Strategic Direction from the President

Jack Godwin is a political scientist and author of Office Politics (Career Press, 2013), Clintonomics (Amacom Books, 2009) and Arrow and the Olive Branch (Praeger, 2007). During the second Obama administration and the first Trump administration, Jack was Director of International Programs at National Defense University (NDU) and Associate Editor at NDU Press. Prior to this, he served many years as Chief International Officer at California State University, Sacramento. He was a Fulbright scholar in Britain, Canada, Germany, Hungary and Japan, and a Peace Corps volunteer in Gabon. Jack has a PhD from University of Hawaii, an MBA from San Francisco State University, and a BA from University of California.

• IntroductionChapter 1: Test Case: Wilson & his Critics. This case begins in 1915 with Wilson’s analysis ofthe “unstable equilibrium” in Europe, then his postwar advocacy for the Treaty of Versailles andUS membership in the League of Nations. It ends with Wilson’s immediate successors (Harding,Coolidge, and Hoover) who put their faith in the Washington Naval Treaty and the theory ofarms control and disarmament.Chapter 2: Roosevelt & Total War. This is the longest case partly because Franklin Rooseveltserves many years as president, and partly because the Good Neighbor policy (which Rooseveltintroduces in his first inaugural) is a case-within-a-case. Years later, Roosevelt begins using totalwar as a pejorative term, but this changes after Pearl Harbor and it becomes US policy. There isno precise definition, but total war is a combination of industrial mobilization, readiness, anddeterrence.Chapter 3: Truman’s New Paradigm. This case continues with the policy of total war underHarry Truman until December 1945 when Truman calls for a comprehensive national securityprogram. The phrase “national security” is not new to the presidential lexicon. However, the wayTruman uses it—and every president after him—national security is a new paradigm whichtranscends foreign and defense policy and affects everything the government does. In addition,this chapter introduces NSC-68, the classified policy paper written in 1950 by an interagencystudy group (declassified in 1975) which recommends the policy of containment.Chapter 4: Eisenhower & Mutual Security. Dwight Eisenhower begins his presidency bycalling for armistice in Korea and proposing arms control and disarmament negotiations with theSoviet Union. In May 1953 (following the death of Josef Stalin) Eisenhower begins a tirelesscampaign for a system of mutual security, which he considers to be the most cost-effective wayto project power and prevent war. As a strategic concept, mutual security originates fromTruman’s 1947 request for military assistance to Greece and Turkey. But Eisenhower believes itshould be permanent national policy.Chapter 5: Kennedy’s Stylistic Analysis. This case begins with John Kennedy’s InauguralAddress and a reminder that good reasoning and good communication are the building blocks ofcoherence. Kennedy is a great communicator, exceptionally good on camera, but hisinauguration speech and other public statements are full of vague promises, loaded phrases, andemotionalism. This chapter contains a case-within-a-case, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis whenKennedy anticipates an emergent threat and demonstrates effective crisis management.Chapter 6: Johnson’s Many Principles. The purpose of this case isn’t to revisit the lessons ofVietnam. Instead, we focus on Johnson’s preference for abstract principles (theoreticalperfection) and his avoidance of rigorous analysis. Johnson is a skilled politician—at least whenit comes to domestic politics—but international politics doesn’t suit him or interest him the sameway. For example, his one overriding rule is that foreign policy must always be an extension ofdomestic policy. However, Johnson’s principles are neither certain nor fixed, too numerous, andtoo inconsistent to provide sufficient planning guidance.Chapter 7: Nixon’s Structure of Peace. Richard Nixon’s first Inaugural Address (1969) isunremarkable except for one phrase: the structure of peace. Several of Nixon’s predecessors usethis phrase, beginning with Wilson in 1919, followed by Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, andJohnson, but only Nixon dedicates his presidency to it. The structure of peace is not an artifact ofthe Cold War, not aimed at the Soviet Union (unlike the policy of containment), and notexplicitly ideological. Most importantly, the structure of peace is Nixon’s long-term vision forthe US’s role in the world after the Vietnam War.Chapter 8: Carter & Human Rights. On Inauguration Day, Jimmy Carter does somethingunusual. He records a message on foreign policy for citizens of the world, for those who cannotvote in US elections but are affected by US foreign policy. In Carter’s Inaugural Address, hesays his commitment to human rights is absolute. The problem is that human rights is his firstprinciple, his course of action, and his strategy all in one. There is no logical sequence, and nodifference at any level. This chapter contains another case-within-a-case, the 1979 Hostage Crisiswhen Iranian students storm the US embassy in Teheran and take more than sixty hostages.Chapter 9: Reagan & Economic Freedom. In Ronald Reagan’s closing statement during the1980 presidential debate, he asks a question. Are you better off than you were four years ago?This question is highly effective but not particularly original. Reagan is imitating FranklinRoosevelt who asks the same question during the Great Depression. When Reagan gives his firstmajor foreign policy address (in October 1981) he continues to draw inspiration from Roosevelt,who says political freedom without economic freedom is meaningless. For the rest of Reagan’spresidency, his foreign policy is a convergence of themes such as strategic defense, arms control,and the concept of economic freedom.Chapter 10: Beyond the Cold War. In the early years after the Cold War, George Bush and BillClinton try to make sense of the new era. Bush uses a simplistic slogan—beyond containment—which is mostly a list of rules Russia must obey to reintegrate (or rejoin) the new world order.These rules of international behavior—which go back to Eisenhower and Nixon—are unwrittenand well-known but often ignored. Now that the Cold War is over, both Bush and Clinton areworried the US will withdraw from the world and retreat into protectionism and isolationism.Chapter 11: Bush & Homeland Security. In November 2001, barely two months after the 9/11attack, George W. Bush gives a national address. The symbolic meaning in his remarks is clearfrom the subtext: burning buildings, innocent lives, unimaginable horror, and so many funerals.All of which means one thing: our lives will never be the same. This case highlights the unusualchallenge of simultaneously producing and executing a national strategy while the emergencyresponse is ongoing. Dozens of federal agencies are already mobilized, as well as state and localgovernments, and many international organizations. And a new cabinet-level position is created:Director of (later Secretary of) Homeland Security, whose assignment is to develop a nationalstrategy for homeland security. Chapter 12: Obama’s Campaign Promise. In October 2002, Illinois State Senator BarackObama gives a speech to oppose the use of force against Iraq. Five years later, Obama announceshe’s running for president and promises to end the war. Obama even quotes his own antiwar speech five years ago when he predicts an occupation of undetermined length, undeterminedcosts, and undetermined consequences. This campaign promise is relevant to our inquiry becauseit shows the difference between the candidate and the commander-in-chief. And it shows thatcampaign promises are no substitute for structured analysis, which represents the first element ofcritical thinking.ConclusionAppendicesBibliography