Antonio Estella – författare

The aim of this work is two-fold. First it attempts to construct a more solid critique of the European Union principle of subsidiarity. Second it tries to explain why the European Court of Justice is not fully implementing subsidiarity. Introduced in the EU legal order as a last resort protection mechanism for member states in a minoroty position in the Council of Ministers regarding a particular issue , the principle of subsidiarity is not only misplaced to fulfill that goal, but also its underlying logic has potential side-effects for European integration. Furthermore it is argued that, the 'legislation' of the principle in the Maastricht Treaty, and its reinforcement through the Amsterdam Protocol on subsidiarity cannot overcome the legitimacy dilemmas that the European Court of Justice would have to confront if it opted for the implementation of the principle. This book gives an in-depth analysis of both issues, in the context of a wider analysis that concerns the legitimacy of the political and legal structures of the European Union.

Since the economic crisis unfolded in 2008, the European Union economic governance framework has been profoundly transformed from a legal perspective. The EU has adopted new tools, institutions and rules to tackle the changes and is arguably better prepared to combat any future crises. This book analyses the basic legal framework of EU economic governance and considers the economic underpinnings which underlie legal institutions in this area. It uses analytical dialectics as a method of analysis and the paradigm of 'law as credibility' as the main model through which the substantive parts of EU economic governance are accounted for. Important issues such as access, exit and expulsion from the euro, the independence of the European Central Bank, the Stability and Growth Pact, bail-outs to member states, and the EU's economic strategy are addressed in a clear, critical and innovative way.