David C. Barker – författare

The deep divides that define politics in the United States are not restricted to policy or even cultural differences anymore. Americans no longer agree on basic questions of fact. Is climate change real? Does racism still determine who gets ahead? Is sexual orientation innate? Do immigration and free trade help or hurt the economy? Does gun control reduce violence? Are false convictions common?Employing several years of original survey data and experiments, Marietta and Barker reach a number of enlightening and provocative conclusions: dueling fact perceptions are not so much a product of hyper-partisanship or media propaganda as they are of simple value differences and deepening distrust of authorities. These duels foster social contempt, even in the workplace, and they warp the electorate. The educated -- on both the right and the left -- carry the biggest guns and are the quickest to draw. And finally, fact-checking and other proposed remedies don't seem to holster too many weapons; they can even add bullets to the chamber. Marietta and Barker's pessimistic conclusions will challenge idealistic reformers.

The deep divides that define politics in the United States are not restricted to policy or even cultural differences anymore. Americans no longer agree on basic questions of fact. Is climate change real? Does racism still determine who gets ahead? Is sexual orientation innate? Do immigration and free trade help or hurt the economy? Does gun control reduce violence? Are false convictions common?Employing several years of original survey data and experiments, Marietta and Barker reach a number of enlightening and provocative conclusions: dueling fact perceptions are not so much a product of hyper-partisanship or media propaganda as they are of simple value differences and deepening distrust of authorities. These duels foster social contempt, even in the workplace, and they warp the electorate. The educated -- on both the right and the left -- carry the biggest guns and are the quickest to draw. And finally, fact-checking and other proposed remedies don''t seem to holster too many weapons; they can even add bullets to the chamber. Marietta and Barker''s pessimistic conclusions will challenge idealistic reformers.

The deep divides that define politics in the United States are not restricted to policy or even cultural differences anymore. Americans no longer agree on basic questions of fact. Is climate change real? Does racism still determine who gets ahead? Is sexual orientation innate? Do immigration and free trade help or hurt the economy? Does gun control reduce violence? Are false convictions common?Employing several years of original survey data and experiments, Marietta and Barker reach a number of enlightening and provocative conclusions: dueling fact perceptions are not so much a product of hyper-partisanship or media propaganda as they are of simple value differences and deepening distrust of authorities. These duels foster social contempt, even in the workplace, and they warp the electorate. The educated -- on both the right and the left -- carry the biggest guns and are the quickest to draw. And finally, fact-checking and other proposed remedies don''t seem to holster too many weapons; they can even add bullets to the chamber. Marietta and Barker''s pessimistic conclusions will challenge idealistic reformers.

In American politics, the truth is rapidly losing relevance. The public square is teeming with misinformation, conspiracy theories, cynicism, and hubris. Why has this happened? What does it mean? What can we do about it? In this volume, leading scholars offer multiple perspectives on these questions, and many more, to provide the first comprehensive empirical examination of the "politics of truth" -- its context, causes, and potential correctives. With experts in social science weighing in, this volume examines different drivers such as the dynamics of politically motivated fact perceptions.Combining insights from the fields of political science, political theory, communication, and psychology and offering substantial new arguments and evidence, these chapters draw compelling -- if sometimes competing -- conclusions regarding this rising democratic threat.

In American politics, the truth is rapidly losing relevance. The public square is teeming with misinformation, conspiracy theories, cynicism, and hubris. Why has this happened? What does it mean? What can we do about it? In this volume, leading scholars offer multiple perspectives on these questions, and many more, to provide the first comprehensive empirical examination of the "politics of truth" -- its context, causes, and potential correctives. With experts in social science weighing in, this volume examines different drivers such as the dynamics of politically motivated fact perceptions.Combining insights from the fields of political science, political theory, communication, and psychology and offering substantial new arguments and evidence, these chapters draw compelling -- if sometimes competing -- conclusions regarding this rising democratic threat.

A deep dive into the intellectual rifts between Democrats and Republicans, how they happened, how they're damaging democracy, and how to reverse those trends.Deriding book-smarts is an American pastime, but the spirit and significance of that scorn have been completely transformed. Anti-intellectualism has come to unite the Republican Party because intellectualism has come to define the Democratic party. Critically, given the class standing and cultural clout that intellectuals now tend to enjoy, the Right's contempt is more aggrieved than it is mocking. In Head Cases, David C. Barker and Ron Elving examine the politics of intellect and indignation in the United States. Through original survey data, randomized experiments, and deep historical dives, they explain how Republicans came to loathe the intellectual establishment, how Democrats came to inhabit the intellectual establishment, and how this deepening divide over diplomas and deference is pushing American democracy to the brink. Specifically, the authors investigate the impacts of Republican rage-casting, religious resentments and meritocratic romanticism, coupled with Democratic smirk-casting, secular superciliousness and meritocratic cynicism. Unsparing in their assessment of responsibility for this rift, Barker and Elving challenge their own community to close it. By diversifying its ranks in terms of social class and religious perspectives--and thus by ideological viewpoints--the intellectual establishment can gradually chart a path toward renewing public trust, restoring the policy relevance of verified facts, and revitalizing democratic health.

A deep dive into the intellectual rifts between Democrats and Republicans, how they happened, how they're damaging democracy, and how to reverse those trends.Deriding book-smarts is an American pastime, but the spirit and significance of that scorn have been completely transformed. Anti-intellectualism has come to unite the Republican Party because intellectualism has come to define the Democratic party. Critically, given the class standing and cultural clout that intellectuals now tend to enjoy, the Right's contempt is more aggrieved than it is mocking. In Head Cases, David C. Barker and Ron Elving examine the politics of intellect and indignation in the United States. Through original survey data, randomized experiments, and deep historical dives, they explain how Republicans came to loathe the intellectual establishment, how Democrats came to inhabit the intellectual establishment, and how this deepening divide over diplomas and deference is pushing American democracy to the brink. Specifically, the authors investigate the impacts of Republican rage-casting, religious resentments and meritocratic romanticism, coupled with Democratic smirk-casting, secular superciliousness and meritocratic cynicism. Unsparing in their assessment of responsibility for this rift, Barker and Elving challenge their own community to close it. By diversifying its ranks in terms of social class and religious perspectives--and thus by ideological viewpoints--the intellectual establishment can gradually chart a path toward renewing public trust, restoring the policy relevance of verified facts, and revitalizing democratic health.

Compromise is critical to democratic policymaking, but it can be hard to find on Capitol Hill. In this era of routine legislative gridlock, however, some lawmakers do still cross the aisle. In Dealmakers, David C. Barker, Andrew M.O. Ballard, and Christopher Jan Carman examine why they do-and why they tend to be Democrats. The answer, the authors contend, comes down to voter differences in personality and values. Specifically, they argue that empathetic traits and values drive Democrats to accept compromise, whereas competitive traits and values drive Republicans to reject it. Those differences filter up through the ballot box, the data suggest, guiding behavior in the halls of Congress. Drawing on evidence from opinion surveys, randomized experiments, Twitter/X, and legislative records, Dealmakers is the first analytical deep dive into the psychological factors that structure political dealmaking and its absence.

Compromise is critical to democratic policymaking, but it can be hard to find on Capitol Hill. In this era of routine legislative gridlock, however, some lawmakers do still cross the aisle. In Dealmakers, David C. Barker, Andrew M.O. Ballard, and Christopher Jan Carman examine why they do—and why they tend to be Democrats. The answer, the authors contend, comes down to voter differences in personality and values. Specifically, they argue that empathetic traits and values drive Democrats to accept compromise, whereas competitive traits and values drive Republicans to reject it. Those differences filter up through the ballot box, the data suggest, guiding behavior in the halls of Congress. Drawing on evidence from opinion surveys, randomized experiments, Twitter/X, and legislative records, Dealmakers is the first analytical deep dive into the psychological factors that structure political dealmaking and its absence.

Compromise is critical to democratic policymaking, but it can be hard to find on Capitol Hill. In this era of routine legislative gridlock, however, some lawmakers do still cross the aisle. In Dealmakers, David C. Barker, Andrew M.O. Ballard, and Christopher Jan Carman examine why they do-and why they tend to be Democrats. The answer, the authors contend, comes down to voter differences in personality and values. Specifically, they argue that empathetic traits and values drive Democrats to accept compromise, whereas competitive traits and values drive Republicans to reject it. Those differences filter up through the ballot box, the data suggest, guiding behavior in the halls of Congress. Drawing on evidence from opinion surveys, randomized experiments, Twitter/X, and legislative records, Dealmakers is the first analytical deep dive into the psychological factors that structure political dealmaking and its absence.

What is a political representative's job, really? Are they supposed to simply figure out what "the people" want and deliver it, or are they charged to do what they think is best for their constituents -- even if that means sometimes ignoring those constituents' wishes? In Representing Red and Blue, David Barker and Christopher Carman explore what people think about this question, why their answers vary, and what difference it makes. They observe that the citizens of "Red America" -- religious and cultural traditionalists, including most Republicans -- often prefer lawmakers who challenge public opinion, whereas "Blue Americans," or culturally progressive Democrats, typically prefer lawmakers who follow it. What is more, these preferences filter up: lawmakers who represent progressive locales tend to pursue the policies their constituents want, whereas representatives of more traditionalistic places often behave quite differently, leaning decidedly to the Right of even most Red American voters. The fundamental reason underlying these patterns, Barker and Carman argue, is that on average, traditionalists and progressives simply do not hold the values of liberal popular democracy in equally high esteem. What all of this means is that the citizens of Red America live in a different kind of democracy than that of the citizens of Blue America -- one where they have less political say over what their government does, but one that seems to suit their tastes all the same.

What is a political representative''s job, really? Are they supposed to simply figure out what "the people" want and deliver it, or are they charged to do what they think is best for their constituents -- even if that means sometimes ignoring those constituents'' wishes? In IRepresenting Red and Blue/I, David Barker and Christopher Carman explore what people think about this question, why their answers vary, and what difference it makes. They observe that the citizens of "Red America" -- religious and cultural traditionalists, including most Republicans -- often prefer lawmakers who challenge public opinion, whereas "Blue Americans," or culturally progressive Democrats, typically prefer lawmakers who follow it. What is more, these preferences filter up: lawmakers who represent progressive locales tend to pursue the policies their constituents want, whereas representatives of more traditionalistic places often behave quite differently, leaning decidedly to the Right of even most Red American voters. The fundamental reason underlying these patterns, Barker and Carman argue, is that on average, traditionalists and progressives simply do not hold the values of liberal popular democracy in equally high esteem. What all of this means is that the citizens of Red America live in a different kind of democracy than that of the citizens of Blue America -- one where they have less political say over what their government does, but one that seems to suit their tastes all the same.

What is a political representative''s job, really? Are they supposed to simply figure out what "the people" want and deliver it, or are they charged to do what they think is best for their constituents -- even if that means sometimes ignoring those constituents'' wishes? In IRepresenting Red and Blue/I, David Barker and Christopher Carman explore what people think about this question, why their answers vary, and what difference it makes. They observe that the citizens of "Red America" -- religious and cultural traditionalists, including most Republicans -- often prefer lawmakers who challenge public opinion, whereas "Blue Americans," or culturally progressive Democrats, typically prefer lawmakers who follow it. What is more, these preferences filter up: lawmakers who represent progressive locales tend to pursue the policies their constituents want, whereas representatives of more traditionalistic places often behave quite differently, leaning decidedly to the Right of even most Red American voters. The fundamental reason underlying these patterns, Barker and Carman argue, is that on average, traditionalists and progressives simply do not hold the values of liberal popular democracy in equally high esteem. What all of this means is that the citizens of Red America live in a different kind of democracy than that of the citizens of Blue America -- one where they have less political say over what their government does, but one that seems to suit their tastes all the same.