Chris McGillion – författare

This is a comprehensive study of US policy towards Cuba in the post-Cold War era. Drawing on interviews with Bush and Clinton policy-makers, congressional participants in the policy debate, and leaders of the anti-sanctions business community, it makes an important contribution to our knowledge of the evolution of American policy during this period. This study argues that Bush and Clinton operated within the same Cold War framework that shaped the Cuba policy of their predecessors. But it also demonstrates that US policy after 1989 was driven principally by the imperatives of domestic politics. The authors show how Bush and Clinton corrupted the policy-making process by subordinating rational decision-making in the national interest to narrow political calculations. The result was the pursuit of a policy that had nothing to do with its stated objectives of promoting reforms in Cuba and everything to do with getting rid of Fidel Castro's regime.

This is a comprehensive study of US policy towards Cuba in the post-Cold War era. Drawing on interviews with Bush and Clinton policy-makers, congressional participants in the policy debate, and leaders of the anti-sanctions business community, it makes an important contribution to our knowledge of the evolution of American policy during this period. This study argues that Bush and Clinton operated within the same Cold War framework that shaped the Cuba policy of their predecessors. But it also demonstrates that US policy after 1989 was driven principally by the imperatives of domestic politics. The authors show how Bush and Clinton corrupted the policy-making process by subordinating rational decision-making in the national interest to narrow political calculations. The result was the pursuit of a policy that had nothing to do with its stated objectives of promoting reforms in Cuba and everything to do with getting rid of Fidel Castro's regime.

This book is the first comprehensive study of the Reagan administration's policy toward the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile. Based on new primary and archival materials, as well as on original interviews with former US and Chilean officials, it traces the evolution of Reagan policy from an initial 'close embrace' of the junta to a re-evaluation of whether Pinochet was a risk to long-term US interests in Chile and, finally, to an acceptance in Washington of the need to push for a return to democracy. It provides fresh insights into the bureaucratic conflicts that were a key part of the Reagan decision-making process and reveals not only the successes but also the limits of US influence on Pinochet's regime. Finally, it contributes to the ongoing debate about the US approach toward democracy promotion in the Third World over the past half century.

This book is the first comprehensive study of the Reagan administration's policy toward the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile. Based on new primary and archival materials, as well as on original interviews with former US and Chilean officials, it traces the evolution of Reagan policy from an initial 'close embrace' of the junta to a re-evaluation of whether Pinochet was a risk to long-term US interests in Chile and, finally, to an acceptance in Washington of the need to push for a return to democracy. It provides fresh insights into the bureaucratic conflicts that were a key part of the Reagan decision-making process and reveals not only the successes but also the limits of US influence on Pinochet's regime. Finally, it contributes to the ongoing debate about the US approach toward democracy promotion in the Third World over the past half century.