Daniel Cohnitz - Böcker

Nelson Goodman's distinctive contributions to such diverse areas of philosophy as epistemology, metaphysics, semiotics, logic, philosophy of language, science, and art, and his engagement with the work of Rudolf Carnap and other prominent figures in the analytic tradition, places him at the forefront of the history and development of Anglo-American philosophy in the twentieth century. Although recently the significance of Goodman's work has not been sufficiently appreciated, Daniel Cohnitz and Marcus Rossberg show that much of it is of relevance for contemporary philosophy. This book, the first comprehensive introduction to Goodman's philosophy, examines and assesses his contribution. The book begins with Goodman's New Riddle of Induction, the so-called "Grue"-paradox, which exemplifies his way of dealing with philosophical problems, and thus provides an introduction to Goodman's thought. It then covers his central work, The Structure of Appearance, as well as his philosophy of art, philosophy of language, his conventionalism, constructionalism and relativism. The technical apparatus that is required to understand Goodman's work, in particular his mereology and theory of symbols, is introduced in an accessible manner in the course of the book. The final chapter locates Goodman's position in contemporary debates and discusses recent criticisms.

Metasemantics studies the foundations of meaning, asking what makes it the case that certain words have the meanings that they do. But what makes metasemantic theories true? This question has been all but ignored in philosophy of language. In this book, Cohnitz and Haukioja address this issue and argue that just as in metasemantics, both internalist and externalist answers are available for this foundational question.The authors introduce and defend meta-internalism, arguing that the foundations of reference and meaning are anchored in the individual dispositions and psychological states of language users, offering an alternative to meta-externalist views that would appeal to broader community-based or otherwise external factors. Meta-internalism is, moreover, compatible with semantic externalism as usually understood, and provides an explanation of why externalism is true. Through a critical examination of prominent theories and thought experiments, the book explores fundamental issues like reference failure, conceptual engineering, and the metaphysical implications of reference, as well as the methodology of theories of reference.With its focus on the foundations of metasemantics, the book provides a fresh and empirically informed perspective on one of the core questions in the philosophy of language. Foundations for Metasemantics is essential reading for philosophers, scholars, and students seeking to understand the underlying principles that support our theories of meaning and reference.

Philosophy of logic is a fundamental part of philosophical study, and one which is increasingly recognized as being immensely important in relation to many issues in metaphysics, metametaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language. This textbook provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to topics including the objectivity of logical inference rules and its relevance in discussions of epistemological relativism, the revived interest in logical pluralism, the question of logic's metaphysical neutrality, and the demarcation between logic and mathematics. Chapters in the book cover the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of logic, and allow students to understand the philosophical relevance of these debates without having to contend with complex technical arguments. This will be a major new resource for students working on logic, as well as for readers seeking a better understanding of philosophy of logic in its wider context.

Philosophy of logic is a fundamental part of philosophical study, and one which is increasingly recognized as being immensely important in relation to many issues in metaphysics, metametaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language. This textbook provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to topics including the objectivity of logical inference rules and its relevance in discussions of epistemological relativism, the revived interest in logical pluralism, the question of logic's metaphysical neutrality, and the demarcation between logic and mathematics. Chapters in the book cover the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of logic, and allow students to understand the philosophical relevance of these debates without having to contend with complex technical arguments. This will be a major new resource for students working on logic, as well as for readers seeking a better understanding of philosophy of logic in its wider context.

Nelson Goodman's acceptance and critique of certain methods and tenets of positivism, his defence of nominalism and phenomenalism, his formulation of a new riddle of induction, his work on notational systems, and his analysis of the arts place him at the forefront of the history and development of American philosophy in the twentieth-century. However, outside of America, Goodman has been a rather neglected figure. In this first book-length introduction to his work Cohnitz and Rossberg assess Goodman's lasting contribution to philosophy and show that although some of his views may be now considered unfashionable or unorthodox, there is much in Goodman's work that is of significance today. The book begins with the "grue"-paradox, which exemplifies Goodman's way of dealing with philosophical problems. After this, the unifying features of Goodman's philosophy are presented - his constructivism, conventionalism and relativism - followed by an discussion of his central work, The Structure of Appearance and its significance in the analytic tradition. The following chapters present the technical apparatus that underlies his philosophy, his mereology and semiotics, which provides the background for discussion of Goodman's aesthetics. The final chapter examines in greater depth the presuppositions underlying his philosophy.