Edited by Howard R. Vane, Emeritus Professor of Economics, Liverpool Business School, Liverpool John Moores University, UK and Chris Mulhearn, formerly Reader in Economics, Liverpool Business School, Liverpool John Moores University, UK

‘What a brilliant idea! To provide readers with both information on the Nobel Laureates in Economics and, to the degree possible, the original papers for which they were honored. The names of the “contributing” Laureates speak for themselves. Howard Vane and Chris Mulhearn, the editors, and Edward Elgar, the publisher, are to be congratulated for putting the idea into effect.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsGeneral IntroductionPART IJOHN C. HARSANYI Introduction to Part IHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn1. John C. Harsanyi (1967), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By “Bayesian” Players, I-III. Part I. The Basic Model’2. John C. Harsanyi (1968a), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By “Bayesian” Players, Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points’3. John C. Harsanyi (1968b), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game’PART IIJOHN F. NASH Jr. Introduction to Part IIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn4. John F. Nash Jr. (1950a), ‘Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games’5. John F. Nash Jr. (1950b), ‘The Bargaining Problem’6. John Nash (1951), ‘Non-Cooperative Games’7. John Nash (1953), ‘Two-Person Cooperative Games’PART IIIREINHARD SELTEN Introduction to Part IIIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn8. Reinhard Selten (1975), ‘Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games’9. Reinhard Selten (1983), ‘A Model of Oligopolistic Size, Structure and Profitability’10. Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein (1984), ‘Gaps in Harley’s Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of “Tit for Tat”’11. Reinhard Selten (1990), ‘Bounded Rationality’12. Reinhard Selten, Michael Mitzkewitz and Gerald R. Uhlich (1997), ‘Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players’PART IVROBERT J. AUMANN Introduction to Part IVHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn13. Robert J. Aumann (1959), ‘Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games’14. Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler ([1966], 1995), ‘Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament’15. Robert J. Aumann (1974), ‘Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies’16. Robert J. Aumann (1976), ‘Agreeing to Disagree’17. Robert J. Aumann and Lloyd L. Shapley (1976), ‘Long-Term Competition: A Game Theoretic Analysis’18. Robert J. Aumann (1987), ‘Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality’PART VTHOMAS C. SCHELLINGIntroduction to Part VHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn19. Thomas C. Schelling (1956), ‘An Essay on Bargaining’20. Thomas C. Schelling (1957), ‘Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War’21. Thomas C. Schelling (1971), ‘Dynamic Models of Segregation’22. Thomas C. Schelling (1980), ‘The Intimate Contest for Self-Command’23. Thomas C. Schelling (1983), ‘Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command’24. Thomas C. Schelling (1984), ‘Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice’Name Index

Edited by Howard R. Vane, Emeritus Professor of Economics, Liverpool Business School, Liverpool John Moores University, UK and Chris Mulhearn, formerly Reader in Economics, Liverpool Business School, Liverpool John Moores University, UK

‘What a brilliant idea! To provide readers with both information on the Nobel Laureates in Economics and, to the degree possible, the original papers for which they were honored. The names of the “contributing” Laureates speak for themselves. Howard Vane and Chris Mulhearn, the editors, and Edward Elgar, the publisher, are to be congratulated for putting the idea into effect.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsGeneral IntroductionPART IJOHN C. HARSANYI Introduction to Part IHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn1. John C. Harsanyi (1967), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By “Bayesian” Players, I-III. Part I. The Basic Model’2. John C. Harsanyi (1968a), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By “Bayesian” Players, Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points’3. John C. Harsanyi (1968b), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game’PART IIJOHN F. NASH Jr. Introduction to Part IIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn4. John F. Nash Jr. (1950a), ‘Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games’5. John F. Nash Jr. (1950b), ‘The Bargaining Problem’6. John Nash (1951), ‘Non-Cooperative Games’7. John Nash (1953), ‘Two-Person Cooperative Games’PART IIIREINHARD SELTEN Introduction to Part IIIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn8. Reinhard Selten (1975), ‘Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games’9. Reinhard Selten (1983), ‘A Model of Oligopolistic Size, Structure and Profitability’10. Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein (1984), ‘Gaps in Harley’s Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of “Tit for Tat”’11. Reinhard Selten (1990), ‘Bounded Rationality’12. Reinhard Selten, Michael Mitzkewitz and Gerald R. Uhlich (1997), ‘Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players’PART IVROBERT J. AUMANN Introduction to Part IVHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn13. Robert J. Aumann (1959), ‘Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games’14. Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler ([1966], 1995), ‘Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament’15. Robert J. Aumann (1974), ‘Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies’16. Robert J. Aumann (1976), ‘Agreeing to Disagree’17. Robert J. Aumann and Lloyd L. Shapley (1976), ‘Long-Term Competition: A Game Theoretic Analysis’18. Robert J. Aumann (1987), ‘Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality’PART VTHOMAS C. SCHELLINGIntroduction to Part VHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn19. Thomas C. Schelling (1956), ‘An Essay on Bargaining’20. Thomas C. Schelling (1957), ‘Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War’21. Thomas C. Schelling (1971), ‘Dynamic Models of Segregation’22. Thomas C. Schelling (1980), ‘The Intimate Contest for Self-Command’23. Thomas C. Schelling (1983), ‘Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command’24. Thomas C. Schelling (1984), ‘Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice’Name Index

Edited by Howard R. Vane, Emeritus Professor of Economics, Liverpool Business School, Liverpool John Moores University, UK and Chris Mulhearn, formerly Reader in Economics, Liverpool Business School, Liverpool John Moores University, UK

‘What a brilliant idea! To provide readers with both information on the Nobel Laureates in Economics and, to the degree possible, the original papers for which they were honored. The names of the “contributing” Laureates speak for themselves. Howard Vane and Chris Mulhearn, the editors, and Edward Elgar, the publisher, are to be congratulated for putting the idea into effect.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsGeneral IntroductionPART IJOHN C. HARSANYI Introduction to Part IHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn1. John C. Harsanyi (1967), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By “Bayesian” Players, I-III. Part I. The Basic Model’2. John C. Harsanyi (1968a), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By “Bayesian” Players, Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points’3. John C. Harsanyi (1968b), ‘Games With Incomplete Information Played By ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game’PART IIJOHN F. NASH Jr. Introduction to Part IIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn4. John F. Nash Jr. (1950a), ‘Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games’5. John F. Nash Jr. (1950b), ‘The Bargaining Problem’6. John Nash (1951), ‘Non-Cooperative Games’7. John Nash (1953), ‘Two-Person Cooperative Games’PART IIIREINHARD SELTEN Introduction to Part IIIHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn8. Reinhard Selten (1975), ‘Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games’9. Reinhard Selten (1983), ‘A Model of Oligopolistic Size, Structure and Profitability’10. Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein (1984), ‘Gaps in Harley’s Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of “Tit for Tat”’11. Reinhard Selten (1990), ‘Bounded Rationality’12. Reinhard Selten, Michael Mitzkewitz and Gerald R. Uhlich (1997), ‘Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players’PART IVROBERT J. AUMANN Introduction to Part IVHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn13. Robert J. Aumann (1959), ‘Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games’14. Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler ([1966], 1995), ‘Game Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament’15. Robert J. Aumann (1974), ‘Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies’16. Robert J. Aumann (1976), ‘Agreeing to Disagree’17. Robert J. Aumann and Lloyd L. Shapley (1976), ‘Long-Term Competition: A Game Theoretic Analysis’18. Robert J. Aumann (1987), ‘Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality’PART VTHOMAS C. SCHELLINGIntroduction to Part VHoward R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn19. Thomas C. Schelling (1956), ‘An Essay on Bargaining’20. Thomas C. Schelling (1957), ‘Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War’21. Thomas C. Schelling (1971), ‘Dynamic Models of Segregation’22. Thomas C. Schelling (1980), ‘The Intimate Contest for Self-Command’23. Thomas C. Schelling (1983), ‘Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command’24. Thomas C. Schelling (1984), ‘Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice’Name Index