Kamil Majcherek, Ph.D. (2022), University of Toronto, is Title A Fellow in History of Philosophy of Trinity College, Cambridge. His main interests lie in late medieval metaphysics and natural philosophy. He is currently mainly interested in late medieval metaphysics of numbers.

• AcknowledgmentsNote on Previously Published PiecesList of AbbreviationsShort Biographical NotesIntroduction1 The Problem of Artefacts2 Status Quaestionis3 Sources and Scope4 Outline1 Nature and Art1 Nature as a Principle of Motion and Rest2 Natural Things3 Art as a Productive Habit4 Artificial Things5 Artificial FormsExcursus1: Why Can Artefacts Not Be Substances?1 Introduction2 Sources3 Rationale4 Other Limitations on the Productive Capacity of Art5 Conclusion2 The Nature of Artificial Change1 Introduction2 Artificial Forms: Modi vs. Res3 Artefact Realists on Changed Involved in the Making of Artefacts4 Artefact Nominalism in First Approximation5 Artefact Nominalists on the Nature of Change Involved in the Making of Artefacts6 Artefact Nominalists on the Two Other Realist Arguments7 Artefact Nominalists on Local Motion and Change8 ConclusionExcursus2: The Peculiar Status of Artificial Forms and Artefacts1 Introduction2 Thirteenth-Century Commentators on the Status of Artificial Forms3 Paul of Venice on the Status of Artificial Forms4 Paul of Venice on Artefacts as Wholes3 The Problem of Multipart Artefacts1 Introduction2 Ockham’s Argument3 Realist Reply 1: Walter Burley4 Realist Reply 2: Paul of Venice5 Realist Reply 3: Theodoric of Magdeburg6 ConclusionExcursus3: Artefacts, Principle of Motion, and Reduplication1 Introduction2 The Realist Position3 The Nominalist Position4 Productivity of Art1 Introduction2 Realist Argument(s) Based on the Productivity of Art3 Nominalist Account of the Productivity of Art4 Realist Critique of the Nominalist Solution5 ConclusionExcursus4: Artificial Production and Natural Generation1 Introduction2 The View of the “Ancient Materialists”3 Ancient Materialism and Artefact Nominalism4 Conclusion5 Problems of Separability1 Introduction2 The Principle of Separability: The Realist View3 A Nominalist Critique of the Realist Version of the Principle of Separability4 The Principle of Separability: The Nominalist View5 ConclusionExcursus5: The Relational View of Artefacts and Its Discontents1 Introduction2 Henry of Ghent: The Reductive Relational View3 John Duns Scotus: The (Anti?)Reductive Relational View4 John of Pouilly and Bernard of Auvergne: The Rejection of the Relational View5 The Nominalist Rejection of the Relational ViewFinal ConclusionAppendix: Critical EditionsTextI: Anonymous, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, lib. II, qq.19–21TextII: Bernard of Auvergne, Reprobationes Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet VII, q.1 (selected passages)TextIII: John of Pouilly, Quodlibet II, q.16/22TextIV: Anonymous, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, q.26TextV: Theodoric of Magdeburg, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, lib. I, q.1TextVI: Anonymous, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, lib. II, q.3TextVII: Lawrence of Lindores, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, lib. I, qq.1 and 4TextVIII: Hugolinus of Orvieto and Anonymus Erfordiensis, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, lib. I, q.1TextIX: John Aurifaber, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, lib. I, q.1TextX: Blasius of Parma, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, v. prima, lib. I, q.1, et v. altera, lib. I, q.1TextXI: John Hennon, Commentarius in libros Physicorum, lib. II, q.2, dub. 3TextXII: John le Damoiseau, Commentarius in libros Physicorum, lib. II, q.3 (selected passages)Bibliography

Kamil Majcherek, Ph.D. (2022), University of Toronto, is Title A Fellow in History of Philosophy of Trinity College, Cambridge. His main interests lie in late medieval metaphysics and natural philosophy. He is currently mainly interested in late medieval metaphysics of numbers.

• AcknowledgmentsNote on Previously Published PiecesList of AbbreviationsShort Biographical NotesIntroduction1 The Problem of Artefacts2 Status Quaestionis3 Sources and Scope4 Outline1 Nature and Art1 Nature as a Principle of Motion and Rest2 Natural Things3 Art as a Productive Habit4 Artificial Things5 Artificial FormsExcursus1: Why Can Artefacts Not Be Substances?1 Introduction2 Sources3 Rationale4 Other Limitations on the Productive Capacity of Art5 Conclusion2 The Nature of Artificial Change1 Introduction2 Artificial Forms: Modi vs. Res3 Artefact Realists on Changed Involved in the Making of Artefacts4 Artefact Nominalism in First Approximation5 Artefact Nominalists on the Nature of Change Involved in the Making of Artefacts6 Artefact Nominalists on the Two Other Realist Arguments7 Artefact Nominalists on Local Motion and Change8 ConclusionExcursus2: The Peculiar Status of Artificial Forms and Artefacts1 Introduction2 Thirteenth-Century Commentators on the Status of Artificial Forms3 Paul of Venice on the Status of Artificial Forms4 Paul of Venice on Artefacts as Wholes3 The Problem of Multipart Artefacts1 Introduction2 Ockham’s Argument3 Realist Reply 1: Walter Burley4 Realist Reply 2: Paul of Venice5 Realist Reply 3: Theodoric of Magdeburg6 ConclusionExcursus3: Artefacts, Principle of Motion, and Reduplication1 Introduction2 The Realist Position3 The Nominalist Position4 Productivity of Art1 Introduction2 Realist Argument(s) Based on the Productivity of Art3 Nominalist Account of the Productivity of Art4 Realist Critique of the Nominalist Solution5 ConclusionExcursus4: Artificial Production and Natural Generation1 Introduction2 The View of the “Ancient Materialists”3 Ancient Materialism and Artefact Nominalism4 Conclusion5 Problems of Separability1 Introduction2 The Principle of Separability: The Realist View3 A Nominalist Critique of the Realist Version of the Principle of Separability4 The Principle of Separability: The Nominalist View5 ConclusionExcursus5: The Relational View of Artefacts and Its Discontents1 Introduction2 Henry of Ghent: The Reductive Relational View3 John Duns Scotus: The (Anti?)Reductive Relational View4 John of Pouilly and Bernard of Auvergne: The Rejection of the Relational View5 The Nominalist Rejection of the Relational ViewFinal ConclusionAppendix: Critical EditionsTextI: Anonymous, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, lib. II, qq.19–21TextII: Bernard of Auvergne, Reprobationes Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet VII, q.1 (selected passages)TextIII: John of Pouilly, Quodlibet II, q.16/22TextIV: Anonymous, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, q.26TextV: Theodoric of Magdeburg, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, lib. I, q.1TextVI: Anonymous, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, lib. II, q.3TextVII: Lawrence of Lindores, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, lib. I, qq.1 and 4TextVIII: Hugolinus of Orvieto and Anonymus Erfordiensis, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, lib. I, q.1TextIX: John Aurifaber, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, lib. I, q.1TextX: Blasius of Parma, Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum, v. prima, lib. I, q.1, et v. altera, lib. I, q.1TextXI: John Hennon, Commentarius in libros Physicorum, lib. II, q.2, dub. 3TextXII: John le Damoiseau, Commentarius in libros Physicorum, lib. II, q.3 (selected passages)Bibliography