Instead of treating the paradox of fiction as a problem to be solved, we can use it as a tool for analysing the underlying concepts. Intentionality ‒ the ›aboutness‹ or ›directedness‹ of our mental states ‒ lies at the core of the paradox. Our emotional responses are usually formulated as directed toward the fictional characters and situations in a story: we feel pity for Anna Karenina and we are afraid of Nosferatu. Iulia Nistor shows how the paradox invites us, on the one hand to ask whether there is a difference between the intentionality of thought and that of emotion, and on the other hand whether intentionality differs when directed toward factual or fictional states of affairs. In this framework, she examines the concepts of affective and derived intentionality and identifies inconsistencies in the general use of the term, concluding with requirements for a theory of intentionality.

Instead of treating the paradox of fiction as a problem to be solved, we can use it as a tool for analysing the underlying concepts. Intentionality ‒ the ›aboutness‹ or ›directedness‹ of our mental states ‒ lies at the core of the paradox. Our emotional responses are usually formulated as directed toward the fictional characters and situations in a story: we feel pity for Anna Karenina and we are afraid of Nosferatu. Iulia Nistor shows how the paradox invites us, on the one hand to ask whether there is a difference between the intentionality of thought and that of emotion, and on the other hand whether intentionality differs when directed toward factual or fictional states of affairs. In this framework, she examines the concepts of affective and derived intentionality and identifies inconsistencies in the general use of the term, concluding with requirements for a theory of intentionality.

Instead of treating the paradox of fiction as a problem to be solved, we can use it as a tool for analysing the underlying concepts. Intentionality ‒ the ›aboutness‹ or ›directedness‹ of our mental states ‒ lies at the core of the paradox. Our emotional responses are usually formulated as directed toward the fictional characters and situations in a story: we feel pity for Anna Karenina and we are afraid of Nosferatu. Iulia Nistor shows how the paradox invites us, on the one hand to ask whether there is a difference between the intentionality of thought and that of emotion, and on the other hand whether intentionality differs when directed toward factual or fictional states of affairs. In this framework, she examines the concepts of affective and derived intentionality and identifies inconsistencies in the general use of the term, concluding with requirements for a theory of intentionality.