Fabrizio Gilardi, Associate Professor of Political Science, Institute of Political Science and Center for Comparative and International Studies, University of Zurich, Switzerland

'. . . it is thanks to works like this one that we can make progress in the understanding of the phenomenon of independent regulatory authorities in Europe and elsewhere.'

• Contents: Preface 1. Introduction 2. The Institutional Foundations of the Regulatory State 3. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Credibility, Political Uncertainty, and Veto Players 4. The Formal Independence of Regulators: Empirical Analysis 5. Interdependent Delegation: The Diffusion of Independent Regulators Agencies 6. The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies: Empirical Analysis 7. Conclusion 8. Appendixes Bibliography Index

Fabrizio Gilardi, Associate Professor of Political Science, Institute of Political Science and Center for Comparative and International Studies, University of Zurich, Switzerland

'. . . it is thanks to works like this one that we can make progress in the understanding of the phenomenon of independent regulatory authorities in Europe and elsewhere.'

• Contents: Preface 1. Introduction 2. The Institutional Foundations of the Regulatory State 3. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Credibility, Political Uncertainty, and Veto Players 4. The Formal Independence of Regulators: Empirical Analysis 5. Interdependent Delegation: The Diffusion of Independent Regulators Agencies 6. The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies: Empirical Analysis 7. Conclusion 8. Appendixes Bibliography Index

Fabrizio Gilardi, Associate Professor of Political Science, Institute of Political Science and Center for Comparative and International Studies, University of Zurich, Switzerland

'. . . it is thanks to works like this one that we can make progress in the understanding of the phenomenon of independent regulatory authorities in Europe and elsewhere.'

• Contents: Preface 1. Introduction 2. The Institutional Foundations of the Regulatory State 3. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Credibility, Political Uncertainty, and Veto Players 4. The Formal Independence of Regulators: Empirical Analysis 5. Interdependent Delegation: The Diffusion of Independent Regulators Agencies 6. The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies: Empirical Analysis 7. Conclusion 8. Appendixes Bibliography Index