Charles A. Stevenson – författare

With historical case studies ranging from the Revolutionary War to the war in Iraq, this new book shows how and why the US military is caught between two civilian masters – the President and Congress – in responding to the challenges of warfighting, rearmament, and transformation. Charles Stevenson skilfully shows how, although the United States has never faced the danger of a military coup, the relations between civilian leaders and the military have not always been easy. Presidents have contended with military leaders who were reluctant to carry out their orders. Generals and Admirals have appealed to Congress for sympathy and support. Congressional leaders have tried to impose their own visions and strategies on the US armed forces. This triangular struggle has recurred time and again, in wartime and in efforts to reshape the military for future wars.Illustrating this dual system of civilian military control in a series of case studies, this new volume starts from the way the Continental Congress ran the Revolutionary War by committee and concludes with the George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld efforts to transform the US military into a modern terrorist-fighting force. This detailed coverage shows how warriors and politicians interacted at key points in US history. This book will be of great interest to all students of the US Military, government of the United States and of strategic and military studies in general.

With historical case studies ranging from the Revolutionary War to the war in Iraq, this new book shows how and why the US military is caught between two civilian masters – the President and Congress – in responding to the challenges of warfighting, rearmament, and transformation. Charles Stevenson skilfully shows how, although the United States has never faced the danger of a military coup, the relations between civilian leaders and the military have not always been easy. Presidents have contended with military leaders who were reluctant to carry out their orders. Generals and Admirals have appealed to Congress for sympathy and support. Congressional leaders have tried to impose their own visions and strategies on the US armed forces. This triangular struggle has recurred time and again, in wartime and in efforts to reshape the military for future wars.Illustrating this dual system of civilian military control in a series of case studies, this new volume starts from the way the Continental Congress ran the Revolutionary War by committee and concludes with the George W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld efforts to transform the US military into a modern terrorist-fighting force. This detailed coverage shows how warriors and politicians interacted at key points in US history. This book will be of great interest to all students of the US Military, government of the United States and of strategic and military studies in general.

SECDEF offers an expert's insights into one of the most difficult jobs in Washington. Of the twenty-one men who have held the post of secretary of defense since it was created in 1947, only half served more than eighteen months. The first, James Forrestal, committed suicide soon after leaving the Pentagon. Seven of his successors were fired or allowed to resign gracefully after losing the confidence of the president. Many left frustrated and disappointed, while few retained the celebrity and esteem they held while in office. One observer has called the job "the graveyard of political ambitions."Charles A. Stevenson, who as a national security adviser to four U.S. senators has seen several defense secretaries in action, examines the unique challenges of this office to learn why the failure rate has been so high. SECDEF focuses on how the secretary performs in the broader world of national security policymaking, how he handles civil-military relations in planning strategy and wars, how he functions on the National Security Council and deals with the president and secretary of state, and how well he performs as a politician, especially in dealing with Congress. In office, Charles Stevenson finds, these men have tended to fall into one of the three general roles for executing such responsibilities: revolutionaries, firefighters, or, the most common role, team players. Stevenson analyzes each type for its defining characteristics and evaluates individual secretaries. This book will appeal to defense professionals and students alike and to readers interested in American defense and foreign policy who want to learn more about the important role often played by the person informally labeled the SECDEF.

Congress at War reviews the historical record of the U.S. Congress in authorizing, funding, overseeing, and terminating major military operations. Refuting arguments that Congress cannot and should not set limits or conditions on the use of U.S. armed forces, this book catalogs the many times when previous Congresses have enacted restrictions—often with the acceptance and compliance of wartime presidents. While Congress has formally declared war only five times in U.S. history, it has authorized the use of force fifteen other times. In recent decades, however, lawmakers have weakened their Constitutional claims by failing on several occasions to enact measures either supporting or opposing military operations ordered by the president. Concise, dramatically written, and illustrated with several summary tables, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in America's wars—past or present.

SECDEF offers an expert's insights into one of the most difficult jobs in Washington. Of the twenty-one men who have held the post of secretary of defense since it was created in 1947, only half served more than eighteen months. The first, James Forrestal, committed suicide soon after leaving the Pentagon. Seven of his successors were fired or allowed to resign gracefully after losing the confidence of the president. Many left frustrated and disappointed, while few retained the celebrity and esteem they held while in office. One observer has called the job "the graveyard of political ambitions."Charles A. Stevenson, who as a national security adviser to four U.S. senators has seen several defense secretaries in action, examines the unique challenges of this office to learn why the failure rate has been so high. SECDEF focuses on how the secretary performs in the broader world of national security policymaking, how he handles civil-military relations in planning strategy and wars, how he functions on the National Security Council and deals with the president and secretary of state, and how well he performs as a politician, especially in dealing with Congress. In office, Charles Stevenson finds, these men have tended to fall into one of the three general roles for executing such responsibilities: revolutionaries, firefighters, or, the most common role, team players. Stevenson analyzes each type for its defining characteristics and evaluates individual secretaries. This book will appeal to defense professionals and students alike and to readers interested in American defense and foreign policy who want to learn more about the important role often played by the person informally labeled the SECDEF.

Congress at War reviews the historical record of the U.S. Congress in authorizing, funding, overseeing, and terminating major military operations. Refuting arguments that Congress cannot and should not set limits or conditions on the use of U.S. armed forces, this book catalogs the many times when previous Congresses have enacted restrictions—often with the acceptance and compliance of wartime presidents. While Congress has formally declared war only five times in U.S. history, it has authorized the use of force fifteen other times. In recent decades, however, lawmakers have weakened their Constitutional claims by failing on several occasions to enact measures either supporting or opposing military operations ordered by the president. Concise, dramatically written, and illustrated with several summary tables, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in America's wars—past or present.

Covering the period from World War II through the Trump presidency, Peace, War, and Partnership: Congress and the Military Since World War II unpacks the vital and dynamic relationship between Congress and the military, two entities that have worked together, at times with different purposes, to solve myriad important issues impacting the United States in both peace and war. Congress and the military have had their periods of cooperation. However, they have also had alternating periods of resistance to each other, based on distinct conceptions of national interests and divergent strategies. Their partnership has been a symbiotic relationship in which one entity or the other has ebbed and flowed in power depending on the circumstances. They have altered each other in far-reaching ways and transformed American society as a result of their liaisons.Peace, War, and Partnership analyzes the significant, powerful, and central relationship between Congress and the military. It investigates intersections of policy, politics, and society to theorize the impact of this relationship on the United States in the modern era. This work also offers a better understanding of earlier attempts by policy makers in Congress and the military to provide national security, contextualizing highly relevant current issues such as military service, proliferation, foreign intervention, national security, joint operations, diplomacy, alliances, mobilization, post-conflict resolution, citizenship, and military innovation. It illuminates crucial questions involving military policies in American democracy, and their sway on America historically and today, sparking and informing public debate about its implications now and for the future.