Charles H. Pence – författare

Humans, however much we would care to think otherwise, do not represent the fated pinnacle of ape evolution. The diversity of life, from single-celled organisms to multicellular animals and plants, is the result of a long, complex, and highly chancy history. But how profoundly has chance shaped life on earth? And what, precisely, do we mean by chance? Bringing together biologists, philosophers of science, and historians of science, Chance in Evolution is the first book to untangle the far-reaching effects of chance, contingency, and randomness on the evolution of life. The book begins by placing chance in historical context, starting with the ancients and moving through Darwin and his contemporaries, documenting how the understanding of chance changed as Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection developed into the Modern Synthesis, and how the acceptance of chance in Darwinian theory affected theological resistance to it.Subsequent chapters detail the role of chance in contemporary evolutionary theory in particular, in connection with the concepts of genetic drift, mutation, and parallel evolution as well as recent empirical work in the experimental evolution of microbes and in paleobiology. By engaging in collaboration across biology, history, philosophy, and theology, this book offers a comprehensive and synthetic overview both of the history of chance in evolution and of our current, best understanding of the impact of chance on life on earth.

The Rise of Chance in Evolutionary Theory: A Pompous Parade of Arithmetic explores a pivotal conceptual moment in the history of evolutionary theory: the development of its extensive reliance on a wide array of concepts of chance. It tells the history of a methodological and conceptual development that reshaped our approach to natural selection over a century, ranging from Darwin's earliest notebooks in the 1830s to the early years of the Modern Synthesis in the 1930s. Far from being a "pompous parade of arithmetic,� as one early critic argued, evolution transformed during this period to make these conceptual and technical tools indispensable.

This book charts the role of chance in evolutionary theory from its beginnings to the earliest days of modern evolutionary theory, making it an ideal resource for evolutionary biologists, historians, philosophers, and researchers in science studies or biological statistics.

Analyzes contributions of key historical figures and assesses how and why these "foundational� conclusions were reached by original evolutionary biologists, including Darwin, Galton, Pearson, and more Describes the journey of the role of chance in evolutionary theory and illuminates our contemporary understanding Presents the historical narrative in a non-technical way, focusing on the conceptual structure of evolutionary theory

Recent arguments concerning the nature of causation in evolutionary theory, now often known as the debate between the 'causalist' and 'statisticalist' positions, have involved answers to a variety of independent questions - definitions of key evolutionary concepts like natural selection, fitness, and genetic drift; causation in multi-level systems; or the nature of evolutionary explanations, among others. This Element offers a way to disentangle one set of these questions surrounding the causal structure of natural selection. Doing so allows us to clearly reconstruct the approach that some of these major competing interpretations of evolutionary theory have to this causal structure, highlighting particular features of philosophical interest within each. Further, those features concern problems not exclusive to the philosophy of biology. Connections between them and, in two case studies, contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of physics demonstrate the potential value of broader collaboration in the understanding of evolution.

This four-volume collection of primary sources examines scientific methodology in Britain during the long nineteenth century. As the physical, biological, human, and social sciences were radically reshaped across the 1800's, so the prevailing understanding of scientific methodology changed with them, making this period one of the most significant in the early development of the philosophy of science in the English-speaking world. This development was driven not only by the reflections of numerous men of science, scattered across their works, but also by the publication of some of the first major treatises in the philosophy of science. These volumes form a valuable complement instruction and learning in nineteenth-century philosophy and the history of science. An understanding of the philosophical and methodological innovations that grounded these epoch-making developments in the sciences is crucial for helping us understand how several generations of scientists interpreted and hoped to justify their own work. These same questions would go on to form a significant part of the foundation for reflection on such issues across the twentieth century and today.

This collection of primary sources examines scientific methodology in Britain during the long nineteenth century. Perhaps the most striking feature of nineteenth-century works on scientific method is the extent to which they were taken up by authors interested in writing large-scale, systemic works introducing, at one stroke, a philosophy of science, a view of what "good scientific practice" would look like, and investigations of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. This volume presents the views laid out in the four largest and most important such treatises: Sir John F. W. Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy, William Whewell’s History of the Inductive Sciences and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, and John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic, as well as other contributors to the philosophy of science in this period. This title will be of great interest to students of the history of philosophy and the history of science.

This collection of primary sources examines scientific methodology in Britain during the long nineteenth century. Over the course of the nineteenth century, emblematically but not exclusively represented by the work of Charles Darwin, natural science reconfigured the ways in which practitioners would treat the sciences of "deep time" – especially geology and the new theory of natural selection. This volume uses primary sources and editorial commentary to examine the topics of geology and evolution in this period. This title will be of great interest to students of the history of philosophy and the history of science.

This collection of primary sources examines scientific methodology in Britain during the long nineteenth century. The nineteenth century played host to the development, for the first time, of statistical and probabilistic methods across the biological, human, and social sciences. A new kind of quantified, statistical social science came into being. Such innovations were quickly marshaled for use in the life sciences, from evolution to agriculture to eugenics. This title will be of great interest to students of the history of philosophy and the history of science.

This collection of primary sources examines scientific methodology in Britain during the long nineteenth century. The nineteenth century begins with what was still a largely Newtonian perspective on the nature of matter and the physical world – Newtonian bodies moving through space, guided by a collection of forces, with gravity foremost among them. By the end of the century, physical science had refocused itself around the concept of energy, the first moves toward the understanding of atomic structure had been undertaken, and electricity and magnetism were understood in terms of fields of force. This volume examines primary sources related to the philosophy of the physical sciences, and will be of great interest to students of the history of philosophy and the history of science.

Recent arguments concerning the nature of causation in evolutionary theory, now often known as the debate between the 'causalist' and 'statisticalist' positions, have involved answers to a variety of independent questions - definitions of key evolutionary concepts like natural selection, fitness, and genetic drift; causation in multi-level systems; or the nature of evolutionary explanations, among others. This Element offers a way to disentangle one set of these questions surrounding the causal structure of natural selection. Doing so allows us to clearly reconstruct the approach that some of these major competing interpretations of evolutionary theory have to this causal structure, highlighting particular features of philosophical interest within each. Further, those features concern problems not exclusive to the philosophy of biology. Connections between them and, in two case studies, contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of physics demonstrate the potential value of broader collaboration in the understanding of evolution.