Bruce A. Watson – författare

In 1857-1858, rebels in northern India recruited tens of thousands of civilian volunteers in a mutiny that threatened to engulf the entire subcontinent. This study explores a fundamental question never explicitly investigated in histories of the mutiny: How could a vastly outnumbered British army, with dangerously extended lines of supply and reinforcement, defeat so large a force on its home ground? Watson addresses the problem by focusing on the Lucknow campaign, which was pivotal to the success of the British, and abandons the usual narrative approach to the subject in favor of an analysis of the leadership, armies, and other crucial elements in the campaign.After reviewing the religious, economic, and political unrest that set the stage for the mutiny, Watson provides a brief history of the campaign. In his comparative analysis of the armies and leadership of the combatants, a panorama of contrasts emerges. The British had the advantages of experienced and well-organized leadership, a better trained and organized army, superior weapons, and a cohesive sense of purpose. The rebel forces, on the other hand, consisted of decentralized armies whose effectiveness was compromised by the influx of untrained volunteers and whose leaders were mainly revolutionaries and military amateurs with few common goals. In his analytical comparisons of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and other factors affecting fighting ability, Watson applies John Keegan's categories of battle to develop equations that spell out the character of battle not only for the Lucknow campaign but for the entire conflict. Adding a new dimension to our understanding of the mutiny, this book is relevant to historical study of India, the British Empire, and the British army, and will also appeal to military history buffs.

.Watson presents five sieges for detailed analysis. The author utilizes the methodology John Keegan developed to define sieges as a form of battle and to explore the categories of combat--those relationships of men versus weapons and the commitment to battle on the part of the contestants--which determined the outcome of battles and wars. Watson's unique study is a contribution to the study of siege warfare and provides a background for understanding the Gulf War--which, Watson shows, was a siege--as well as contemporary global conflict.The sieges--Jerusalem, Malta, Sebastopol, Kut-al-Amara, and Singapore--are analyzed in great detail. From his analysis, Watson developes a set of characteristics of sieges that is useful for understanding the siege--a form of battle that has been with us for a long time and that will remain a major element of modern warfare. Students of military history and tactics--buffs and professionals--will find value and entertainment in this provocative study.

Desert Battle is a study of the nature of desert warfare with special attention to the evolution of weaponry, the organization of forces, the impact of the desert environment on the ability of those forces to sustain battle, and the influences of the desert on battle tactics. The work concentrates on seven campaigns, from Bonaparte's adventure in Egypt in 1798-1799 to the 1991 Gulf War. Each campaign is discussed in relation to its political-military background, with focus on leadership, the forces available, and the weapons at their disposal. A narration of each campaign follows, ending with an evaluation in relative degrees of the leadership, weapons, and tactics and the long-run consequences of the campaign.Watson's study opens with a description and analysis of Erwin Rommel's first advance in North Africa in April of 1941, but his emphasis is not on Rommel's magnificent achievements but on the creation of the Rommel legend and its effect on our understanding of desert warfare. That opening chapter is followed by an examination of deserts as a physical context for battle—the nature of the environment and who fights in deserts and why. Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt, 1798-1799, is discussed in the context of desert campaigns. British operations along India's Northwest Frontier from 1849-1852 follow. The Tigris campaign of World War I is particularly notable because it introduced armored cars, thereby increasing an army's mobility in desert sands. The British counterattack against the Italians in North Africa from late 1940 to early 1941 demonstrates how a small army, utilizing surprise, indirect attack, and high mobility, were able to offset the Italians' numerical superiority. Post-World War II battle is illustrated by the Yom Kippur War between the Arabs and the Israelis in 1973. The final campaign discussed is the 1991 Gulf War. Watson's original conclusions about the nature of desert battle and the constants that determine the outcome of battles in that hostile environment are surprising and illuminating. They constitute a real contribution to the study of desert warfare.

After an introduction showing three examples of military disintegration, the author examines six historical occurrences in depth: The India Mutiny of 1857; the 1917 French Army mutinies; the depredations following the British siege of San Sebastian, 1813; the surrender of the U.S. 106th Infantry Division in 1944; the Sand Creek Indian Massacre, 1864; and the My Lai massacre in 1968. The final chapter begins with a recapitulation of the four processes shown to be the foundations of disintegration—leadership failure, collapse of the units' internal primary groups, alienation, and desperation among the troops—and continues with an analysis of the crowd behaviors to which these processes give rise. The book ends with a brief discussion of the moral dilemma that disintegration imposes on military institutions.

A study of Rommel's generalship in the context of the fateful Tunisian campaign, this book explores Rommel's generalship through the influential variables of battle, including logistics difficulties, weapons technology, and his relations with Hitler. The legend of the Desert Fox colors most battle accounts of North Africa in World War II, but this is the story of Rommel's performance in the face of defeat. After a detailed discussion of the Alamein battles, July through November 1942, and Rommel's retreat to Tunisia, ending in January 1943, Watson recounts the British and American invasion of North Africa and the confused web of Axis command that spawned the debacle at Medenine. The final three chapters cover selected variables of battle and of command to reveal the man behind the legend.After his dramatic successes in North Africa, the Desert Fox would face a new challenge, the arrival of the Americans. Faced with a lack of logistical support and a steady erosion of weapons quality, a de-modernization of the front, Rommel planned to attack American bases in central Tunisia by advancing through Kasserine Pass. Unfortunately, a last minute alteration of the plan by the Italian high command would disperse his troops along three fronts. The attacks failed, and Rommel discovered that the relative independence he had enjoyed during earlier phases of the desert war no longer existed.

In November of 1940, the German pocket battleship Admiral Scheer attacked British Convoy HX-84. The merchant cruiser HMS Jervis Bay, a converted passenger liner that was the convoy's only escort—armed only with antique 6-inch guns—charged the Nazi raider. While the Jervis Bay did not stand a chance of surviving the battle, her crew's fatalistic bravery inspired awe in all who witnessed the fight. Watson recounts how the Scheer's 11-inch guns turned the ship into a burning hulk in twenty-two minutes, but most of the convoy escaped.In November of 1940, the German pocket battleship Admiral Scheer attacked British Convoy HX-84. The Armed Merchant Cruiser HMS Jervis Bay, the only escort and mounting antique 6-inch guns, charged the Nazi raider. While the Jervis Bay did not stand a chance of surviving the battle, her crew's fatalistic bravery inspired awe in all who witnessed the fight. Watson describes how the Scheer's 11-inch guns turned the converted passenger liner into a burning hulk in twenty-two minutes, but most of the convoy escaped.How did this confrontation come to pass? Both the necessity of arming a passenger liner and pretending it was a warship, and the building of the Admiral Scheer and her sister ships for the express purpose of commerce raiding, find their roots in the events, political decisions, re-armament polices, war plans, naval traditions, and blunders that arose in pre-war Britain and Germany. But this event holds a significance beyond the battle itself. The sinking of the Jervis Bay symbolizes the end of an era in naval warfare. The Armed Merchant Cruisers of the Second World War inherited a long, sometimes noble and sometimes ignoble history. Long employed in blockade or patrol duty, armed merchant cruisers ventured out for the first time to escort convoys, a defensive duty for which they were eminently unsuited, and for which the Jervis Bay paid a fearful price.

.Watson presents five sieges for detailed analysis. The author utilizes the methodology John Keegan developed to define sieges as a form of battle and to explore the categories of combat--those relationships of men versus weapons and the commitment to battle on the part of the contestants--which determined the outcome of battles and wars. Watson's unique study is a contribution to the study of siege warfare and provides a background for understanding the Gulf War--which, Watson shows, was a siege--as well as contemporary global conflict.The sieges--Jerusalem, Malta, Sebastopol, Kut-al-Amara, and Singapore--are analyzed in great detail. From his analysis, Watson developes a set of characteristics of sieges that is useful for understanding the siege--a form of battle that has been with us for a long time and that will remain a major element of modern warfare. Students of military history and tactics--buffs and professionals--will find value and entertainment in this provocative study.

In November of 1940, the German pocket battleship Admiral Scheer attacked British Convoy HX-84. The merchant cruiser HMS Jervis Bay, a converted passenger liner that was the convoy's only escort—armed only with antique 6-inch guns—charged the Nazi raider. While the Jervis Bay did not stand a chance of surviving the battle, her crew's fatalistic bravery inspired awe in all who witnessed the fight. Watson recounts how the Scheer's 11-inch guns turned the ship into a burning hulk in twenty-two minutes, but most of the convoy escaped.In November of 1940, the German pocket battleship Admiral Scheer attacked British Convoy HX-84. The Armed Merchant Cruiser HMS Jervis Bay, the only escort and mounting antique 6-inch guns, charged the Nazi raider. While the Jervis Bay did not stand a chance of surviving the battle, her crew's fatalistic bravery inspired awe in all who witnessed the fight. Watson describes how the Scheer's 11-inch guns turned the converted passenger liner into a burning hulk in twenty-two minutes, but most of the convoy escaped.How did this confrontation come to pass? Both the necessity of arming a passenger liner and pretending it was a warship, and the building of the Admiral Scheer and her sister ships for the express purpose of commerce raiding, find their roots in the events, political decisions, re-armament polices, war plans, naval traditions, and blunders that arose in pre-war Britain and Germany. But this event holds a significance beyond the battle itself. The sinking of the Jervis Bay symbolizes the end of an era in naval warfare. The Armed Merchant Cruisers of the Second World War inherited a long, sometimes noble and sometimes ignoble history. Long employed in blockade or patrol duty, armed merchant cruisers ventured out for the first time to escort convoys, a defensive duty for which they were eminently unsuited, and for which the Jervis Bay paid a fearful price.