mayer (2001), ‘Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market’15. Botond Köszegi and Matthew Rabin (2006), ‘A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences’PART IITASTES FOR IDENTITY AND EMOTIONS 16. George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2000), ‘Economics and Identity’17. George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2005), ‘Identity and the Economics of Organizations’18. Robert Sugden (2004), ‘The Opportunity Criterion: Consumer Sovereignty Without the Assumption of Coherent Preferences’19. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2002), ‘Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation’20. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2003), ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation’21. John Geanakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti (1989), ‘Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality’22. Bruno S. Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee (1997), ‘The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out’23. Jon Elster (1998), ‘Emotions and Economic Theory’24. Andrew Caplin and John Leahy (2001), ‘Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings’25. Botond Köszegi (2006), ‘Emotional Agency’Name Index

Edited by Elias L. Khalil, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar

• Contents:Volume I: A Taste for FairnessAcknowledgementsIntroduction: A Taste for Every Season Elias L. Khalil1. M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), ‘On Dividing Justly’2. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’3. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics’4. Robyn M. Dawes and Richard H. Thaler (1988), ‘Anomalies: Cooperation’5. Richard H. Thaler (1988), ‘Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game’6. Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler (1995), ‘Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners’7. Sally Blount (1995), ‘When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences’8. Gary E. Bolton (1991), ‘A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence’9. Matthew Rabin (1993), ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’10. Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000), ‘ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition’11. Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999), ‘A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation’12. Patrick Francois and Jan Zabojnik (2005), ‘Trust, Social Capital, and Economic Development’13. Herbert Gintis (2000), ‘Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality’14. Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr (2001), ‘Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment’15. Robert Kurzban and Daniel Houser (2005), ‘Experiments Investigating Cooperative Types in Humans: A Complement to Evolutionary Theory and Simulations’16. Erte Xiao and Daniel Houser (2005), ‘Emotion Expression in Human Punishment Behavior’17. James Andreoni (1995), ‘Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?’18. Daniel Houser and Robert Kurzban (2002), ‘Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments’19. James Andreoni and John Miller (2002), ‘Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism’20. Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002), ‘Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests’21. David K. Levine (1998), ‘Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments’22. Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein and Klaus M. Schmidt (2007), ‘Fairness and Contract Design’23. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith (1996), ‘Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games’24. John A. List (2007), ‘On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games’Name IndexVolume II: A Taste for the PresentAcknowledgementsAn introduction to all three volumes by the editor appears in Volume I1. Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue (2002), ‘Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review’2. R.H. Strotz (1956), ‘Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization’3. R.A. Pollak (1968), ‘Consistent Planning’4. Steven M. Goldman (1980), ‘Consistent Plans’5. George Ainslie (2005), ‘Précis of Breakdown of Will’6. Daniel Read (2001), ‘Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or Subadditive?’7. Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier (2006), ‘Paying Not to Go to the Gym’8. Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch (2002), ‘Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment’9. David Laibson (1997), ‘Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting’10. George-Marios Angeletos, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman and Stephen Weinberg (2001), ‘The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation’11. Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (1999), ‘Doing It Now or Later’12. Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (2001), ‘Choice and Procrastination’13. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2004), ‘Willpower and Personal Rules’14. Juan D. Carrillo and Thomas Mariotti (2000), ‘Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device’15. Richard H. Thaler and H.M. Shefrin (1981), ‘An Economic Theory of Self-Control’16. Hersh M. Shefrin and Richard H. Thaler (1988), ‘The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis’17. B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel (2004), ‘Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes’18. David Laibson (2001), ‘A Cue-Theory of Consumption’19. Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (2006), ‘A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control’20. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2004), ‘Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption’21. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2004), ‘Self Control, Revealed Preference and Consumption Choice’22. George Loewenstein (1987), ‘Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption’23. George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (2003), ‘Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility’Name IndexVolume III: Tastes for Endowment, Identity and the EmotionsAcknowledgementsAn introduction to all three volumes by the editor appears in Volume IPART IA TASTE FOR ENDOWMENT 1. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’2. Richard Thaler (1980), ‘Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice’3. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1991), ‘Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias’4. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1986), ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’5. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1991), ‘Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model’6. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1990), ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’7. Jack L. Knetsch (1989), ‘The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves’8. Ian Bateman, Alistair Munro, Bruce Rhodes, Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden (1997), ‘A Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences’9. John A. List (2004), ‘Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace’10. Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler (1995), ‘Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle’11. Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea (2001), ‘The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior’12. David Bowman, Deborah Minehart and Matthew Rabin (1999), ‘Loss Aversion in a Consumption-Savings Model’13. Terrance Odean (1998), ‘Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?’14. David Genesove and Christopher Mayer (2001), ‘Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market’15. Botond Köszegi and Matthew Rabin (2006), ‘A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences’PART IITASTES FOR IDENTITY AND EMOTIONS 16. George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2000), ‘Economics and Identity’17. George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2005), ‘Identity and the Economics of Organizations’18. Robert Sugden (2004), ‘The Opportunity Criterion: Consumer Sovereignty Without the Assumption of Coherent Preferences’19. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2002), ‘Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation’20. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2003), ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation’21. John Geanakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti (1989), ‘Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality’22. Bruno S. Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee (1997), ‘The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out’23. Jon Elster (1998), ‘Emotions and Economic Theory’24. Andrew Caplin and John Leahy (2001), ‘Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings’25. Botond Köszegi (2006), ‘Emotional Agency’Name Index

Edited by Elias L. Khalil, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Doha, Qatar

• Contents:Volume I: A Taste for FairnessAcknowledgementsIntroduction: A Taste for Every Season Elias L. Khalil1. M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), ‘On Dividing Justly’2. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’3. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1986), ‘Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics’4. Robyn M. Dawes and Richard H. Thaler (1988), ‘Anomalies: Cooperation’5. Richard H. Thaler (1988), ‘Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game’6. Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler (1995), ‘Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners’7. Sally Blount (1995), ‘When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences’8. Gary E. Bolton (1991), ‘A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence’9. Matthew Rabin (1993), ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’10. Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000), ‘ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition’11. Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999), ‘A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation’12. Patrick Francois and Jan Zabojnik (2005), ‘Trust, Social Capital, and Economic Development’13. Herbert Gintis (2000), ‘Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality’14. Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr (2001), ‘Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment’15. Robert Kurzban and Daniel Houser (2005), ‘Experiments Investigating Cooperative Types in Humans: A Complement to Evolutionary Theory and Simulations’16. Erte Xiao and Daniel Houser (2005), ‘Emotion Expression in Human Punishment Behavior’17. James Andreoni (1995), ‘Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?’18. Daniel Houser and Robert Kurzban (2002), ‘Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments’19. James Andreoni and John Miller (2002), ‘Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism’20. Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002), ‘Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests’21. David K. Levine (1998), ‘Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments’22. Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein and Klaus M. Schmidt (2007), ‘Fairness and Contract Design’23. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon L. Smith (1996), ‘Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games’24. John A. List (2007), ‘On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games’Name IndexVolume II: A Taste for the PresentAcknowledgementsAn introduction to all three volumes by the editor appears in Volume I1. Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue (2002), ‘Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review’2. R.H. Strotz (1956), ‘Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization’3. R.A. Pollak (1968), ‘Consistent Planning’4. Steven M. Goldman (1980), ‘Consistent Plans’5. George Ainslie (2005), ‘Précis of Breakdown of Will’6. Daniel Read (2001), ‘Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or Subadditive?’7. Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier (2006), ‘Paying Not to Go to the Gym’8. Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch (2002), ‘Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment’9. David Laibson (1997), ‘Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting’10. George-Marios Angeletos, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman and Stephen Weinberg (2001), ‘The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation’11. Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (1999), ‘Doing It Now or Later’12. Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (2001), ‘Choice and Procrastination’13. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2004), ‘Willpower and Personal Rules’14. Juan D. Carrillo and Thomas Mariotti (2000), ‘Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device’15. Richard H. Thaler and H.M. Shefrin (1981), ‘An Economic Theory of Self-Control’16. Hersh M. Shefrin and Richard H. Thaler (1988), ‘The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis’17. B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel (2004), ‘Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes’18. David Laibson (2001), ‘A Cue-Theory of Consumption’19. Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (2006), ‘A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control’20. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2004), ‘Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption’21. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2004), ‘Self Control, Revealed Preference and Consumption Choice’22. George Loewenstein (1987), ‘Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption’23. George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (2003), ‘Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility’Name IndexVolume III: Tastes for Endowment, Identity and the EmotionsAcknowledgementsAn introduction to all three volumes by the editor appears in Volume IPART IA TASTE FOR ENDOWMENT 1. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’2. Richard Thaler (1980), ‘Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice’3. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1991), ‘Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias’4. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1986), ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’5. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1991), ‘Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model’6. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1990), ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’7. Jack L. Knetsch (1989), ‘The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves’8. Ian Bateman, Alistair Munro, Bruce Rhodes, Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden (1997), ‘A Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences’9. John A. List (2004), ‘Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace’10. Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler (1995), ‘Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle’11. Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea (2001), ‘The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior’12. David Bowman, Deborah Minehart and Matthew Rabin (1999), ‘Loss Aversion in a Consumption-Savings Model’13. Terrance Odean (1998), ‘Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?’14. David Genesove and Christopher Mayer (2001), ‘Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market’15. Botond Köszegi and Matthew Rabin (2006), ‘A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences’PART IITASTES FOR IDENTITY AND EMOTIONS 16. George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2000), ‘Economics and Identity’17. George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2005), ‘Identity and the Economics of Organizations’18. Robert Sugden (2004), ‘The Opportunity Criterion: Consumer Sovereignty Without the Assumption of Coherent Preferences’19. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2002), ‘Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation’20. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2003), ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation’21. John Geanakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti (1989), ‘Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality’22. Bruno S. Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee (1997), ‘The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out’23. Jon Elster (1998), ‘Emotions and Economic Theory’24. Andrew Caplin and John Leahy (2001), ‘Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings’25. Botond Köszegi (2006), ‘Emotional Agency’Name Index