Political theorists often imagine themselves as political architects, asking what an ideal set of laws or social structures might look like. Yet persistent injustices can endure for decades or even centuries despite such ideal theorizing. In circumstances of this kind, it is essential for political theorists to think carefully about the political choices available to those who directly face such injustices and seek to change them.This book focuses on the claims of Aboriginal peoples to better treatment from the United States and Canada. Though other groups face similarly persistent injustices (e.g. African Americans in the United States), the specific details of injustice matter a great deal for its analysis. The book focuses on two intertwined issues: the kinds of moral permissions that those facing persistent injustice have when they act politically, and the kinds of transformations that political action may bringabout in those who undertake it. The book argues for normative permissions to speak untruth to power; to circumvent or nullify existing law; to give primary attention to protecting one''s own community first; and to engage in political experimentation that reshapes future generations. When carefullyused, the book argues, these permissions may help political actors to avoid co-optation and self-delusion. At the same time, divisions of labor between those who grapple most closely with state institutions and those who keep their distance may be necessary to facilitate escape from persistent injustice over the long term.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. Series Editors: Will Kymlicka and David Miller.

Political theorists often imagine themselves as political architects, asking what an ideal set of laws or social structures might look like. Yet persistent injustices can endure for decades or even centuries despite such ideal theorizing. In circumstances of this kind, it is essential for political theorists to think carefully about the political choices available to those who directly face such injustices and seek to change them.This book focuses on the claims of Aboriginal peoples to better treatment from the United States and Canada. Though other groups face similarly persistent injustices (e.g. African Americans in the United States), the specific details of injustice matter a great deal for its analysis. The book focuses on two intertwined issues: the kinds of moral permissions that those facing persistent injustice have when they act politically, and the kinds of transformations that political action may bringabout in those who undertake it. The book argues for normative permissions to speak untruth to power; to circumvent or nullify existing law; to give primary attention to protecting one''s own community first; and to engage in political experimentation that reshapes future generations. When carefullyused, the book argues, these permissions may help political actors to avoid co-optation and self-delusion. At the same time, divisions of labor between those who grapple most closely with state institutions and those who keep their distance may be necessary to facilitate escape from persistent injustice over the long term.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. Series Editors: Will Kymlicka and David Miller.

Political theorists often imagine themselves as political architects, asking what an ideal set of laws or social structures might look like. Yet persistent injustices can endure for decades or even centuries despite such ideal theorizing. In circumstances of this kind, it is essential for political theorists to think carefully about the political choices available to those who directly face such injustices and seek to change them.This book focuses on the claims of Aboriginal peoples to better treatment from the United States and Canada. Though other groups face similarly persistent injustices (e.g. African Americans in the United States), the specific details of injustice matter a great deal for its analysis. The book focuses on two intertwined issues: the kinds of moral permissions that those facing persistent injustice have when they act politically, and the kinds of transformations that political action may bring about in those who undertake it. The book argues for normative permissions to speak untruth to power; to circumvent or nullify existing law; to give primary attention to protecting one's own community first; and to engage in political experimentation that reshapes future generations. When carefully used, the book argues, these permissions may help political actors to avoid co-optation and self-delusion. At the same time, divisions of labor between those who grapple most closely with state institutions and those who keep their distance may be necessary to facilitate escape from persistent injustice over the long term.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. Series Editors: Will Kymlicka and David Miller.

Non-Indigenous citizens of the United States and Canada often argue that it is unfair for Indigenous peoples to have distinctive political and property rights within countries purportedly dedicated to equal treatment. Yet Indigenous nations in the United States and Canada have long made claims for a more contextually rich sense of fairness, and their legal and political successes in these efforts - difficult, uneven, and partial as they has been - have allowed them to continue to exist into the present. Their fairness arguments have thus found traction even in the face of longstanding political animosity. Situated within debates on ideal and non-ideal theory, this book begins from arguments of this kind, and seeks to show why they are defensible within a contextually-rich theory of political fairness for Indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada. Structured to be accessible to political theorists and their students with little background in Indigenous politics, the book argues that this broader conception of fairness applies in relation to political sovereignty, ownership rights, cultural choices, and - uncomfortably - racially-inflected standards of tribal membership. Seeking to outline parameters for potential future political orders, it argues that such a contextually-rich standard of fairness is likely to be required long into the future as well, given the unavoidably variegated texture of human social order.

Non-Indigenous citizens of the United States and Canada often argue that it is unfair for Indigenous peoples to have distinctive political and property rights within countries purportedly dedicated to equal treatment. Yet Indigenous nations in the United States and Canada have long made claims for a more contextually rich sense of fairness, and their legal and political successes in these efforts - difficult, uneven, and partial as they has been - have allowed them to continue to exist into the present. Their fairness arguments have thus found traction even in the face of longstanding political animosity. Situated within debates on ideal and non-ideal theory, this book begins from arguments of this kind, and seeks to show why they are defensible within a contextually-rich theory of political fairness for Indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada. Structured to be accessible to political theorists and their students with little background in Indigenous politics, the book argues that this broader conception of fairness applies in relation to political sovereignty, ownership rights, cultural choices, and - uncomfortably - racially-inflected standards of tribal membership. Seeking to outline parameters for potential future political orders, it argues that such a contextually-rich standard of fairness is likely to be required long into the future as well, given the unavoidably variegated texture of human social order.

Non-Indigenous citizens of the United States and Canada often argue that it is unfair for Indigenous peoples to have distinctive political and property rights within countries purportedly dedicated to equal treatment. Yet Indigenous nations in the United States and Canada have long made claims for a more contextually rich sense of fairness, and their legal and political successes in these efforts - difficult, uneven, and partial as they has been - have allowed them to continue to exist into the present. Their fairness arguments have thus found traction even in the face of longstanding political animosity. Situated within debates on ideal and non-ideal theory, this book begins from arguments of this kind, and seeks to show why they are defensible within a contextually-rich theory of political fairness for Indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada. Structured to be accessible to political theorists and their students with little background in Indigenous politics, the book argues that this broader conception of fairness applies in relation to political sovereignty, ownership rights, cultural choices, and - uncomfortably - racially-inflected standards of tribal membership. Seeking to outline parameters for potential future political orders, it argues that such a contextually-rich standard of fairness is likely to be required long into the future as well, given the unavoidably variegated texture of human social order.

Much controversy has existed over the claims of Native Americans and other indigenous peoples that they have a right—based on original occupancy of land, historical transfers of sovereignty, and principles of self-determination—to a political status separate from the states in which they now find themselves embedded. How valid are these claims on moral grounds?Burke Hendrix tackles these thorny questions in this book. Rather than focusing on the legal and constitutional status of indigenous nations within the states now ruling them, he starts at a more basic level, interrogating fundamental justifications for political authority itself. He shows that historical claims of land ownership and prior sovereignty cannot provide a sufficient basis for challenging the authority of existing states, but that our natural moral duties to aid other persons in danger can justify rights to political separation from states that fail to protect their citizens as they should.Actual attempts at political separation must be carefully managed through well-defined procedural mechanisms, however, to foster extensive democratic deliberation about the nature of the political changes at stake. Using such procedures, Hendrix argues, indigenous peoples should be able to withdraw politically from the states currently ruling them, even to the point of choosing full independence.

Recent scholarship in political thought has closely examined the relationship between European political ideas and colonialism, particularly the ways in which canonical thinkers supported or opposed colonial practices. But little attention has been given to the engagement of colonized political and intellectual actors with European ideas. The essays in this volume demonstrate that a full reckoning of colonialism’s effects requires attention to the ways in which colonized intellectuals reacted to, adopted, and transformed these ideas, and to the political projects that their reactions helped to shape. Across nine chapters, a mix of political theorists and intellectual historians grapple with specific thinkers and contexts to show in detail the unpredictable, complex and sometimes paradoxical impact of European ideas in an array of colonial settings.

Much controversy has existed over the claims of Native Americans and other indigenous peoples that they have a right—based on original occupancy of land, historical transfers of sovereignty, and principles of self-determination—to a political status separate from the states in which they now find themselves embedded. How valid are these claims on moral grounds?Burke Hendrix tackles these thorny questions in this book. Rather than focusing on the legal and constitutional status of indigenous nations within the states now ruling them, he starts at a more basic level, interrogating fundamental justifications for political authority itself. He shows that historical claims of land ownership and prior sovereignty cannot provide a sufficient basis for challenging the authority of existing states, but that our natural moral duties to aid other persons in danger can justify rights to political separation from states that fail to protect their citizens as they should.Actual attempts at political separation must be carefully managed through well-defined procedural mechanisms, however, to foster extensive democratic deliberation about the nature of the political changes at stake. Using such procedures, Hendrix argues, indigenous peoples should be able to withdraw politically from the states currently ruling them, even to the point of choosing full independence.

Political theorists often imagine themselves as political architects, asking what an ideal set of laws or social structures might look like. Yet persistent injustices can endure for decades or even centuries despite such ideal theorizing. In circumstances of this kind, it is essential for political theorists to think carefully about the political choices available to those who directly face such injustices and seek to change them.This book focuses on the claims of Aboriginal peoples to better treatment from the United States and Canada. Though other groups face similarly persistent injustices (e.g. African Americans in the United States), the specific details of injustice matter a great deal for its analysis. The book focuses on two intertwined issues: the kinds of moral permissions that those facing persistent injustice have when they act politically, and the kinds of transformations that political action may bringabout in those who undertake it. The book argues for normative permissions to speak untruth to power; to circumvent or nullify existing law; to give primary attention to protecting one''s own community first; and to engage in political experimentation that reshapes future generations. When carefullyused, the book argues, these permissions may help political actors to avoid co-optation and self-delusion. At the same time, divisions of labor between those who grapple most closely with state institutions and those who keep their distance may be necessary to facilitate escape from persistent injustice over the long term.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. Series Editors: Will Kymlicka and David Miller.

Political theorists often imagine themselves as political architects, asking what an ideal set of laws or social structures might look like. Yet persistent injustices can endure for decades or even centuries despite such ideal theorizing. In circumstances of this kind, it is essential for political theorists to think carefully about the political choices available to those who directly face such injustices and seek to change them.This book focuses on the claims of Aboriginal peoples to better treatment from the United States and Canada. Though other groups face similarly persistent injustices (e.g. African Americans in the United States), the specific details of injustice matter a great deal for its analysis. The book focuses on two intertwined issues: the kinds of moral permissions that those facing persistent injustice have when they act politically, and the kinds of transformations that political action may bringabout in those who undertake it. The book argues for normative permissions to speak untruth to power; to circumvent or nullify existing law; to give primary attention to protecting one''s own community first; and to engage in political experimentation that reshapes future generations. When carefullyused, the book argues, these permissions may help political actors to avoid co-optation and self-delusion. At the same time, divisions of labor between those who grapple most closely with state institutions and those who keep their distance may be necessary to facilitate escape from persistent injustice over the long term.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. Series Editors: Will Kymlicka and David Miller.

Political theorists often imagine themselves as political architects, asking what an ideal set of laws or social structures might look like. Yet persistent injustices can endure for decades or even centuries despite such ideal theorizing. In circumstances of this kind, it is essential for political theorists to think carefully about the political choices available to those who directly face such injustices and seek to change them.This book focuses on the claims of Aboriginal peoples to better treatment from the United States and Canada. Though other groups face similarly persistent injustices (e.g. African Americans in the United States), the specific details of injustice matter a great deal for its analysis. The book focuses on two intertwined issues: the kinds of moral permissions that those facing persistent injustice have when they act politically, and the kinds of transformations that political action may bring about in those who undertake it. The book argues for normative permissions to speak untruth to power; to circumvent or nullify existing law; to give primary attention to protecting one's own community first; and to engage in political experimentation that reshapes future generations. When carefully used, the book argues, these permissions may help political actors to avoid co-optation and self-delusion. At the same time, divisions of labor between those who grapple most closely with state institutions and those who keep their distance may be necessary to facilitate escape from persistent injustice over the long term.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. Series Editors: Will Kymlicka and David Miller.

Non-Indigenous citizens of the United States and Canada often argue that it is unfair for Indigenous peoples to have distinctive political and property rights within countries purportedly dedicated to equal treatment. Yet Indigenous nations in the United States and Canada have long made claims for a more contextually rich sense of fairness, and their legal and political successes in these efforts - difficult, uneven, and partial as they has been - have allowed them to continue to exist into the present. Their fairness arguments have thus found traction even in the face of longstanding political animosity. Situated within debates on ideal and non-ideal theory, this book begins from arguments of this kind, and seeks to show why they are defensible within a contextually-rich theory of political fairness for Indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada. Structured to be accessible to political theorists and their students with little background in Indigenous politics, the book argues that this broader conception of fairness applies in relation to political sovereignty, ownership rights, cultural choices, and - uncomfortably - racially-inflected standards of tribal membership. Seeking to outline parameters for potential future political orders, it argues that such a contextually-rich standard of fairness is likely to be required long into the future as well, given the unavoidably variegated texture of human social order.

Non-Indigenous citizens of the United States and Canada often argue that it is unfair for Indigenous peoples to have distinctive political and property rights within countries purportedly dedicated to equal treatment. Yet Indigenous nations in the United States and Canada have long made claims for a more contextually rich sense of fairness, and their legal and political successes in these efforts - difficult, uneven, and partial as they has been - have allowed them to continue to exist into the present. Their fairness arguments have thus found traction even in the face of longstanding political animosity. Situated within debates on ideal and non-ideal theory, this book begins from arguments of this kind, and seeks to show why they are defensible within a contextually-rich theory of political fairness for Indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada. Structured to be accessible to political theorists and their students with little background in Indigenous politics, the book argues that this broader conception of fairness applies in relation to political sovereignty, ownership rights, cultural choices, and - uncomfortably - racially-inflected standards of tribal membership. Seeking to outline parameters for potential future political orders, it argues that such a contextually-rich standard of fairness is likely to be required long into the future as well, given the unavoidably variegated texture of human social order.

Non-Indigenous citizens of the United States and Canada often argue that it is unfair for Indigenous peoples to have distinctive political and property rights within countries purportedly dedicated to equal treatment. Yet Indigenous nations in the United States and Canada have long made claims for a more contextually rich sense of fairness, and their legal and political successes in these efforts - difficult, uneven, and partial as they has been - have allowed them to continue to exist into the present. Their fairness arguments have thus found traction even in the face of longstanding political animosity. Situated within debates on ideal and non-ideal theory, this book begins from arguments of this kind, and seeks to show why they are defensible within a contextually-rich theory of political fairness for Indigenous peoples in the United States and Canada. Structured to be accessible to political theorists and their students with little background in Indigenous politics, the book argues that this broader conception of fairness applies in relation to political sovereignty, ownership rights, cultural choices, and - uncomfortably - racially-inflected standards of tribal membership. Seeking to outline parameters for potential future political orders, it argues that such a contextually-rich standard of fairness is likely to be required long into the future as well, given the unavoidably variegated texture of human social order.

Much controversy has existed over the claims of Native Americans and other indigenous peoples that they have a right—based on original occupancy of land, historical transfers of sovereignty, and principles of self-determination—to a political status separate from the states in which they now find themselves embedded. How valid are these claims on moral grounds?Burke Hendrix tackles these thorny questions in this book. Rather than focusing on the legal and constitutional status of indigenous nations within the states now ruling them, he starts at a more basic level, interrogating fundamental justifications for political authority itself. He shows that historical claims of land ownership and prior sovereignty cannot provide a sufficient basis for challenging the authority of existing states, but that our natural moral duties to aid other persons in danger can justify rights to political separation from states that fail to protect their citizens as they should.Actual attempts at political separation must be carefully managed through well-defined procedural mechanisms, however, to foster extensive democratic deliberation about the nature of the political changes at stake. Using such procedures, Hendrix argues, indigenous peoples should be able to withdraw politically from the states currently ruling them, even to the point of choosing full independence.

Recent scholarship in political thought has closely examined the relationship between European political ideas and colonialism, particularly the ways in which canonical thinkers supported or opposed colonial practices. But little attention has been given to the engagement of colonized political and intellectual actors with European ideas. The essays in this volume demonstrate that a full reckoning of colonialism’s effects requires attention to the ways in which colonized intellectuals reacted to, adopted, and transformed these ideas, and to the political projects that their reactions helped to shape. Across nine chapters, a mix of political theorists and intellectual historians grapple with specific thinkers and contexts to show in detail the unpredictable, complex and sometimes paradoxical impact of European ideas in an array of colonial settings.

Much controversy has existed over the claims of Native Americans and other indigenous peoples that they have a right—based on original occupancy of land, historical transfers of sovereignty, and principles of self-determination—to a political status separate from the states in which they now find themselves embedded. How valid are these claims on moral grounds?Burke Hendrix tackles these thorny questions in this book. Rather than focusing on the legal and constitutional status of indigenous nations within the states now ruling them, he starts at a more basic level, interrogating fundamental justifications for political authority itself. He shows that historical claims of land ownership and prior sovereignty cannot provide a sufficient basis for challenging the authority of existing states, but that our natural moral duties to aid other persons in danger can justify rights to political separation from states that fail to protect their citizens as they should.Actual attempts at political separation must be carefully managed through well-defined procedural mechanisms, however, to foster extensive democratic deliberation about the nature of the political changes at stake. Using such procedures, Hendrix argues, indigenous peoples should be able to withdraw politically from the states currently ruling them, even to the point of choosing full independence.