There is currently a proliferation of private telecommunications networks in al­ most every country of the world. More and more companies are setting up own privately managed and controlled telecommunications networks. Some observers fear that this development may lead to a fragmented telecommunications infra­ structure in which communication becomes increasingly difficult. Thus, the "net­ working" of private firms raises questions which resemble certain arguments in the classical "monopoly versus competition" debate in telecommunications. The central problem is whether the creation of a modern and competitive infrastructure can be left to the decentralised decision-making of private economic agents or not. In or­ der to assess this problem it is indispensible to look more deeply into the actual telecommunications activities of firms. In which ways do firms use telematics? In how far are their strategic options increased by telematics? Are there significant differences in the application of telematics across industries? Are there significant differences in the application of telematics across countries with differing regula­ tory regimes? Do large firms try to influence telecommunications policy in order to make it more responsive to their needs? These are only some of the questions focussing on the interrelation between firm's competitive strategy, their use of te­ lematics and the national telecommunications regulatory framework that we want to address in the following for the case of West-Germany.

Adam Smith hat das berühmte Theorem aufgestellt, daß in einer Industrie das Ausmaß der Arbeitsteilung durch die Größe des Absatzmarktes begrenzt werde. Je größer der Absatzmarkt, desto mehr lohne es sich für die Unternehmen, Aktivitäten auszulagern und spezialisierten Zulieferern zu übertragen. Nun hat die Telekommunikation in unserer Zeit zu einer erheblichen Markterweiterung für alle Dienstleistungen geführt, die mit der Gewinnung und der Verarbeitung von Information zu tun haben. Also sollte es in allen informationsintensiven Branchen zu einer immer größeren Arbeitsteilung zwischen den Endanbietern eines Produkts oder einer Dienstleistung und hochspezialisierten Informationszulieferern kommen. Diese These wird theoretisch untersucht und anhand des Bankwesens empirisch überprüft.

There is currently a proliferation of private telecommunications networks in al­ most every country of the world. More and more companies are setting up own privately managed and controlled telecommunications networks. Some observers fear that this development may lead to a fragmented telecommunications infra­ structure in which communication becomes increasingly difficult. Thus, the "net­ working" of private firms raises questions which resemble certain arguments in the classical "monopoly versus competition" debate in telecommunications. The central problem is whether the creation of a modern and competitive infrastructure can be left to the decentralised decision-making of private economic agents or not. In or­ der to assess this problem it is indispensible to look more deeply into the actual telecommunications activities of firms. In which ways do firms use telematics? In how far are their strategic options increased by telematics? Are there significant differences in the application of telematics across industries? Are there significant differences in the application of telematics across countries with differing regula­ tory regimes? Do large firms try to influence telecommunications policy in order to make it more responsive to their needs? These are only some of the questions focussing on the interrelation between firm''s competitive strategy, their use of te­ lematics and the national telecommunications regulatory framework that we want to address in the following for the case of West-Germany.

There is currently a proliferation of private telecommunications networks in al­ most every country of the world. More and more companies are setting up own privately managed and controlled telecommunications networks. Some observers fear that this development may lead to a fragmented telecommunications infra­ structure in which communication becomes increasingly difficult. Thus, the "net­ working" of private firms raises questions which resemble certain arguments in the classical "monopoly versus competition" debate in telecommunications. The central problem is whether the creation of a modern and competitive infrastructure can be left to the decentralised decision-making of private economic agents or not. In or­ der to assess this problem it is indispensible to look more deeply into the actual telecommunications activities of firms. In which ways do firms use telematics? In how far are their strategic options increased by telematics? Are there significant differences in the application of telematics across industries? Are there significant differences in the application of telematics across countries with differing regula­ tory regimes? Do large firms try to influence telecommunications policy in order to make it more responsive to their needs? These are only some of the questions focussing on the interrelation between firm's competitive strategy, their use of te­ lematics and the national telecommunications regulatory framework that we want to address in the following for the case of West-Germany.

Adam Smith hat das berühmte Theorem aufgestellt, daß in einer Industrie das Ausmaß der Arbeitsteilung durch die Größe des Absatzmarktes begrenzt werde. Je größer der Absatzmarkt, desto mehr lohne es sich für die Unternehmen, Aktivitäten auszulagern und spezialisierten Zulieferern zu übertragen. Nun hat die Telekommunikation in unserer Zeit zu einer erheblichen Markterweiterung für alle Dienstleistungen geführt, die mit der Gewinnung und der Verarbeitung von Information zu tun haben. Also sollte es in allen informationsintensiven Branchen zu einer immer größeren Arbeitsteilung zwischen den Endanbietern eines Produkts oder einer Dienstleistung und hochspezialisierten Informationszulieferern kommen. Diese These wird theoretisch untersucht und anhand des Bankwesens empirisch überprüft.

There is currently a proliferation of private telecommunications networks in al­ most every country of the world. More and more companies are setting up own privately managed and controlled telecommunications networks. Some observers fear that this development may lead to a fragmented telecommunications infra­ structure in which communication becomes increasingly difficult. Thus, the "net­ working" of private firms raises questions which resemble certain arguments in the classical "monopoly versus competition" debate in telecommunications. The central problem is whether the creation of a modern and competitive infrastructure can be left to the decentralised decision-making of private economic agents or not. In or­ der to assess this problem it is indispensible to look more deeply into the actual telecommunications activities of firms. In which ways do firms use telematics? In how far are their strategic options increased by telematics? Are there significant differences in the application of telematics across industries? Are there significant differences in the application of telematics across countries with differing regula­ tory regimes? Do large firms try to influence telecommunications policy in order to make it more responsive to their needs? These are only some of the questions focussing on the interrelation between firm''s competitive strategy, their use of te­ lematics and the national telecommunications regulatory framework that we want to address in the following for the case of West-Germany.