Edited by Bruce H. Kobayashi, Professor of Law, School of Law, George Mason University, US and the late Larry E. Ribstein, formerly Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair in Law, College of Law, University of Illinois, US

'A terrific collection of canonical federalism articles, along with a characteristically clear-headed Introduction by the editors. The volume will be very helpful to legal scholars, economists, and political scientists who teach courses on the increasingly dominant economic theories of federalism.'

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroduction Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. RibsteinPART IBASICS A Multiple Jurisdictions Are a Solution to the Public Good Problem1. Charles M. Tiebout (1956), ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’BExit and Federalism2. Richard A. Epstein (1992), ‘Exit Rights Under Federalism’COptimal Jurisdiction Size3. Gordon Tullock (1969), ‘Federalism: Problems of Scale’DTwin Dilemmas of Federalism: Free Riding, Spillovers, and Agency Costs 4. William H. Riker (1964), ‘The Origin and Purposes of Federalism’ and ‘The Maintenance of Federalism: The Administrative Theory’EConditions for Federalism5. Edmund W. Kitch (1980), ‘Regulation and the American Common Market’FPublic Choice and Federalism 6. Jonathan R. Macey (1990), ‘Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism’PART IIFISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR ATests of the Tiebout Model7. Edward M. Gramlich and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1982), ‘Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses’8. Paul W. Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf (2003), ‘Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990’BDoes Structure Matter?9. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1981), ‘Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic’10. Dennis Epple and Alan Zelentiz (1981), ‘The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?’CVertical and Horizontal Competition11. Albert Breton (1996), ‘A Retrospective Overview’ and ‘The Organization of Governmental Systems’DFederalism, Development, and Self-Enforcing Federalism12. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’ECooperative Federalism13. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997), ‘Rethinking Federalism’FOptimal Taxation and Fiscal Instruments and Intergovernmental Grants14. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1996), ‘Designing Tax Policy in Federalist Economies: An Overview’GLeviathan and the Size of Government15. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1980), ‘Open Economy, Federalism, and Taxing Authority’16. Jonathan Rodden (2003), ‘Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government’HDistribution17. John Donahue (1997), ‘Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s Devolution Debate’18. Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer (1991), ‘Mobility and Redistribution’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsAn introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume IPART ILAW ACommerce Clause1. Saul Levmore (1983), ‘Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention’BUniform State Laws2. Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi (1996), ‘An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws’CThe Choice of State Versus Federal Law3. William F. Baxter (1963), ‘Choice of Law and the Federal System’DContractual Choice of Law and Forum4. Erin O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein (2000), ‘From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law’PART IISPECIFIC APPLICATIONS ACorporate Law and the Race to the Top5. Roberta Romano (1985), ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’6. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk (1992), ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law’BAntitrust and the Economics of Federalism7. Frank H. Easterbrook (1983), ‘Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism’CEnvironmental Regulation8. Richard L. Revesz (2001), ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis’DTaxation9. Daniel Shaviro (1992), ‘An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation’EWelfare Reform10. Charles C. Brown and Wallace E. Oates (1987), ‘Assistance to the Poor in a Federal System’FCrime11. Doron Teichman (2005), ‘The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition’Name Index

Edited by Bruce H. Kobayashi, Professor of Law, School of Law, George Mason University, US and the late Larry E. Ribstein, formerly Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair in Law, College of Law, University of Illinois, US

'A terrific collection of canonical federalism articles, along with a characteristically clear-headed Introduction by the editors. The volume will be very helpful to legal scholars, economists, and political scientists who teach courses on the increasingly dominant economic theories of federalism.'

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroduction Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. RibsteinPART IBASICS A Multiple Jurisdictions Are a Solution to the Public Good Problem1. Charles M. Tiebout (1956), ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’BExit and Federalism2. Richard A. Epstein (1992), ‘Exit Rights Under Federalism’COptimal Jurisdiction Size3. Gordon Tullock (1969), ‘Federalism: Problems of Scale’DTwin Dilemmas of Federalism: Free Riding, Spillovers, and Agency Costs 4. William H. Riker (1964), ‘The Origin and Purposes of Federalism’ and ‘The Maintenance of Federalism: The Administrative Theory’EConditions for Federalism5. Edmund W. Kitch (1980), ‘Regulation and the American Common Market’FPublic Choice and Federalism 6. Jonathan R. Macey (1990), ‘Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism’PART IIFISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR ATests of the Tiebout Model7. Edward M. Gramlich and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1982), ‘Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses’8. Paul W. Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf (2003), ‘Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990’BDoes Structure Matter?9. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1981), ‘Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic’10. Dennis Epple and Alan Zelentiz (1981), ‘The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?’CVertical and Horizontal Competition11. Albert Breton (1996), ‘A Retrospective Overview’ and ‘The Organization of Governmental Systems’DFederalism, Development, and Self-Enforcing Federalism12. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’ECooperative Federalism13. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997), ‘Rethinking Federalism’FOptimal Taxation and Fiscal Instruments and Intergovernmental Grants14. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1996), ‘Designing Tax Policy in Federalist Economies: An Overview’GLeviathan and the Size of Government15. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1980), ‘Open Economy, Federalism, and Taxing Authority’16. Jonathan Rodden (2003), ‘Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government’HDistribution17. John Donahue (1997), ‘Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s Devolution Debate’18. Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer (1991), ‘Mobility and Redistribution’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsAn introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume IPART ILAW ACommerce Clause1. Saul Levmore (1983), ‘Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention’BUniform State Laws2. Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi (1996), ‘An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws’CThe Choice of State Versus Federal Law3. William F. Baxter (1963), ‘Choice of Law and the Federal System’DContractual Choice of Law and Forum4. Erin O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein (2000), ‘From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law’PART IISPECIFIC APPLICATIONS ACorporate Law and the Race to the Top5. Roberta Romano (1985), ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’6. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk (1992), ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law’BAntitrust and the Economics of Federalism7. Frank H. Easterbrook (1983), ‘Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism’CEnvironmental Regulation8. Richard L. Revesz (2001), ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis’DTaxation9. Daniel Shaviro (1992), ‘An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation’EWelfare Reform10. Charles C. Brown and Wallace E. Oates (1987), ‘Assistance to the Poor in a Federal System’FCrime11. Doron Teichman (2005), ‘The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition’Name Index

Edited by Bruce H. Kobayashi, Professor of Law, School of Law, George Mason University, US and the late Larry E. Ribstein, formerly Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair in Law, College of Law, University of Illinois, US

'A terrific collection of canonical federalism articles, along with a characteristically clear-headed Introduction by the editors. The volume will be very helpful to legal scholars, economists, and political scientists who teach courses on the increasingly dominant economic theories of federalism.'

• Contents:Volume IAcknowledgementsIntroduction Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. RibsteinPART IBASICS A Multiple Jurisdictions Are a Solution to the Public Good Problem1. Charles M. Tiebout (1956), ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’BExit and Federalism2. Richard A. Epstein (1992), ‘Exit Rights Under Federalism’COptimal Jurisdiction Size3. Gordon Tullock (1969), ‘Federalism: Problems of Scale’DTwin Dilemmas of Federalism: Free Riding, Spillovers, and Agency Costs 4. William H. Riker (1964), ‘The Origin and Purposes of Federalism’ and ‘The Maintenance of Federalism: The Administrative Theory’EConditions for Federalism5. Edmund W. Kitch (1980), ‘Regulation and the American Common Market’FPublic Choice and Federalism 6. Jonathan R. Macey (1990), ‘Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism’PART IIFISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR ATests of the Tiebout Model7. Edward M. Gramlich and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1982), ‘Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses’8. Paul W. Rhode and Koleman S. Strumpf (2003), ‘Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990’BDoes Structure Matter?9. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1981), ‘Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic’10. Dennis Epple and Alan Zelentiz (1981), ‘The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?’CVertical and Horizontal Competition11. Albert Breton (1996), ‘A Retrospective Overview’ and ‘The Organization of Governmental Systems’DFederalism, Development, and Self-Enforcing Federalism12. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’ECooperative Federalism13. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997), ‘Rethinking Federalism’FOptimal Taxation and Fiscal Instruments and Intergovernmental Grants14. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1996), ‘Designing Tax Policy in Federalist Economies: An Overview’GLeviathan and the Size of Government15. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1980), ‘Open Economy, Federalism, and Taxing Authority’16. Jonathan Rodden (2003), ‘Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government’HDistribution17. John Donahue (1997), ‘Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s Devolution Debate’18. Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer (1991), ‘Mobility and Redistribution’Name IndexVolume IIAcknowledgementsAn introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume IPART ILAW ACommerce Clause1. Saul Levmore (1983), ‘Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention’BUniform State Laws2. Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi (1996), ‘An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws’CThe Choice of State Versus Federal Law3. William F. Baxter (1963), ‘Choice of Law and the Federal System’DContractual Choice of Law and Forum4. Erin O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein (2000), ‘From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law’PART IISPECIFIC APPLICATIONS ACorporate Law and the Race to the Top5. Roberta Romano (1985), ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’6. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk (1992), ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law’BAntitrust and the Economics of Federalism7. Frank H. Easterbrook (1983), ‘Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism’CEnvironmental Regulation8. Richard L. Revesz (2001), ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis’DTaxation9. Daniel Shaviro (1992), ‘An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation’EWelfare Reform10. Charles C. Brown and Wallace E. Oates (1987), ‘Assistance to the Poor in a Federal System’FCrime11. Doron Teichman (2005), ‘The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition’Name Index