Making of a Neo-Propaganda State

Titus C. Chen, Ph.D. (2008), University of California-Irvine, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan. He has published articles in leading academic journals, including Journal of Contemporary China (Taylor & Francis) and The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (SAGE Journals).

"How has China’s propaganda strategy evolved in the digital era when social media and internet technology challenge the state’s monopoly on information? In his new book titled The Making of a Neo-Propaganda State, Titus Chen has provided a comprehensive review of the evolution of China’s propaganda machine and a strong argument of how it embraced the digital era to enhance the party-state’s ideological work: they utilize marketized channels to conduct propaganda works in a large and efficient manner."- Dongshu Liu, The China Quarterly, (2023), 1-2."Chen quantifies posts and themes on WeChat to chart the growth and sophistication of frames that legitimize the regime and delegitimize anything contrary. This raises several questions, chief among them whether China's patriotic unity will remain strong. Since the publication of Chen's book, China's lockdowns have alienated many Chinese people. But Chen's work raises broader questions about the future of the internet. Will polarization and violence push the US to institute similar online limits? China's present sheds light on a possible future the rest of the world faces." - M. G. Roskin, emeritus, Lycoming College

• List of Figures and Tables1 Introduction1Making Sense of China’s Authoritarian Resilience Under Xi Jinping2Market Authoritarianism and Online thought Work3The Revitalization of Party Media4Online thought Work as Authoritarian Signaling5Mischaracterizing Hong Kong: The “Newspeak” of a Neo-propaganda State6The plan of the Book2 China as a Post-propaganda State: The Erosion of Market Authoritarianism in the Age of Social Media1Introduction2Market Authoritarianism: How Media Marketization Sustained Authoritarianism in China3China’s State–media Relationship in the Age of Social Media: The State Losing Both Control and Influence4Chapter Conclusion3 Regaining Control, Reclaiming Influence: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Taming Social Media1Introduction2Setting the Stage for the New Leader: The Intensification of Online Censorship Targeting Social Media3Conceptual Developments of Xi Jinping’s thought Control Strategy (2013–2014)3.1Showing True Colors: Main Melody, Positive Energy, and “Grand Propaganda”3.2Social Management and Cultural Management: Xi Jinping’s Blueprint for thought Control on the Internet4Instituting and Substantializing Xi Jinping’s thought Control Strategy on the Internet4.1Centralizing the Command Structure of the Cyber Affairs System4.2Regaining Control: The Proposition of “Cyber Sovereignty”4.3Reclaiming Influence: The Initiative of “Media Convergence” (´CÊ^¿Ä¦X)5Constructing a Regulatory Framework Favoring Online thought Control5.1Reinforcing Regime Presence and Influence on Social Media5.2Enhancing Control Mechanisms over Social Media Access and Content5.3Reinforcing Online Influence Work6Chapter Conclusion: The Party-lization of Chinese Social Media Market4 Entrepreneurial Mouthpieces: Party Media as Digital thought Workers1Introduction2Conceptualizing Party Media as Digital thought Workers3Locating Party Media in the Regime’s Grand Scheme of “Media Convergence”4People’s Daily: Pioneering Online thought Work on Social Media4.1The “Central Kitchen” Model: Mass Producing Online thought Work Materials4.2One Paper, Multiple Outlets: Effective Circulation of Pro-regime Content4.3The Business of Net-watching: Online Surveillance and Censorship Operations5A Propaganda Deluge on the Chinese Internet6Chapter Conclusion5 Autocracy Marketized: Surveying the Party-state’s Hegemonic Discursive Patterns on Social Media1Introduction2Chinese Social Media as an Arena for Hegemonic Communication Power3Introducing the WeChat Data and Research Methods for Content Analysis4Exploring Layout Features of Pro-regime Social Media Posts5Topic Modeling the Content of Pro-regime Social Media Posts6Tracking Diachronic Changes in the Content Structure of Pro-regime Social Media Posts7Examining Framing Techniques of “Mainstream” Discourses on WeChat7.1The Discursive Strategies of Reification and Dissimulation7.2The Discursive Strategy of Legitimation7.3The Discursive Strategies of Unification and Fragmentation8Chapter Conclusion: The Prevalence of “Feel-good” Propaganda in Xi’s China6 China’s Online thought Work as Authoritarian Diplomatic Signaling1Introduction2Costly Signals and Credible Information: A Literature Review3Conceptualizing Beijing’s Authoritarian Diplomatic Signaling on Social Media4Identifying and Measuring Beijing’s Diplomatic Signaling on WeChat4.1Measuring the Information Coordination Costs4.2Measuring the Domestic Audience Costs4.3Dataset for Empirical Analyses4.4Case Studies for Empirical Analyses5Beijing’s Diplomatic Signaling During the Intensified US–China Trade Disputes (May 2019)5.1Comparing Operational Patterns of Beijing’s Diplomatic Signaling5.2Comparing Beijing’s Information Coordination Costs for Handling Trade Dispute Incidents5.3Comparing Beijing’s Domestic Audience Costs Generated by Trade Dispute Incidents6Chapter Conclusion: Diplomatic Signaling for Domestic Purposes7 Misrepresenting Hong Kong: China’s Disinformation Against the Rallying Cry for Democracy1Introduction2Beijing’s Early Responses to the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong3June–August 2019, a Critical Juncture4Shifting Approaches of China’s Online Influence Operations Targeting the Hong Kong Protests5Traitors, Flag Guardians, and Azhong Gege: Disinformation with Chinese Characteristics6Chapter Conclusion8 China as a Neo-propaganda State1Marketized Ideological Work Matters2Ideological Work Going Abroad3A call for Future ResearchReferencesIndex