Edited by Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner, Compass Lexecon, Los Angeles, US

‘Antitrust law and policy now use economic analysis as the guiding star. This collection contains the seminal articles that influenced the shift to reliance on economics, as well more recent articles that are likely to influence antitrust’s future. Moreover, Klein and Lerner have written a highly useful introduction to guide the reader through the major developments of the last 30 years.’

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroductionThe Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. LernerPART IMARKET POWER 1. Harold Demsetz (1973), ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy’2. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’3. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), ‘On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits’4. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande and Steven C. Salop (1987), ‘Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law’5. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1992), ‘Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power’6. Benjamin Klein (1993), ‘Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak’PART II HORIZONTAL ARRANGEMENTS AOligopoly and Collusion7. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’8. Donald F. Turner (1962), ‘The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal’9. Richard A. Posner (1969), ‘Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach’10. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View’11. Jonathan B. Baker (1993), ‘Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory’BHorizontal Mergers and Joint Ventures12. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’13. Janusz Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1983), ‘The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment’14. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’15. Jonathan B. Baker (2002), ‘Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws’16. Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece (1990), ‘Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust’17. Carl Shapiro and Robert D. Willig (1990), ‘On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsIntroductionThe Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. LernerPART IVERTICAL ARRANGEMENTS 1. Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi (1956), ‘Law and the Future: Trade Regulation’2. Frank H. Easterbrook (1984), ‘The Limits of Antitrust’ATying and Bundling3. Ward S. Bowman, Jr. (1957), ‘Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem’4. George J. Stigler (1963), ‘United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note of Block-Booking’5. William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen (1976), ‘Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly’6. Benjamin Klein and Lester F. Saft (1985), ‘The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts’7. Michael D. Whinston (1990), ‘Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion’8. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’9. Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’BResale Price Maintenance and Exclusive Territories10. Lester G. Telser (1960), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’11. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’12. Pauline M. Ippolito (1991), ‘Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence From Litigation’CExclusive Dealing13. Howard P. Marvel (1982), ‘Exclusive Dealing’14. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to Entry’15. Eric Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991), ‘Naked Exclusion’16. Benjamin Klein and Andres Lerner (2007), ‘The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty’PART IIUNILATERAL EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR APredatory Pricing17. John S. McGee (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’18. Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner (1975), ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’19. Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1981), ‘An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation’B Raising Rivals’ Costs20. Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop (1986), ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price’21. Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein (1996), ‘Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case’Name Index

Edited by Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner, Compass Lexecon, Los Angeles, US

‘Antitrust law and policy now use economic analysis as the guiding star. This collection contains the seminal articles that influenced the shift to reliance on economics, as well more recent articles that are likely to influence antitrust’s future. Moreover, Klein and Lerner have written a highly useful introduction to guide the reader through the major developments of the last 30 years.’

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroductionThe Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. LernerPART IMARKET POWER 1. Harold Demsetz (1973), ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy’2. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’3. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), ‘On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits’4. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande and Steven C. Salop (1987), ‘Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law’5. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1992), ‘Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power’6. Benjamin Klein (1993), ‘Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak’PART II HORIZONTAL ARRANGEMENTS AOligopoly and Collusion7. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’8. Donald F. Turner (1962), ‘The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal’9. Richard A. Posner (1969), ‘Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach’10. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View’11. Jonathan B. Baker (1993), ‘Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory’BHorizontal Mergers and Joint Ventures12. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’13. Janusz Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1983), ‘The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment’14. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’15. Jonathan B. Baker (2002), ‘Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws’16. Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece (1990), ‘Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust’17. Carl Shapiro and Robert D. Willig (1990), ‘On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsIntroductionThe Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. LernerPART IVERTICAL ARRANGEMENTS 1. Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi (1956), ‘Law and the Future: Trade Regulation’2. Frank H. Easterbrook (1984), ‘The Limits of Antitrust’ATying and Bundling3. Ward S. Bowman, Jr. (1957), ‘Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem’4. George J. Stigler (1963), ‘United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note of Block-Booking’5. William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen (1976), ‘Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly’6. Benjamin Klein and Lester F. Saft (1985), ‘The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts’7. Michael D. Whinston (1990), ‘Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion’8. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’9. Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’BResale Price Maintenance and Exclusive Territories10. Lester G. Telser (1960), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’11. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’12. Pauline M. Ippolito (1991), ‘Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence From Litigation’CExclusive Dealing13. Howard P. Marvel (1982), ‘Exclusive Dealing’14. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to Entry’15. Eric Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991), ‘Naked Exclusion’16. Benjamin Klein and Andres Lerner (2007), ‘The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty’PART IIUNILATERAL EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR APredatory Pricing17. John S. McGee (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’18. Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner (1975), ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’19. Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1981), ‘An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation’B Raising Rivals’ Costs20. Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop (1986), ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price’21. Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein (1996), ‘Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case’Name Index

Edited by Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner, Compass Lexecon, Los Angeles, US

‘Antitrust law and policy now use economic analysis as the guiding star. This collection contains the seminal articles that influenced the shift to reliance on economics, as well more recent articles that are likely to influence antitrust’s future. Moreover, Klein and Lerner have written a highly useful introduction to guide the reader through the major developments of the last 30 years.’

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroductionThe Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. LernerPART IMARKET POWER 1. Harold Demsetz (1973), ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy’2. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’3. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), ‘On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits’4. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande and Steven C. Salop (1987), ‘Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law’5. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1992), ‘Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power’6. Benjamin Klein (1993), ‘Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak’PART II HORIZONTAL ARRANGEMENTS AOligopoly and Collusion7. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’8. Donald F. Turner (1962), ‘The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal’9. Richard A. Posner (1969), ‘Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach’10. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View’11. Jonathan B. Baker (1993), ‘Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory’BHorizontal Mergers and Joint Ventures12. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’13. Janusz Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1983), ‘The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment’14. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’15. Jonathan B. Baker (2002), ‘Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws’16. Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece (1990), ‘Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust’17. Carl Shapiro and Robert D. Willig (1990), ‘On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsIntroductionThe Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. LernerPART IVERTICAL ARRANGEMENTS 1. Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi (1956), ‘Law and the Future: Trade Regulation’2. Frank H. Easterbrook (1984), ‘The Limits of Antitrust’ATying and Bundling3. Ward S. Bowman, Jr. (1957), ‘Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem’4. George J. Stigler (1963), ‘United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note of Block-Booking’5. William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen (1976), ‘Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly’6. Benjamin Klein and Lester F. Saft (1985), ‘The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts’7. Michael D. Whinston (1990), ‘Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion’8. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’9. Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’BResale Price Maintenance and Exclusive Territories10. Lester G. Telser (1960), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’11. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’12. Pauline M. Ippolito (1991), ‘Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence From Litigation’CExclusive Dealing13. Howard P. Marvel (1982), ‘Exclusive Dealing’14. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to Entry’15. Eric Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991), ‘Naked Exclusion’16. Benjamin Klein and Andres Lerner (2007), ‘The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty’PART IIUNILATERAL EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR APredatory Pricing17. John S. McGee (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’18. Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner (1975), ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’19. Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1981), ‘An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation’B Raising Rivals’ Costs20. Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop (1986), ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price’21. Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein (1996), ‘Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case’Name Index