Barry W. Bussey – författare

'The Status of Religion and the Public Benefit in Charity Law' is an apologetic for maintaining the presumption of public benefit for the charitable category ‘advancement of religion’ in democratic countries within the English common law tradition. In response to growing academic and political pressure to reform charity law – including recurring calls to remove tax exemptions granted to religious charities – the scholars in this volume analyse the implications of legislative and legal developments in Canada, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In the process, they also confront more fundamental, sociological or philosophical questions on the very nature and role of religion in a secular society that would deny any space for religious communities outside their houses of worship. In other words, this book is concerned with the place of religion – and religious institutions – in contemporary society. It represents a series of concerns about the proper role of the state in relation to the differing beliefs of citizens – some of which will quite rightly manifest in actions to benefit the wider society. This debate, then, naturally engages with broader issues related to secularism, civic engagement and liberal democratic freedoms.

'The Status of Religion and the Public Benefit in Charity Law' is an apologetic for maintaining the presumption of public benefit for the charitable category ‘advancement of religion’ in democratic countries within the English common law tradition. In response to growing academic and political pressure to reform charity law – including recurring calls to remove tax exemptions granted to religious charities – the scholars in this volume analyse the implications of legislative and legal developments in Canada, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In the process, they also confront more fundamental, sociological or philosophical questions on the very nature and role of religion in a secular society that would deny any space for religious communities outside their houses of worship. In other words, this book is concerned with the place of religion – and religious institutions – in contemporary society. It represents a series of concerns about the proper role of the state in relation to the differing beliefs of citizens – some of which will quite rightly manifest in actions to benefit the wider society. This debate, then, naturally engages with broader issues related to secularism, civic engagement and liberal democratic freedoms.

Focused at the theoretical level, this volume seeks to clarify our understanding of various historical and contemporary concepts of human dignity. It examines the various meanings of the term ‘dignity’ before looking at the philosophical sources of dignity and both religious and secular attempts to provide a grounding for the notion. It also compares the merits and defects of older and newer concepts of dignity, including extensions of dignity to groups, animals, and machines.

Focused at the theoretical level, this volume seeks to clarify our understanding of various historical and contemporary concepts of human dignity. It examines the various meanings of the term ‘dignity’ before looking at the philosophical sources of dignity and both religious and secular attempts to provide a grounding for the notion. It also compares the merits and defects of older and newer concepts of dignity, including extensions of dignity to groups, animals, and machines.

Focused on the more practical level, volume 2 seeks to understand the work dignity may do as a foundation for law, how it is related to religious liberty, and how we should adjudicate religious liberty disputes at the individual and corporate level. What is the sphere of human dignity that the law should be trying to protect? Is the role of dignity helpful as a foundational legal concept, and if so, how exactly? What is the status of religious liberty as a component of human dignity, and how is it to be balanced with other individual rights, such as freedom of expression? And finally, to what extent can the law adjudicate corporate religious claims?