Brian Kogelmann – författare

Political meritocrats believe political power should be allocated according to virtue and competence. It is an old idea, going back at least to Plato. But what is old is new again, as several political philosophers have recently proposed and defended novel articulations of this ancient idea. The purpose of this short monograph is to offer a critical overview of this literature. I cover three schools of thought. I first look at epistocracy, a form of government identical to modern liberal democracies, except voting power is allocated to citizens according to competence. I then turn to Confucian meritocracy, where more blatantly nondemocratic forms of political meritocracy are defended. I finally look at democratic meritocracy, which is the idea that elections either do or could (if they were appropriately reformed) select virtuous and competent leaders. I end by offering reasons to think the entire enterprise of political meritocracy rests on a mistake.

Political meritocrats believe political power should be allocated according to virtue and competence. It is an old idea, going back at least to Plato. But what is old is new again, as several political philosophers have recently proposed and defended novel articulations of this ancient idea. The purpose of this short monograph is to offer a critical overview of this literature. I cover three schools of thought. I first look at epistocracy, a form of government identical to modern liberal democracies, except voting power is allocated to citizens according to competence. I then turn to Confucian meritocracy, where more blatantly nondemocratic forms of political meritocracy are defended. I finally look at democratic meritocracy, which is the idea that elections either do or could (if they were appropriately reformed) select virtuous and competent leaders. I end by offering reasons to think the entire enterprise of political meritocracy rests on a mistake.

Among politicians and policy-makers it is almost universally assumed that more transparency in government is better. Until now, philosophers have almost completely ignored the topic of transparency, and when it is discussed there seems to be an assumption (shared with politicians and policy-makers) that increased transparency is a good thing, which results in no serious attempt to justify it. In this book Brian Kogelmann shows that the standard narrative is false and that many arguments in defence of transparency are weak. He offers a comprehensive philosophical analysis of transparency in government, examining both abstract normative defences of transparency, and transparency's role in the theory of institutional design. His book shows that even when the arguments in favour of transparency are compelling, the costs associated with it are just as forceful as the original arguments themselves, and that strong arguments can be made in defence of more opaque institutions.

Among politicians and policy-makers it is almost universally assumed that more transparency in government is better. Until now, philosophers have almost completely ignored the topic of transparency, and when it is discussed there seems to be an assumption (shared with politicians and policy-makers) that increased transparency is a good thing, which results in no serious attempt to justify it. In this book Brian Kogelmann shows that the standard narrative is false and that many arguments in defence of transparency are weak. He offers a comprehensive philosophical analysis of transparency in government, examining both abstract normative defences of transparency, and transparency''s role in the theory of institutional design. His book shows that even when the arguments in favour of transparency are compelling, the costs associated with it are just as forceful as the original arguments themselves, and that strong arguments can be made in defence of more opaque institutions.

Among politicians and policy-makers it is almost universally assumed that more transparency in government is better. Until now, philosophers have almost completely ignored the topic of transparency, and when it is discussed there seems to be an assumption (shared with politicians and policy-makers) that increased transparency is a good thing, which results in no serious attempt to justify it. In this book Brian Kogelmann shows that the standard narrative is false and that many arguments in defence of transparency are weak. He offers a comprehensive philosophical analysis of transparency in government, examining both abstract normative defences of transparency, and transparency''s role in the theory of institutional design. His book shows that even when the arguments in favour of transparency are compelling, the costs associated with it are just as forceful as the original arguments themselves, and that strong arguments can be made in defence of more opaque institutions.

Among politicians and policy-makers it is almost universally assumed that more transparency in government is better. Until now, philosophers have almost completely ignored the topic of transparency, and when it is discussed there seems to be an assumption (shared with politicians and policy-makers) that increased transparency is a good thing, which results in no serious attempt to justify it. In this book Brian Kogelmann shows that the standard narrative is false and that many arguments in defence of transparency are weak. He offers a comprehensive philosophical analysis of transparency in government, examining both abstract normative defences of transparency, and transparency's role in the theory of institutional design. His book shows that even when the arguments in favour of transparency are compelling, the costs associated with it are just as forceful as the original arguments themselves, and that strong arguments can be made in defence of more opaque institutions.

Political Process: New Perspectives on the Virginia and Bloomington Schools explores political process as emphasized by the Virginia and Bloomington schools of political economy. Though the Virginia school of public choice and Bloomington school of institutional analysis have risen to prominence through the works of James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Elinor Ostrom; their joint emphasis on political process has been neglected. The chapters in this volume explore the idea of political process through a multi-disciplinary perspective and to better situate both schools in this discussion. Approximately half the chapters make theoretical contributions, proposing new frameworks for understanding how people come together to make collective decisions. The other half examine applied case studies through a process-oriented framework.

This definitive book examines and engages with the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, along with the Bloomington School of Political Economy more generally. The contributors emphasize the continuing relevance of the Ostroms’ work on collective action, self-governance, and institutional diversity for interdisciplinary research in the social sciences and humanities. This book’s wide array of topics and approaches will be a valuable resource to readers in a variety of fields, including: political science, economics, philosophy, sociology, public administration, environmental studies, and political economy.