Apparently, people who are aware of the relevant facts and experiences in a belief forming situation, sometimes reasonably disagree about whether to believe and why. This study argues that such disagreements are possible, and that some purportedly fully informed reasonable disagreements are genuine, including cases involving disagreement about which beliefs about God are reasonably taken to be properly basic, given the facts of religious diversity and cases in which phenomenologically similar religious experiences properly ground a variety of religious beliefs. Drawing on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, it also argues that Tradition-Based Perspectivalism – roughly, the view that foundational beliefs about what is reasonable to believe and why, are tradition-based and perspectival in nature, originating in and appropriately grounded only from the perspective of some tradition of inquiry or other – is true, and that its truth provides additional support for the claim that fully informed reasonable disagreement actually occurs.

Apparently, people who are aware of the relevant facts and experiences in a belief forming situation, sometimes reasonably disagree about whether to believe and why. This study argues that such disagreements are possible, and that some purportedly fully informed reasonable disagreements are genuine, including cases involving disagreement about which beliefs about God are reasonably taken to be properly basic, given the facts of religious diversity and cases in which phenomenologically similar religious experiences properly ground a variety of religious beliefs. Drawing on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, it also argues that Tradition-Based Perspectivalism – roughly, the view that foundational beliefs about what is reasonable to believe and why, are tradition-based and perspectival in nature, originating in and appropriately grounded only from the perspective of some tradition of inquiry or other – is true, and that its truth provides additional support for the claim that fully informed reasonable disagreement actually occurs.

Apparently, people who are aware of the relevant facts and experiences in a belief forming situation, sometimes reasonably disagree about whether to believe and why. This study argues that such disagreements are possible, and that some purportedly fully informed reasonable disagreements are genuine, including cases involving disagreement about which beliefs about God are reasonably taken to be properly basic, given the facts of religious diversity and cases in which phenomenologically similar religious experiences properly ground a variety of religious beliefs. Drawing on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, it also argues that Tradition-Based Perspectivalism – roughly, the view that foundational beliefs about what is reasonable to believe and why, are tradition-based and perspectival in nature, originating in and appropriately grounded only from the perspective of some tradition of inquiry or other – is true, and that its truth provides additional support for the claim that fully informed reasonable disagreement actually occurs.