D. Costantini – författare

The book is a collection of essays on various issues in philosophy of science, with special emphasis on the foundations of probability and statistics, and quantum mechanics. The main topics, addressed by some of the most outstanding researchers in the field, are subjective probability, Bayesian statistics, probability kinematics, causal decision making, probability and realism in quantum mechanics.

An inference may be defined as a passage of thought according to some method. In the theory of knowledge it is customary to distinguish deductive and non-deductive inferences. Deductive inferences are truth preserving, that is, the truth of the premises is preserved in the con­ clusion. As a result, the conclusion of a deductive inference is already ''contained'' in the premises, although we may not know this fact until the inference is performed. Standard examples of deductive inferences are taken from logic and mathematics. Non-deductive inferences need not preserve truth, that is, ''thought may pass'' from true premises to false conclusions. Such inferences can be expansive, or, ampliative in the sense that the performances of such inferences actually increases our putative knowledge. Standard non-deductive inferences do not really exist, but one may think of elementary inductive inferences in which conclusions regarding the future are drawn from knowledge of the past. Since the body of scientific knowledge is increasing, it is obvious that the method of science must allow non-deductive as well as deductive inferences. Indeed, the explosive growth of science in recent times points to a prominent role for the former. Philosophers of science have long tried to isolate and study the non-deductive inferences in science. The inevitability of such inferences one the one hand, juxtaposed with the poverty of all efforts to identify them, constitutes one of the major cognitive embarrassments of our time.

The present volume contains the proceedings of the conference on "Prob- ability, dynamics and causality" that took place in Luino on June 15-17, 1995. This was the third conference on topics related to the foundations of probability and statistics held in Luino, following that on "Probability, statistics and inductive logic" (1981) and that on "Statistics in science" (1988). 1 Like the previous ones, the conference brought together people working on the foundations of probability and statistics, as well as their applica- tion to science. The meeting opened with a session on "Exchangeability" including the papers by Persi Diaconis and Susan Holmes, Eugenio Regaz- zini and Attilio Wedlin, followed by one on "Sufficiency, frequentism and analogy", including the papers by Colin Howson, Alan Hajek and Roberto Festa. The second day of the meeting was in honour of Dick Jeffrey, on the occasion of his forthcoming 70th birthday (August 5, 1996). Dick also took part in the previous meetings and, to use a term dear to him, we consider him the guru of the Luino conferences.The papers by Maria Car- la Ga1avotti, Sandy Zabell, Brian Skyrms, Cristina Bicchieri and Richard Jeffrey himself all belong to this section of the conference. The third day included two sessions, devoted to "Probability and quantum mechanics" and "Probability in physical science". Abner Shimony, Giancarlo Ghirar- di, Francesco De Martini, Nino Zanghi, Domenico Costantini and Ubaldo Garibaldi gave talks in these sessions.

An inference may be defined as a passage of thought according to some method. In the theory of knowledge it is customary to distinguish deductive and non-deductive inferences. Deductive inferences are truth preserving, that is, the truth of the premises is preserved in the con­ clusion. As a result, the conclusion of a deductive inference is already 'contained' in the premises, although we may not know this fact until the inference is performed. Standard examples of deductive inferences are taken from logic and mathematics. Non-deductive inferences need not preserve truth, that is, 'thought may pass' from true premises to false conclusions. Such inferences can be expansive, or, ampliative in the sense that the performances of such inferences actually increases our putative knowledge. Standard non-deductive inferences do not really exist, but one may think of elementary inductive inferences in which conclusions regarding the future are drawn from knowledge of the past. Since the body of scientific knowledge is increasing, it is obvious that the method of science must allow non-deductive as well as deductive inferences. Indeed, the explosive growth of science in recent times points to a prominent role for the former. Philosophers of science have long tried to isolate and study the non-deductive inferences in science. The inevitability of such inferences one the one hand, juxtaposed with the poverty of all efforts to identify them, constitutes one of the major cognitive embarrassments of our time.