Legal Institutions and Economic Development

Edited by Robert Cooter, Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, US and Francesco Parisi, Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, US and Professor of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy

‘The study of the interaction between legal institutions and economic development is one of the most important research areas in economics and law. Professors Cooter and Parisi have produced a remarkable anthology. Their selection of articles and the way they have structured the literature form an original contribution in themselves. Even those who are already familiar with the literature will enjoy the refreshing perspective that is being offered by two of the leading scholars in the field.’

• Contents:AcknowledgementsIntroductionRobert D. Cooter and Francesco ParisiPART ILAW, FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1998), ‘Law and Finance’2. Paul G. Mahoney (2001), ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right’3. Frank B. Cross (2002), ‘Law and Economic Growth’4. Edward L. Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (2002), ‘Legal Origins’5. Bernard S. Black and Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2007), ‘Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firm Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India’PART II COMMON LAW AND LEGAL EVOLUTION 6. Mark J. Roe (1996), ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’7. Y. Barzel (2000), ‘Dispute and its Resolution: Delineating the Economic Role of the Common Law8. Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model’9. Keith N. Hylton (2006), ‘Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution’PART III PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 10. Frank H. Easterbrook (1983), ‘Statutes’ Domains’11. McNollgast (1994), ‘Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation’12. Robert Cooter (2002), ‘Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy versus Median Democracy’13. Francesco Parisi (2003), ‘Political Coase Theorem’14. Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott (1995), ‘The Political Economy of Private Legislatures’15. Tom Ginsberg (2002), ‘Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in Legal Scholarship’PART IV FEDERALISM AND CHOICE OF LAW 16. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), ‘Choice of Law: New Foundations’17. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997), ‘Rethinking Federalism’18. Lucian Arye Bebchuk (1992), ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law’19. Roberta Romano (2006), ‘The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters’20. Michael J. Trebilcock (2003), ‘The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy’Name Index