Abdullahi Dahir Ahmed - Böcker

This book integrates elements from agency theory and signalling theory and draws upon recent changes in the Australian payout policy and incentives pay for risk-averse employees to provide theoretical and empirical analyses that explain the paradox of the popularity of on-market stock buyback activities in a market environment characterised by reasonably high share prices.The authors utilise a dynamic model that rationalises this paradox, which is divided into three components. The first component predicts that executives may be conducting on-market stock buyback programmes (SBPs) to adjust equity-based remuneration for risk-averse employees, thereby motivating their performance without granting them additional costly equity incentive plans (EIPs); the second component predicts that companies are likely to invest in SBPs to increase the ownership stakes of employees in the firm, thereby inducing risk-averse employees to increase their productivity which increases firm value; while the third component predicts that shareholders would benefit from incentives-induced buybacks if a firm’s opportunity cost of funds spent on buybacks is less than its inverse price-to-earnings ratio.The authors’ findings highlight differences in the market responses towards announced repurchase motives, implying that not all incentives-induced buybacks are value-destructive buybacks. Specifically, the widespread assumption that SBPs stifle investments in human and capital stock may be subjective as the findings show that incentives-induced buybacks may be value-creative or value-destructive depending on share repurchase motives of SBPs.This book will be a useful guide for scholars and researchers of finance, corporate finance, financial economics and financial accounting.

This book integrates elements from agency theory and signalling theory and draws upon recent changes in the Australian payout policy and incentives pay for risk-averse employees to provide theoretical and empirical analyses that explain the paradox of the popularity of on-market stock buyback activities in a market environment characterised by reasonably high share prices.The authors utilise a dynamic model that rationalises this paradox, which is divided into three components. The first component predicts that executives may be conducting on-market stock buyback programmes (SBPs) to adjust equity-based remuneration for risk-averse employees, thereby motivating their performance without granting them additional costly equity incentive plans (EIPs); the second component predicts that companies are likely to invest in SBPs to increase the ownership stakes of employees in the firm, thereby inducing risk-averse employees to increase their productivity which increases firm value; while the third component predicts that shareholders would benefit from incentives-induced buybacks if a firm’s opportunity cost of funds spent on buybacks is less than its inverse price-to-earnings ratio.The authors’ findings highlight differences in the market responses towards announced repurchase motives, implying that not all incentives-induced buybacks are value-destructive buybacks. Specifically, the widespread assumption that SBPs stifle investments in human and capital stock may be subjective as the findings show that incentives-induced buybacks may be value-creative or value-destructive depending on share repurchase motives of SBPs.This book will be a useful guide for scholars and researchers of finance, corporate finance, financial economics and financial accounting.

The recent global ?nancial crisis has made ?nancial liberalization a topic of great academic and practical interest. This book makes new contributions to the topic by combining fact-?nding, empirical analysis, and theory to examine the relationship between ?nancial liberalization and economic growth. Among its contributions, the book provides detailed country assessments on the effects of ?nancial liberalization, including its striking impact on the banking sector. Although an important goal of ?nancial deregulation has been to help ?nancial institutions better perform their role in intermediating resources, the book models how deregulation may fail to achieve that goal in countries with underdeveloped ?nancial markets and institutions. For that purpose, the book draws on actual experience in Kenya, Malawi, Botswana, and Thailand. This book should constitute important reading for students of ?nancial economics, researchers and general academics, ?nancial practitioners, policymakers, and teachers of economics. North Carolina, USA Steven L. Schwarcz December 2008 Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University Founding Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center Durham vii Abstract and Preface The latest global ?nancial and economic crisis of 2008 shows the need to - examine the desirability of ?nancial liberalization and the basis for the view that ?nancial deregulation by itself cannot be considered as a substitute for better economic management. The literature on ?nancial liberalization has identi?ed various mechanisms through which removing controls on interest rates may impact economic growth.