Social Choice Mechanisms

AvVladimir I. Danilov,Alexander I. Sotskov

Inbunden, Engelska, 2002

Del i serien Studies in Economic Design

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Beskrivning

Theory of social choice mechanisms is a comparatively new theory. The first results were obtained as early as the beginning of the seventies. The book contains the most important results of the theory. In two main topics the book describes what mechanisms allow equilibrium solutions at any agents' preference profiles, and what outcomes can be implemented. The answer depends on the equilibrium concept. Furthermore the four equilibrium concepts Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium, equilibrium in dominant strategies, and the core were described in detail.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2002-02-25
Mått:155 x 235 x 16 mm
Vikt:477 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Studies in Economic Design
Antal sidor:191
Upplaga:2002
Förlag:Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
ISBN:9783540431053

Utforska kategorier

Sociologi inom Samhälle och politik

Recensioner i media

From the reviews: "This is a fine addition to a growing list of books on the theory of incentives. ... the material is very well presented. I particularly like the selection of examples and the way in which they are used. ... Social Choice Mechanisms will be a valuable research tool. ... it is quite easy to move around in the book. ... I found a lot of gems that I had not come across before, even though I was fairly familiar with the terrain." (Donald E. Campbell, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 21 (3), 2003)

Innehållsförteckning

1. Basic Concepts.- 1.1 Preferences.- 1.2 Social Choice Correspondences.- 1.3 Monotone Social Choice Correspondences.- 1.4 Social Choice Mechanisms.- 1.5 Effectivity Functions and Blockings.- 1.A1 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.- 1.A2 Non-manipulable SCFs.- 1.A3 Minimal Monotone SCCs.- Bibliographic Comments.- 2. Nash-consistent Mechanisms.- 2.1 Definitions and Examples.- 2.2 Blockings Generated by Consistent Mechanisms.- 2.3 Strongly Monotone Social Choice Correspondences.- 2.4 Nash-implementable Correspondences.- 2.5 Implementation: the Case of Two Participants.- 2.6 Acceptable Mechanisms.- 2.A A Simple Mechanism for the Implementation of Walrasian Equilibria.- Bibliographic Comments.- 3. Strategy-proof Mechanisms.- 3.1 Dominant Strategies. The Revelation Principle.- 3.2 Single-Peaked Environment.- 3.3 Linear Environment.- 3.4 The Transferable Environment. Groves Mechanisms.- 3.5 Further Properties of Groves Mechanisms.- 3.A1 The Simple Transferable Environment Case.- 3.A2 Acceptable Mechanisms in Transferable Environment.- Bibliographic Comments.- 4. Cores and Stable Blockings.- 4.1 Stable Outcomes.- 4.2 Additive Blockings.- 4.3 Convex Blockings.- 4.4 Almost Additive Blockings.- 4.5 Necessary Stability Conditions.- 4.6 Veto as a Decision-making Procedure.- 4.A1 Balanced Blockings.- 4.A2 Blockings with Infinite Number of Alternatives.- 4.A3 The Harems Lemma.- Bibliographic Comments.- 5. Strongly Consistent Mechanisms.- 5.1 Definitions and Examples.- 5.2 A Tokens Mechanism (or Veto-mechanism).- 5.3 Blockings Generated by SC-mechanisms.- 5.4 Direct Core Mechanisms.- 5.5 Laminable Blockings.- 5.6 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Laminability.- 5.7 Neutral Laminable Blockings.- 5.A Implementation via Strong Equilibria.- Bibliographic Comments.- References.