Allan Beever - Böcker

Throughout much of the history of political philosophy, many of the great philosophers begin their work with an investigation of private law. Why is this? And why is the central focus of our modern concern, the state, examined so late in their works? This book suggests an answer to these and related questions. It reveals that there are two general ways of thinking about the legal and the political: the modern which sees all through the lens of the state, and the traditional which begins with individuals and with the normative relations that exist between them building only slowly towards the community and the state. In the modern view, private law is understood as a method for achieving certain social goals. As such, it can be overlooked by political philosophy. For the traditional view, on the other hand, private law is of central philosophical importance, because it is there that we observe a society's enunciation of its most fundamental political and legal values. Arguing that an understanding of the traditional view is essential to an understanding of private law and political life, this book highlights how the modern conception is seriously distorting in this regard. A story unfolds throughout the chapters: the story of the growth and decline of the traditional view in political and legal thought. It challenges the modern fixation with the state, arguing for a return to the traditional view of legal and political community.

Freedom Under the Private Law examines the relationship between the private law, the rule of law and the protection of liberty. It traces important historical shifts in how these relationships have been conceived, from Plato’s conception of the Philosopher Kings, through the classical nineteenth century view of Dicey, the rise of the welfare state and the modern political economy of the present day.In this thought-provoking book, Allan Beever argues that today’s dominant understanding of the private law is a conception suited for a political economy that does not exist, that never existed and that was even an apparent political possibility only for a decade or so after the end of the Second World War. As a consequence of this, while many contemporary lawyers believe that their conception of the law is allied to progressive political thought, that conception in fact serves other agendas. This is explained through an examination of the history of twentieth century political economy in the first part of the book and an exploration of how the modern conception of law plays out in the case law in the second part. Here, Beever illustrates how the rule of law has been sacrificed to facilitate collectivist government regimes and highlights how we might move forward.This book is essential reading for students and scholars of law and society, legal philosophy, and legal theory, as well as academic lawyers, historians, legal practitioners, and political theorists.

This book provides a comprehensive theory of the rights upon which tort law is based and the liability that flows from violating those rights. Inspired by the account of private law contained in Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, the book shows that Kant’s theory elucidates a conception of interpersonal wrongdoing that illuminates the operation of tort law. The book then utilises this conception, applying it to the various areas of tort law, in order to develop an understanding of the particular areas in question and, just as importantly, their relationship to each other. It argues that there are three general kinds of liability found in the law of tort: liability for putting another or another’s property to one’s purposes directly, liability for doing something to a third party that puts another or another’s property to one’s purposes, and liability for pursuing purposes in a way that improperly interferes with the ability of another to pursue her legitimate purposes. It terms these forms liability for direct control, liability for indirect control and liability for injury respectively. The result is a coherent, philosophical understanding of the structure of tort liability as an entire system. In developing its position, the book considers the laws of Australia, Canada, England and Wales, New Zealand and the United States.

This book provides a comprehensive theory of the rights upon which tort law is based and the liability that flows from violating those rights. Inspired by the account of private law contained in Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, the book shows that Kant’s theory elucidates a conception of interpersonal wrongdoing that illuminates the operation of tort law. The book then utilises this conception, applying it to the various areas of tort law, in order to develop an understanding of the particular areas in question and, just as importantly, their relationship to each other. It argues that there are three general kinds of liability found in the law of tort: liability for putting another or another’s property to one’s purposes directly, liability for doing something to a third party that puts another or another’s property to one’s purposes, and liability for pursuing purposes in a way that improperly interferes with the ability of another to pursue her legitimate purposes. It terms these forms liability for direct control, liability for indirect control and liability for injury respectively. The result is a coherent, philosophical understanding of the structure of tort liability as an entire system. In developing its position, the book considers the laws of Australia, Canada, England and Wales, New Zealand and the United States.

Unlike other areas of the private law, the law of unjust enrichment stands or falls with the theory upon which it is based. This theory, fashioned primarily by Peter Birks and continued by many other scholars is known as the ‘dominant model’. The model employs a number of crucial concepts such as enrichment, benefit, value, and injustice. Unfortunately, the model has no coherent understanding of these things. Instead, it equivocates over the meanings of these concepts and at times adopts strange and even absurd understandings of them. It has to do this, because the model does not work. The dominant model is a failure. After revealing this, the book goes on to demonstrate how a more constrained and humble law of unjust enrichment might emerge from the wreckage of the dominant model. As scholarly doubts around the dominant model increase, this thought-provoking revision of unjust enrichment is both welcome and needed.

Allan Beever lays the foundation for a timely philosophical and empirical study of the nature of law with a detailed examination of the structure of evolving law through declaratory speech acts. This engaging book demonstrates both how law itself is achieved and also its ability to generate rights, duties, obligations, permissions and powers.Structured into three distinct parts - the philosophy of law and jurisprudence, the structure of the social word and the ontology of law, and the reconstruction of the philosophy of law - the author provides insight into law as a human institution and reveals that central debates are often based on misunderstandings of interpretation and intentionality. Inspired by the philosophy of John Searle alongside other well-respected legal theorists, the author also analyses both sides of the mainstream jurisprudential divide in its current state, in particular the theory of legal positivism.Examining all aspects of law and answering the important question of ‘What is Law?’, this book will be an invaluable resource for academics and advanced students in law schools and philosophy departments.

Rediscovering the Law of Negligence offers a systematic and theoretical exploration of the law of negligence. Its aim is to re-establish the notion that thinking about the law ought to and can proceed on the basis of principle. As such, it is opposed to the prevalent modern view that the various aspects of the law are and must be based on individual policy decisions and that the task of the judge or commentator is to shape the law in terms of the relevant policies as she sees them. The book, then, is an attempt to re-establish the law of negligence as a body of law rather than as a branch of politics. The book argues that the law of negligence is best understood in terms of a relatively small set of principles enunciated in a small number of leading cases. It further argues that these principles are themselves best seen in terms of an aspect of morality called corrective justice which, when applied to the most important aspects of the law of negligence reveals that the law - even as it now exists - possesses a far greater degree of conceptual unity than is commonly thought.Using this method the author is able to examine familiar aspects of the law of negligence such as the standard of care; the duty of care; remoteness; misfeasance; economic loss; negligent misrepresentation; the liability of public bodies; wrongful conception; nervous shock; the defences of contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk, and illegality; causation; and issues concerning proof, to show that when the principles are applied and the idea of corrective justice is properly understood then the law appears both systematic and conceptually satisfactory. The upshot is a rediscovery of the law of negligence.

Rediscovering the Law of Negligence offers a systematic and theoretical exploration of the law of negligence. Its aim is to re-establish the notion that thinking about the law ought to and can proceed on the basis of principle. As such, it is opposed to the prevalent modern view that the various aspects of the law are and must be based on individual policy decisions and that the task of the judge or commentator is to shape the law in terms of the relevant policies as she sees them. The book, then, is an attempt to re-establish the law of negligence as a body of law rather than as a branch of politics. The book argues that the law of negligence is best understood in terms of a relatively small set of principles enunciated in a small number of leading cases. It further argues that these principles are themselves best seen in terms of an aspect of morality called corrective justice which, when applied to the most important aspects of the law of negligence reveals that the law - even as it now exists - possesses a far greater degree of conceptual unity than is commonly thought.Using this method the author is able to examine familiar aspects of the law of negligence such as the standard of care; the duty of care; remoteness; misfeasance; economic loss; negligent misrepresentation; the liability of public bodies; wrongful conception; nervous shock; the defences of contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk, and illegality; causation; and issues concerning proof, to show that when the principles are applied and the idea of corrective justice is properly understood then the law appears both systematic and conceptually satisfactory. The upshot is a rediscovery of the law of negligence. "...an ambitious, well-researched and thought-provoking work, which will appeal to those interested in the academic debate as to the nature of the tort of negligence, reviving the argument that it could be unified under a set of key principles." Paula Giliker, Professional Negligence "Students and practitioners will...find the book valuable...Rediscovering the Law of Negligence asks serious questions about liability, compensation, and justice which is unlikely to leave any reader unmoved." David Dickinson, New Zealand Lawyer Magazine "...offers one of the most accessible introductions to corrective justice and interpretative legal theory that can be found in the relevant literature." Jason W Neyers, King's Law Journal