András Kertész – författare

It is widely believed that inconsistency is one of the greatest sins a scholar can commit. This issue is especially relevant in linguistics due to the rich diversity of data types, exceptions to the rules, counterexamples to the hypotheses, and background assumptions which constantly come into conflict with methodological principles. Bringing together ideas from linguistics and philosophy of science, this groundbreaking book seeks to answer the following questions: which kinds of inconsistency arise in linguistic theorising? Under which conditions can inconsistencies be tolerated? And how can inconsistencies be resolved? It is the first study to develop a novel metatheoretical framework that accounts for the emergence and the resolution of inconsistency in linguistic theorising, and to reveal the strategies of inconsistency resolution in theoretical linguistics. Supported by detailed case studies, the findings of this metatheoretical analysis can be applied to improve the effectiveness of the working linguist's problem-solving activity.

In recent years, research on the nature of linguistic evidence has gained significant attention. One key finding is that linguistic inquiry should not rely solely on a single source of evidence such as introspection, corpus data, or real or thought experiments, but rather combine several types within a single study. However, integrating these diverse forms of evidence presents serious methodological challenges. Broadly, two main situations can arise. The first is the convergence of evidence, wherein different types of data jointly support a hypothesis. In such cases, the hypothesis becomes more robust than it would be if supported by only one kind of evidence. Over the past decade, the concept of converging evidence in linguistics has been widely explored and discussed. The second, much less studied situation, is the divergence of evidence. Evidence diverges when different sources point towards incompatible hypotheses about a linguistic phenomenon. While convergence strengthens theoretical claims, divergence exposes inconsistencies that require explanation.Written accessibly, Diverging Evidence in Semantics and Pragmatics focuses on cases in which diverging evidence in semantics and pragmatics leads to inconsistencies, providing insight on how linguistic theories can account for conflicting data and the challenges they pose for empirical research.

The development of pragmatics has been shaped by thought experiments without which it could not have become an autonomous subfield of linguistics. However, their nature and their impact on current trends in pragmatics has not yet been made subject to systematic scrutiny. The book addresses that gap by confronting a central puzzle: How can thought experiments in pragmatics yield new experiential information about communication when they take place entirely within the researcher’s imagination. The volume offers a clear and original answer by showing that their power lies not in invention or speculation, but in a disciplined process of argumentative re evaluation of existing experiential knowledge.The book is unique in at least two respects. First, it presents carefully elaborated case studies on Searle’s and Grice’s seminal thought experiments, which yield an original solution to the paradox. The key idea of the solution is that thought experiments in pragmatics neither generate new experiential information per se, nor are they mere speculations on imaginary situations. Rather, their novelty is rooted in the plausible argumentation process during which they cyclically and prismatically re-evaluate experiential information. Second, through this solution, the book contributes to the controversies on the semantics–pragmatics interface in particular as well as the methodological foundations of pragmatic research in general.Written with conceptual clarity and supported by extensive engagement with current scholarship, this volume is of vital interest to researchers and advanced students in pragmatics, cognitive linguistics as well as the history and philosophy of linguistics.

Even though the range of phenomena syntactic theories intend to account for is basically the same, the large number of current approaches to syntax shows how differently these phenomena can be interpreted, described, and explained. The goal of the volume is to probe into the question of how exactly these frameworks differ and what if anything they have in common.Descriptions of a sample of current approaches to syntax are presented by their major practitioners (Part I) followed by their metatheoretical underpinnings (Part II). Given that the goal is to facilitate a systematic comparison among the approaches, a checklist of issues was given to the contributors to address. The main headings are Data, Goals, Descriptive Tools, and Criteria for Evaluation. The chapters are structured uniformly allowing an item-by-item survey across the frameworks. The introduction lays out the parameters along which syntactic frameworks must be the same and how they may differ and a final paper draws some conclusions about similarities and differences.The volume is of interest to descriptive linguists, theoreticians of grammar, philosophers of science, and studies of the cognitive science of science.

The volume investigates various approaches to mood distribution and mood variation in lexically selected complement clauses with special reference to Hungarian data. Its primary aim is to show that semantic factors play a crucial role in mood choice. The analysis focuses on the indicative/non-indicative opposition, the latter category includes the subjunctive, the imperative and the conditional. Critical discussion, revision and elaboration of previous semantic approaches pertaining to mood choice are presented, with particular emphasis on the applicability of the various analyses to mood phenomena in Hungarian. The author proposes two novel hypotheses about mood choice in Hungarian complement clauses.

Over the past few decades, cognitive linguistic research has turned metonymy from the "poor sister" of metaphor into a ubiquitous conceptual phenomenon. However, this broad notion of metonymy might run the risk of becoming too unrestricted and vacuous. In order to come to grips with the problem, the author proposes a narrower definition of metonymy, according to which linguistic metonymies co-activate the source, the target, and the relation between them so that only the target is expressed linguistically. Furthermore, he argues for a typology of metonymies based on the mental contents they involve. These results may not only prevent that the category of metonymy will become unlimited but may also take us a step closer to enhancing the empirical study of metonymic phenomena.