The question of what Wittgenstein meant by 'forms of life' has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein's reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein's time. The Element then presents a survey of Wittgenstein's employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein's wider inquiries into the workings of our language.

The question of what Wittgenstein meant by ''forms of life'' has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein''s reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein''s time. The Element then presents a survey of Wittgenstein''s employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein''s wider inquiries into the workings of our language.

The question of what Wittgenstein meant by ''forms of life'' has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein''s reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein''s time. The Element then presents a survey of Wittgenstein''s employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein''s wider inquiries into the workings of our language.

This book investigates the conflicts concerning pragmatism inWittgenstein’s work On Certainty, through a comparison with thepragmatist tradition as expressed by its founding fathers Charles S. Peirceand William James. It also describes Wittgenstein’s first encounters withpragmatism in the 1930s and shows the relevance of Frank Ramsey in thedevelopment of his thought. Offering a balanced, critical and theoreticalexamination the author discusses issues such as doubt, certainty, commonsense, forms of life, action and the pragmatic maxim. While highlightingthe objective convergences and divergences between the two approaches,the volume makes links to ongoing debates on relativism, foundationalism,scepticism and objectivity. It will be of interest to anyone searching for newperspectives on Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

This book investigates the conflicts concerning pragmatism in

Wittgenstein’s work On Certainty, through a comparison with the

pragmatist tradition as expressed by its founding fathers Charles S. Peirce

and William James. It also describes Wittgenstein’s first encounters with

pragmatism in the 1930s and shows the relevance of Frank Ramsey in the

development of his thought. Offering a balanced, critical and theoretical

examination the author discusses issues such as doubt, certainty, common

sense, forms of life, action and the pragmatic maxim. While highlighting

the objective convergences and divergences between the two approaches,

the volume makes links to ongoing debates on relativism, foundationalism,

scepticism and objectivity. It will be of interest to anyone searching for new

perspectives on Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

The question of what Wittgenstein meant by 'forms of life' has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein's reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein's time. The Element then presents a survey of Wittgenstein's employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein's wider inquiries into the workings of our language.

The question of what Wittgenstein meant by ''forms of life'' has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein''s reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein''s time. The Element then presents a survey of Wittgenstein''s employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein''s wider inquiries into the workings of our language.

The question of what Wittgenstein meant by ''forms of life'' has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein''s reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein''s time. The Element then presents a survey of Wittgenstein''s employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein''s wider inquiries into the workings of our language.

This book investigates the conflicts concerning pragmatism inWittgenstein’s work On Certainty, through a comparison with thepragmatist tradition as expressed by its founding fathers Charles S. Peirceand William James. It also describes Wittgenstein’s first encounters withpragmatism in the 1930s and shows the relevance of Frank Ramsey in thedevelopment of his thought. Offering a balanced, critical and theoreticalexamination the author discusses issues such as doubt, certainty, commonsense, forms of life, action and the pragmatic maxim. While highlightingthe objective convergences and divergences between the two approaches,the volume makes links to ongoing debates on relativism, foundationalism,scepticism and objectivity. It will be of interest to anyone searching for newperspectives on Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

This book investigates the conflicts concerning pragmatism in

Wittgenstein’s work On Certainty, through a comparison with the

pragmatist tradition as expressed by its founding fathers Charles S. Peirce

and William James. It also describes Wittgenstein’s first encounters with

pragmatism in the 1930s and shows the relevance of Frank Ramsey in the

development of his thought. Offering a balanced, critical and theoretical

examination the author discusses issues such as doubt, certainty, common

sense, forms of life, action and the pragmatic maxim. While highlighting

the objective convergences and divergences between the two approaches,

the volume makes links to ongoing debates on relativism, foundationalism,

scepticism and objectivity. It will be of interest to anyone searching for new

perspectives on Wittgenstein’s philosophy.